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3. We are also of opinion that the argument of res judicata must equally fail. The parties then occupied positions which were the reverse of their present contentions. The rule of res judicata cannot apply in such a case. It is, no doubt, true that it is immaterial in determining the applicability of the rule that the petitioner in the one case was a respondent in the other, provided their respective contentions are the same. But the basis of the principle is that the parties had the opportunity of fighting out their present quarrel on a previous occasion. The doctrine is not based on the intrinsic effect to be attached to an adjudication by the Court alone but on a rule of public policy that a question which has been once fought out between the parties should not be re-agitated between them again. It necessarily involves that the case of both the parties was the same on both the occasions. A party against whom a judgment has been rendered is not permitted to show that it is erroneous whether as plaintiff or defendant in a subsequent proceeding, but not a party in whose favor it was rendered; the latter may be prevented from doing so, where to permit it will contravene the principle of not allowing a person to derive an equitable benefit by adopting inconsistent positions; but the principle of res judicata has no application to such a case, except where the subject matter of the two proceedings and not merely a point at issue is the same. It would be extraordinary to hold that a party is concluded by a decision against his adversary. An illustration of the unreasonableness of such a view is afforded by the manner in which the finding in E. P No. 67 was arrived at with regard to item No. 1 in this case. The Commissioner whose report was adopted by the Subordinate Judge based his conclusion with regard to the character of the item, on the ground that the 2nd defendant, one of the present appellants, did not do what it was essential for his case that he should do, namely, to point out pariah No. 14. Can he be permitted to say that a finding based on his failure to do something should be availed of by himself against his opponent whose interest then was to disprove his contention? We are of opinion that it would be unreasonable to do so. We disallow this contention also.