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But it is suggested that the words 'committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court, mean that the alleged offence must have been committed by a person who was at the date of the committal of the offence a party to the proceedings in a Court, and must also have been in respect of a docunment produce evidence in such proceeding. If that is the meaning of the section, it seems to me that it can have but little effect, because people who are minded to launch false cases, and to support their cases by forged documents, do not, as a rule, launch the case first and then forge the documents on which they propose to rely. They prepare the ground beforehand. They forge their documents first, and then launch their proceedings based on those documents. So that if the section is only to apply to a person who commits forgery, whilst he is a party to a proceeding, or documents, used in those proceedings, the section will very rarely have any application. That view of the matter has appealed to most of the High Courts in India and there is a long current of authority in which it has been held that if at the time when the Court is asked to take cognizance of a complaint the accused is a party to proceedings in a Court in which the document has been produced or used in evidence, then the bar contained in Section 195(1)(c) applies. That view prevailed in the cases of Emperor v. Bhawani Das (1915) I.L.R. 38 All. 169. Nalini Kanta Laha v. Anukul Chandra Laha (1917) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 1002, Teni Shah v. Balahi Shah (1909) 14 C.W.N. 479 Kanhaiya Lal v. Bhagwan Das (1925) I.L.R. 48 All. 60 and Khairati Ram v. Malawa Ram (1924) I.L.R. 5 Lab. 55 and in a case in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in Sind, Hayat Khan v. Emperor (1932) A.I.R. Sind. 90. I think also that the reasoning adopted in those cases was approved by the Madras High Court in Re Parameshwaran Nambudri (1915) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 677, though that was actually a case under Sub-clause (b)...xxxx...xx. The great majority of offences which fall to be dealt with under Section 476 are committed in relation to proceedings in Court rather than in proceedings in Court. I should think that only rarely would a case arise in which a forged document produced or given in evidence in Court had not been forged in relation to the Court proceedings.

After making the above observations, the learned Chief Justice proceeds to consider the contention which was raised in that case for the narrow construction and proceeds to refute the same in the following words at page 406:

But it is suggested that the words 'committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court' mean that the alleged offence must have been committed by a person who was at the date of the committal of the offence a party to proceedings in a Court, and must also have been in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. If that is the meaning of the section, it seems to me that it can have but little effect, because people who are minded to launch false cases, and to support their cases by forged documents, do not, as a rule, launch the case first, and then forge the documents on which they propose to rely. They prepare the ground beforehand They forge their documents first, and then launch their proceedings based on those documents So that if the section is only to apply to a person who commits forgery, whilst he is a party to a proceeding, of documents used in those proceedings, the section will very rarely have any application That view of the matter has appealed to most of the High Courts in India, and there is a long current of authority in which it has been held that if at the time when the Court is asked to take cognizance of a complaint the accused is a party to proceedings in a Court in which the document has been produced or used in evidence, then the bar contained in Section 195(1)(c) applies.

The interpretation sought to be put on Section 195(1)(c) on behalf of the prosecu-tion in the present case, does not seem to be to follow inevitably from the working of the section or to be consistent with its apparent purpose. Sub-sections (a) and (b), of Section 195(1) are intended to restrain private individuals from coming forward to demand the punishment of certain offences against the lawful authority of public servants, or the administration of public justice, except under the authority of the public servant or the Court of justice concerned. The Legislature has seem fit, in Sub-clause (c), to extend this prohibition to a certain limited class of offences not exactly ejusdem generis with either of the above. Yet it is clear that when a party to a civil suit forges a document for the purpose of that suit and then produces it in support of his claim, he has committed offences punishable under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and for these offences he cannot be prosecuted without the sanction of the Court. It would be something of an anomaly to maintain this prohibition, and yet to permit a prosecution without any sanction for the graver offences of forgery and of using as genuine of forged document. Moreover, the Legislature doubtless intended to prevent the possibility of any such scandal to the administration of justice as is generally understood to have occurred in the historical case of the prosecution for forgery of the Maharaja Nand Kumar (Nuncomar). It was not considered proper to leave it open to the defendant in a civil suit to carry the question of the genuineness of the plaintiff's document of title before a different tribunal by instituting a prosecution against the plaintiff alleging him to have forged the same or to have made use of it knowing it to be forged. If the Legislature had seem fit to limit the prohibition to the prosecution without sanction of a party to any proceeding pending in any court in respect of a document, etc. there could have been no serious doubt as to the meaning of the words; but the prohibition would have ceased to be effective as the suit was decided. It may well be that this was considered practically inconvenient, in view of the possible filing of an appeal after a prosecution had been instituted. Or it may have been thought advisable, as already suggested, to make the prohibition, as against parties to a proceeding in a Civil Court, co-extensive with the prohibition in respect of the offence of fabricating false evidence already embodied in Section 195(1)(b). At any rate, I am decidedly of opinion that the Legislature employed the words 'on offence committed by a party to any proceeding" with reference not to the date of the commission of the alleged offence, but with reference to the date on which the cognizance of the Criminal Court was invited. The argument that an offence cannot with propriety be said to have been committed by a party to a proceeding on a date anterior to the institution of such proceeding seems to me to lose much of its force when the point is clearly grasped that the expression offence committed by a party' is loosely used for 'offence alleged to have been committed by a party' To my mind the provisions of the sub-section under consideration require to be interpreted as applying to the case of any person who, at the time when a Criminal Court is invited to take " cognizance of the matter, can rightly be described as a party to any proceeding in any court' in which the document in question has been produced or given in evidence, that is to say, who is or has been a party to such proceeding. It does not appear to me that this interpretation does any real violence to the language of the sub-section and I am confident that it is in accordance with the general practice of the courts.

The only case about which I have felt any difficulty is the Bombay case of Noor Mahomad Cassum v. Kaikhosru Maneckjee to which I have already referred. The decision in that case is unsupported by reasoning, and it is impossible to say with certainty what view the learned Judges intended to take of the provisions of Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a whole-1 feel the strongest possible doubts as to whether they would have accepted the general proposition contended for on behalf of the prosecution in the present case. Had they taken this view they might well have informed the Chief Presidency Magistrate that no offence anterior in date to the institution of a certain proceeding could with propriety be said to have been committed by a party to that proceeding. I am inclined to the opinion that they had present to their minds some such analogy as I have myself suggested between the prohibition with regard to the manufacture or use of false evidence in Sub-section (1)(b) and the extension of that prohibition to major offences in Sub-section (1)(c). They were trying to distinguish between offences committed by 'a party to any proceeding' in respect to the said proceeding and any offence which he may have committed in the course of a transaction wholly independent of that proceeding. Personally I doubt if the case was rightly decided, and I am inclined to the opinion suggested by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, that the wording of Section 195(1)(c) was 'wide enough' to cover even the case which was then before the court. If it were attempted to apply any such distinction to the facts of the present case, then the necessity or otherwise for sanction would have to depend on whether or not the prosecution was in a position to prove that Bhawani Das, at the time when he abetted this forgery intended that the document should be produced or given in evidence in the subsequent civil suits.