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1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest ? Yes BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
1. The question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is:-
―Whether ―debt‖, as defined in Section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‗the said Act'), would include a claim to share certificates ?

4. The said application was dismissed by the DRT by its order dated 12.02.2008. All the contentions raised by the petitioner with regard to territorial jurisdiction, cause of action and maintainability were rejected. In this petition, the main ground urged before us is with regard to the scope and meaning of the word ―debt‖ as defined in Section 2(g) of the said Act. In this regard, the DRT held as under:-

―17. The another ground taken by the defendant No.1 is that the amount claimed by the applicant FI does not fall within the definition of ―debt‖ as provided in Section 2(g) of the RDDB 7 FI Act, 1993. In support of his contention, the Ld. Counsel has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank reported at (2000) 4 SCC 406.

22. Coming to the main plea, let us now examine the scheme of the relevant provisions of the said Act. The preamble of the said Act reads as under:-

―An Act to provide for the establishment of Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.‖ It is apparent that the focus of the Act is on ―recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions‖. Section 1(4) clearly limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to debts equal to the sum of Rs 10 lakhs and above or to such other amount not being less than Rs 1 lakh as the Central Government may, by notification, specify. The reference here is clearly to ―amount of debt due‖ as quantified in money terms. Section 2 (g) defines ―debt‖ to mean any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application.

38. The case before the Supreme Court was entirely different to the present case. The focus of the Supreme Court appears to be on the material which is to be looked into to determine the question of jurisdiction of the tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the entire averments made by the plaintiff (claimant) in the plaint (Original Application) should be looked into, to answer the question. The Supreme Court then went on to examine the averments in the plaint and came to the conclusion that the claim of the bank was essentially one for recovery of a debt. The Supreme Court also made the general observation that the expression ―debt‖ must be given the widest amplitude. What the Supreme Court did not say was that the net should be cast so wide that even things which did not fall within the meaning of ―debt‖ as defined in section 2(g) of the said Act should be regarded as ―debt‖. We have, on the basis of the allegations contained in the orginial application, come to the conclusion that a claim seeking delivery of shares, even if the word ―debt‖ is given the widest amplitude, cannot be regarded as a claim for recovery of a ―debt‖ as contemplated in section 2(g) of the said Act. When the Supreme Court used the expression ―widest amplitude‖, in our humble opinion, it meant the widest amplitude possible within the four corners of section 2(g) and other provisions of the said Act. We have analysed the provisions of the said Act and the referential provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to conclude that even the ―widest amplitude‖ meaning of ―debt‖ does not extend to a liability to deliver shares in themselves and as distinct from an action for enforcing a security to recover a money claim.