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Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that there was no new tenancy and surrender of flats Nos. 1 and 2 by the Grindlays and retaining two more flats does not amount to a new tenancy atleast so far as Grindlays is concerned and a reduction of rent also does not create new tenancy inasmuch as the rent that they had to pay was only for two flats in respect of each their tenancy continue.

In Woodfall's Law of Landlord and Tenant, 25th Edn. Page 969, paragraph 2079 reads as under:

Smt. Kamalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1989 SC 467 it is held:

"A mere increase or reduction of rent will not necessarily import a surrender of an existing lease and the grant of a new tenancy. So also if on account of the variation in the quantum of rent any consequential change is made regarding the time and manner of the payment of the rent it cannot have the effect of graver consequences being imported into the change of rent than what the parties had intended and warrant a finding by the Court, that the parties had intend- ed to create a new tenancy in supersession of the earlier one or that by operation of law a new tenancy had come into existence."

It is true that Justice A.N. Sen issued an injunction restraining the defendants from selling or transferring any of the properties. There is some force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the lease in favour of Tatas amounts to transfer but the same cannot be said of Grindlays. Therefore the question of evicting them summarily on this ground does not arise. However, the sub- mission of the learned counsel is that even the lease in favour of the Grindlays expired and by creating a monthly tenancy it may even go beyond three years, and therefore it is not only creating a new lease but also is in violation of Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules. We think we need not deal with this question elaborately in view of the main and important question regarding the applicability of the provi- sions of the Act. However, we have already considered and held that no new tenancy is created so far Grindlays are concerned. Regarding the contention of infraction of Rule 5 it must be noted that the tenancy continued as monthly tenancy and it cannot be said that the Receiver has created tenancy for a period exceeding three years and as observed in Utility's case it is an accretion to the old tenancy and not a new tenancy. Merely because there is change in a tenancy namely that it has become a monthly tenancy, it does not amount to a new tenancy as contended by the appellant so far as Grind- lays are concerned.

The Full Bench however took the view that the Receiver appointed by the Court acts as an Officer of the Court and he cannot create a lease which takes the pending matter beyond the purview of the Court and anyone who gets posses- sion through such an act could only do so subject to the directions and orders of the Court. In our view the princi- ple laid down by the Full Bench does not apply to the facts in the instant case atleast to the case of Grindlays as in our view on new tenancy is created in their favour. Even by the time the Receiver was appointed the Grindlays were the tenants in respect of the four flats and they continued to be so. It is only later after due correspondence that they made a partial surrender and those two flats were let out to Tatas after due negotiations in respect of the rent. Grind- lays' affidavit shows that they have also sent rent by way of Bank pay orders and they have been received by the Land- lord. It is only for the first time on 26.7.88 that the tenant was informed to stop the payment of rent. Further the receiver has not acted in any manner affecting the title. Now coming to the case of Tatas we agree with the High Court that it is a new tenancy. Such a lease comes within the meaning of 'transfer' and in view of the injunction order passed by A.N. Sen, J. creation of such a new tenancy is legally barred. In Kerr on Receivers, 12th Edn. at p. 154 it is observed: