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1. The petitioner, who is the Secretary of the Cochin Branch of the Rashtreeya Sevak Sangh (for short, Sevak Sangh) moves for a mandamus to direct respondents Nos. t and 2, the District Collector, Ernakulam, and the City Commissioner of Police, Ernakulam, respectively, to sanction the use of Mike, Loud Speakers or such other Amplifier appliances by the petitioner and the organization he represents. He also prays for a certiorari quashing Ext. P2 proceedings of the 1st respondent. By Ext. P2 proceedings dated 15-2-1974 the 1st respondent accorded sanction to use the Durbar Hall Ground in this city for" conducting the annual day celebrations of the Sevak Sangh subject to three conditions, the first of which is that "mike, loud speaker etc. should not be used at any time." The petitioner's complaint is against the imposition of this condition, and he seeks the aid of this Court to use mike, loud speakers etc. at the annual day celebrations of the Sevak Sangh to be held on 10-3-1974 (it is averred in the petition and submitted at the bar, that the celebrations are decided to be conducted between 5 p.m. and 8.30 p. m. on that day) at the Durbar Hall Ground. Mr. Ramkumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on Article 19 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution and submits that the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens by these clauses could be curtailed only in the manner provided for by Clauses (2) and (3) of that article. The learned counsel also questions the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent to impose such a condition, and further attacks jurisdiction, if any, on the ground that there are no standards or lines to guide and regulate the exercise of jurisdiction. According to the learned Senior Government Counsel who appears on behalf of the respondents, the petitioner has no fundamental right to use mike and loud speakers in the Durbar Hall Ground which is Government property. He submits that administratively the power to regulate the user of the ground is vested in the 1st respondent, that he can impose any condition in exercise of his power to regulate the user, and can even refuse sanction to hold the celebrations without assigning any reason.

3. Petitioner in paragraph 3 of his petition states as follows:--

"The said ground had been used on permission by the Sangh itself on many prior occasions in 1958, 1960, 1962 and 1971. The said ground is used not only by religious/ cultural organisations, but also by political parties for holding public meetings. On such occasions Microphone and Loud Speakers are freely used even till mid-night. On occasions like the festival in the adjoining Siva temple, Amplifiers are used round the clock for about 7 days. Organisations such as the Chinmaya Mission and the Panthicost Sabha use the ground for religious discourses for continuous days using Loud Speakers usually between 5 and 8 P. M. About 15 days back the Panthicost was conducting one such function continuously for about 20 days."

10. The next question for consideration is whether the ban on the use of 'mike, Loudspeakers' etc. is a reasonable restriction in the light of Clause (2) of Article 19. Ext. P2 proceedings do not state any reason for imposing the condition. The nub of what the 1st respondent states in his counter affidavit is that the ban was aimed at preventing unbeatable nuisance, annoyance and disturbance to the inhabitants of the locality and neighbourhood, to all the people living in the vicinity of the Durbar Hall Ground. It is stated that, therefore, he has formed an opinion "that hereafter except in exceptional circumstances it is not advisable or desirable in the public interest to grant permission to use Durbar Hall Ground to any one which may involve incidentally the use of loud-speakers particularly extending to night hours." It is nowhere stated, and it was not argued before me, that the nuisance, if any, arising out of use of mike and loud-speakers at the meeting would amount to a threat to any one or the other of the matters specified in Article 19 (2), or that the ban is necessary because speeches might amount to contempt of court, defamation or incitement an offence. If it were for any of these reasons, one would not have expected the 1st respondent to allow the meeting itself on these grounds, it may also be noticed that as pointed out in Madhu Limaye's case AIR 1971 SC 2486 already referred to acts which disturb only the serenity of others are not threats to public order. The ban is therefore not a reasonable restriction justifiable under Clause (2) of Article 19.

An executive arbitrariness can prevent one from doing so and permit another to travel merely for pleasure. While in the case of enacted law one knows where he stands, in the case of unchannelled arbitrary discretion, discrimination is writ large on the face of it. Such a discretion patently violates the doctrine of equality, for the difference in the treatment of persons rests solely on the arbitrary selection of the executive." I am afraid that the case in hand is one where (assuming that the 1st respondent has valid power to impose the condition in question) 'discrimination is writ large on the face of it'. The 1st respondent has formed an opinion as is stated in his counter affidavit to permit use of loud-speakers (even extending to night hours) in exceptional circumstances, and to refuse such permission in ordinary circumstances. There are no norms and guidelines to distinguish exceptional circumstances from ordinary ones. It would enable the 1st respondent to discriminate between person and person, and between meetings and meetings without any valid classification. Denial of right to use mikes and loud-speakers on the basis of the opinion formed or decision taken not to grant such permission 'except in exceptional circumstances' is in such circumstances violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Himat Lal's case AIR 1973 SC 87 also highlighted the dangers of conferring arbitrary discretionary powers and struck down Rule 7 of Rules for Processions and Public Meetings framed under the Bombay Police Act, 1951. On the ground that the said rule copiers arbitrary powers on the officer authorised by the Commissioner of Police