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3. Subsequent thereto the plaint was amended as per orders made in LA. 6262 of 1988 dated 5.4.1988 and thus the plaintiff is being represented by the Executive Officer. The defendant also amended the written statement by an order in LA. 4480 of 1987 dated 24.11.1987 wherein it was pleaded that the plaintiff is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and the Secretary alone can represent the plaintiff and the bye-laws provide a Trust Board consisting of minimum two trustees jointly can lay the suit. Inasmuch as there is only one trustee as is not co-opted in spite of the fact the bye laws provided for the same. There is no validly constituted Trust Board and so the person who signed the plaint has no right to represent the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed rejoinder denying the allegations. The specific stand was taken that the governing body of the Council of the plaintiff institution validly passed a resolution authorizing the trustee Chelamalasetti Subrahmanyeswararo to file the suit and the trustee is a proper and authorized person to represent the plaintiff institution and to sign and verify the pleadings.

6. Mr. Subhash Chandra Bose, learned Counsel representing Mr. C. Poornaiah, Counsel for the appellant/defendant had made the following submissions. The learned Counsel had contended that the respondent/plaintiff institution was a Society registered under Societies Registration Act governed by bye-laws and the Articles of Association. The learned Counsel further pointed out that in view of Articles 23, 24 and 26 of Articles of Memorandum of Association, there shall be two trustees and whenever there is a vacancy the vacancy shall be filled up and all the legal proceedings by or against the plaintiff institution shall be conducted in the names of those trustees. The learned Counsel further contended that one of the trustees Mr. M. Laxminarayana was no more and hence the other trustees, a single trustee could not have validly instituted the suit and thus the very signing and verification of the plaint and the presentation of the suit is defective and in this view of the matter the suit is not maintainable. The learned Counsel also submitted that the mere fact that the plaintiff institution was taken over by the Endowments Department at a subsequent point of time and the Executive Officer of the department came on record will not in any way alter the situation or cure the defect. It cannot be said to be a mere irregularity but it is an illegality in the way of institution of the suit. The learned Counsel further while elaborating the submissions had pointed out that the evidence of DW-1 is clear and categorical about the extent of land and this aspect is amply established by Exs. B-1 and B-2 also and hence in this view of the matter it can be definitely said that the plaintiff institution is not entitled to the decree as prayed for. The learned Counsel had taken me through the evidence of PW-1 and also DW-1 and Exs. A-1 to A-17 and Exs. B-l and B-2 also.

7. On the contrary Mr. C.S.K.V. Ramana Murthy, learned Counsel for the respondent/ plaintiff while making methodical and systematic submissions had contended that the plea that suit is not maintainable for want of presentation of plaint by two trustees, is totally an unsustainable plea for the reason that as per the objects of the society, the plaintiff institution is undoubtedly a charitable trust. The learned Counsel further submitted that the regulation of the affairs and management of such institutions even otherwise would have been governed by the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 hereinafter referred Act for the purpose of convenience. The learned Counsel also had submitted that even otherwise in view of the resolution it cannot be said that the trustee was not competent to institute the suit. At any rate, it cannot be an illegality but only an irregularity since such provisions were made in Article 26 of the Articles of Association, which would govern the internal affairs, and the management of the plaintiff institution. The learned Counsel, further submitted that even otherwise after the institution was taken over, the competent person Executive Officer came on record and hence it can be taken that the proceedings are being prosecuted by the competent person. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to Sections 21, 25 and also Section 27 of the Act in this regard. The learned Counsel further submitted that as far as the facts are concerned it is a suit based on promissory note and the defence taken by the appellant/plaintiff is a peculiar defence to the effect that the extent of land is of a lesser extent, having executed a promissory note. The appellant/defendant is bound to pay the amount and in case of taking any defence that there is either partial failure of consideration or he is liable only to some extent the burden is on him and except the evidence of DW-1 there is no other evidence and in view of the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, automatically the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for. Hence in any view of the matter it cannot be said that the passing of consideration under Ex. A-4 was not proved and hence the findings recorded by the Trial Court cannot be disturbed in any way.

10. As can be seen from the material available on record the ex-trustee of the plaintiff institution was examined as PW-1 and Ex. A-1 the resolution and Exs. A-2 and A-3 the letters written by the defendant to the plaintiff and Ex. A-4 the suit pronote executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff and Exs. A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8 and A-9 the letters and Exs. A-10 and A-11, the telegrams and Ex. A-12 the office copy of the letter by the plaintiff to the defendant and Ex. A-13 the office copy of the suit notice and Ex. A-14 the postal acknowledgement and Ex. A-15 the inland letter by the defendant to the plaintiff s Advocate and Ex. A-16 the Articles of Memorandum of Association of the plaintiff institution and Ex. A-17 the resolution book at page No. 21 had been marked. The plaintiff institution was originally a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and as per the objects it cannot be in dispute that it is a charitable trust. The evidence available on record shows that this institution was taken over by the Endowments Department and no doubt the same was questioned by way of writ petition wherein the other parties were unsuccessful. It is also on record that subsequent thereto the Executive Officer was brought on record and the Executive Officer the competent person is continuing the litigation and the objection raised by the appellant/defendant relating to the maintainability of the suit is that the suit should have been presented by two trustees at least as per Article 26 only one trustee had signed and verified the pleading and hence there was no valid presentation of the plaint and in that view of the matter the very presentation of the plaint being defective, the suit should have been dismissed on that ground. It is no doubt true that Article 26 specifies so and it is also on record that the other trustee M. Laxminarayana died and there was vacancy. A finding was recorded by the Trial Court under what circumstances during that period the vacancy could not be filled up. In my considered opinion, it is not necessary to dwell into the said point any further for the reason that if the objects of the society are taken into consideration they are charitable objects and there cannot be any dispute that the provisions of the Act at the relevant point of time, Act 17 of 1966, were applicable but, however, the elected trustees were managing the affairs and these Articles of Memorandum of Association of the said society were for the purpose of regulating the internal affairs of the society. In the peculiar circumstances inasmuch as only one trustee was available at the relevant point of time, the said trustee had presented the plaint after signing and verifying the pleading. Such contravention or violation of the conditions specified in Article 26 at the best can be said to be an irregularity and at any rate it cannot be said to be an illegality or of such a mandatory nature which will go to the very root of the matter so as to touch the maintainability of the suit. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the initial defect if any had been cured by virtue of the Executive Officer being brought on record at a subsequent point of time during the pendency of the litigation. Section 21 of the Act which had been no doubt subsequently repealed by Act 30 of 1987, had dealt with the powers of the trustee. Likewise Sections 25 and 27 of the Act read: