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Bennet, J.

12. Lakhan applies in revision against his conviction by a Magistrate of Banda under Section 177, I.P.C., and sentence of Rs. 200 fine, his revision having been dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Two points have been argued: (1) that as Section 45, Criminal P.C., does not apply, the case does not come under Section 177, I.P.C.; (2) that there was no proper complaint as required by Section 195(1) (a), Criminal P.C. The first point has been already before this Court on an application to quash the proceedings, and the late Kendall, J. held that the facts alleged by the prosecution would amount to an offence under Section 177, I.P.C. Those facts, which have now been held proved, are that Lakhan was a mukhia or village headman and in that capacity he attested a panchayatnama stating in writing:

Q. 3.-In my opinion on the facts found in this case the accused cannot be held guilty of an offence under Section 177, I.P.C.

34. One of the most important points which the prosecution has to establish in a case under Section 177,I.P.C., is that the accused was "legally bound to furnish information on a particular subject to a public servant." In my opinion the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused was "legally bound" to supply information on the subject to the police. Section 43,I.P.C., says that a person is said to be "legally bound to do whatever it is illegal in him to omit." The same section says that the word "illegal" is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action. Apart from the provisions of Section 45, Criminal P.C., there is no legal liability on the part of an accused person to give the information which he possessed to the police. In Queen-Empress v. Appayya (1891) 14 Mad 484, it was held that unless a person is "legally bound" to give information, his prosecution under Section 177,I.P.C., cannot succeed. My learned brother, Bonnet, J. in his order in this case refers to the view of the Madras High Court taken in High Court proceedings 21st December 1871 6 MHC App 48 where it was held that in this section the words "legally bound" do not exclusively refer to cases where a person is required to give information by some legislative enactment but also include cases where the accused is bound to give information to his superior in pursuance of a departmental order. I may, however, point out that the view expressed in the above mentioned case, and also in Virasaml Mudali v. The Queen (1882) 4 Mad 144, was expressly dissented from in Queen-Empress v. Appayya (1891) 14 Mad 484. The view taken in, Hari Singh v. Queen-Empress (1894) PR Cr Judgment No. 25 by Plowden, J. is in favour of the applicant.

35. I am, therefore, of opinion that the accused in the case before me was not legally bound to give any information to the Police apart from the duty imposed upon him under the provision of Section 45, Criminal P.C. Merely giving false information to the Police by a person who is not legally bound to give that information, does not make a person liable under the provisions of Section 177, I.P.C. The section has no application to a case in which a false statement has been made to the Police by a person who was under no legal obligation or who was not legally bound to give that information. Such a person may be liable for prosecution under Section 182, I.P.C, which, however, is a different matter. To bring a case under Section 177, I.P.C., it is absolutely necessary to prove that the informant was 'legally bound' to give the information, which is proved to be false, to the Police. Now we find that Section 45, Criminal P.C., imposes a duty on mukhias (village headmen) and other persons to give information on certain subjects to the Police. In the case before us, we are concerned only with Clause (d) of Section 45, Criminal P.C. Under the provisions of that section, a Mukhia is 'legally bound' to give information to the Police which he may possess respecting the following points: (1) The occurrence in or near such village of any sudden or unnatural death; (2) any death under suspicious circumstances; (3) the discovery in or near such village of any corpse or part of a corpse, in circumstances which lead to a reasonable suspicion that such a death has occurred; (4) the disappearance from such village of any person in circumstances which lead to a reasonable suspicion that a non-bailable offence has been committed in respect of such person.

36. In the case before us admittedly no death has taken place and there is no evidence that any non-bailable offence has been committed about which the Mukhia had any information which it was his duty to report to the Police. This being so, it cannot be said that the accused has failed to give information about the occurrence of any death, etc. Therefore, his case cannot come under Section 177, I.P.C. No such occurrence, as specified in Section 45(d), Criminal P.C., had taken place and therefore it cannot be said that the accused in his capacity as a Mukhia was legally bound to furnish information to the Police and that in view of the duty imposed upon him under Section 45, he gave false information to the Police. In my opinion, the words "any subject" occurring in Section 177, I.P.C. have reference to the matters enumerated in Section 45, Criminal P.C., or to matters about which a person is "legally bound" to give information under some other law, and to no other subjects. I, therefore, hold that as none of the events enumerated in Clause (d) of Section 45, Criminal P.C., had happened, it cannot be said that the accused was legally bound to give any information to the Police and that (the false information which he gave to the (Police does not bring his case within the (four corners of Section 177, I.P.C. Let the record be returned to the Bench concerned.