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1. This Civil Revision Petition has come up before us on a reference being made by a learned single Judge, in view of the doubt he felt about the ambit of the decision rendered by another learned single Judge reported in Varghese v. Devi Academy, (1999) 1 Ker LT 440 : (AIR 1999 Ker 185).

2. The plaintiff in a suit filed in the Subordinate Judge's Court of Cochin is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. She originally filed the suit in the Munsiff's Court, Cochin for recovery of possession of a building from the defendants on the strength of her title and for consequential reliefs. On objection regarding jurisdiction based on valuation being taken and after an adjudication, the Munsiffs Court returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the "proper Court. Thereafter, the plaintiff amended the valuation and presented the plaint before the Subordinate Judge's Court. In the light of Section 4A of the Kerala Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, the plaintiff paid 1/10th of the amount of fee chargeable as Court-fee under the Kerala Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act. The defendants filed a written statement resisting the suit. Based on the pleadings, the Court ultimately framed issues in the suit on 13-1-1995. In terms of Section 4A of the Kerala Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, the balance 9/10 Court-fee payable on the plaint, as per valuation, had to be paid within 15 days of 13-1-1995, the date on which the issues were framed. It is said that the trial Court- posted the suit on 17-2-1995 for payment of the balance Court-fee. How the Court could do this in the face of the specific provision in Section 4A of the Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act is not clear. For, under that section, the balance Court-fee had to be paid within 15 days of framing of issues and the Court itself had the power to extend time beyond the 15 days only by such a period as not to exceed 30 days from the date of settlement of issues. In other words, the trial Court on the terms of Section 4A of the Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, could not have extended the time for payment of balance Court-fee beyond 30 days of the framing of issues and that too only for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. It is no doubt true that it has been held by this Court that the power available under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure would still be available with the Court to extend the time. But, when the Court, after framing the issues posts the case for payment of Court-fee, it has necessarily to fix a date, which can only be the last date of the 15 days, as contemplated in Section 4A of the Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act and it cannot certainly be beyond 30 days. But probably what the Court here did was not to fix a date for payment, but only to cost the suit to 17-2-95 to verify whether the Court-fee has been paid in time.

5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that in the light of the decision of this Court in Varghese v. Devi Academy, (1999) 1 Ker LJ 440, the Court had inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code to restore a suit dismissed for nonpayment of balance Court-fee and hence the trial Court was in error in refusing to entertain the application filed by the plaintiff. It was not disputed that the plaintiff has also filed an appeal before this Court challenging the rejection of the plaint on the ground that though the relief claimed is properly valued, the plaint was written upon paper insufficiently stamped. The question whether any interference called for in that appeal will be considered by us separately. For the present what we are concerned with is whether the application made under Order IX, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the plaintiff was maintainable in the trial Court and whether the trial Court could restore the suit already rejected for nonpayment of Court-fee on that application.

7. The question then is whether, a plaintiff whose plaint has been rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(c) of the Code, can seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Order IX of the Code. Obviously, rejection of the plaint in terms of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a dismissal of the suit under Order IX of the Code. .

8. Then the question is whether the Court could exercise the so called inherent power available to it when the plaintiff invokes its jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is now well settled that the Court can exercise its inherent power, which is saved by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in situation where there is no specific provision in the Code for grant of relief to a party in appropriate cases. When a rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 (c) of the Code is a decree and the party has a substantive right to appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, in cases where he is able to make out a case, for a review under Order XLVII of the Code, the question of exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, normally does not arise. In a case where there is another remedy provided to the party by the Code, the Court cannot ordinarily resort to its in herent power in substitution of that remedy. A remedy by way of appeal has necessarily to be understood as a substantive remedy available to a party. When an appeal is provided, the party aggrieved gets an opportunity to have his whole case reconsidered by the appellate Court. It is therefore clear that there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its inherent power in such a situation. The Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 has laid down that the inherent power of the Court can be exercised only in the absence of a specific provision in the Code and if a matter is covered by any of the specific provisions of the Code, no question of the Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction would arise. It is therefore clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure when a plaint gets rejected in terms of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. In Varghese v. Devi Academy, (1999) 1 Ker LT 440 : (AIR 1999 Ker 185), the learned single Judge followed a decision of this Court in Gopalakrishna Pillia v. Narayanan, AIR 1959 Ker 406. That decision, in turn, was rendered following a decision of the Travancore High Court in John v. Kuriyan, (1936) 26 Travancore LJ 932. It has to be noted that both these decisions were rendered before the Supreme Court clarified the scope of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the entitlement of the Court to exercise its inherent power in the face of other specific provisions in the Code in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527. This principle is reiterated also in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 and in Ram Chand and sons Sugar Mills v. Kanhayalal, AIR 1966 SC 1899. With respect, it is not possible to accept the principle laid down in the decisions in Gopalakrishnan Pillai v. Narayanan, AIR 1959 Ker 406 and in Varghese v. Devi Academy, (1999) 1 Ker LT 440 in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court. We may notice here that some of the High Courts have taken the view that the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be invoked to restore the suit in a case where a plaint has been rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(b) or (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. With respect, we feel that it is the correct view to take. We are therefore of the view that the decisions in Gopalakrishnan Pillai v. Narayanan, AIR 1959 Ker 406 and in Varghese v. Devi Academy, (1999) 1 Ker LT 440 do not lay down the correct law.