Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

16. Dismissing the appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords speaking through Lord Diplock held:

That where a final decision had been made by a criminal court of competent jurisdiction it was a general rule of public policy that the use of a civil action to initiate a collateral attack on that decision was an abuse of the process of the court; and that such fresh evidence as the plaintiff sought to adduce in his civil action fell far short of satisfying the test to be applied in considering whether an exception to that general rule of public policy should be made, which, in the case of a collateral attack in a court of coordinate jurisdiction, was whether the fresh evidence entirely changed the aspect of the case.

19. But it was held that the civil action was an abuse of the process of the court. Reasoning is to be found in the following passages:

My Lords, collateral attack upon a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction may take a variety of forms. It is not surprising that no reported case is to be found in which the facts present a precise parallel with those of the instant case. But the principle applicable is, in my view, simply and clearly stated in those passages from the judgment of A.L. Smith L.J. in Stephension v. Garnett (1989) 1 Q.B. 677, 680-681 and the speech of Lord Halsbury L.C. in Reichel v. Magrath (1889) 14 App. Cas. 665, 668 which are cited by Goff L.J. in his judgment in the instant case. I need only repeat an extract from the passage which he cites from the judgment of A.L. Smith L.J.:
x x x x x My Lords, this is the first case to be reported in which the final decision against which it is sought to initiate a collateral attack by means of a civil action has been a final decision reached by a court of criminal jurisdiction.
x x x x x This raises a possible complication that the onus of proof of facts that lies upon the prosecution in criminal proceedings is higher than that required of parties to civil proceedings who seek in those proceedings to prove facts on which they rely. Thus a decision in a criminal case upon a particular question in favor of a defendant, whether by way of acquittal or a ruling on a voir dire, is not inconsistent with the fact that the decision would have been against him if all that were required were the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities.

20. Referring to the probative weight of evidence and where the subsequent civil action was predicated on the same evidence as was considered at the criminal trial, Lord Diplock concluded the decision as under:

There remains to be considered the circumstances in which the existence at the commencement of the civil action of 'fresh evidence' obtained since the criminal trial and the probative weight of such evidence justify making an exception to the general rule of public policy that the use of civil actions to initiate collateral attacks on final decisions against the intending plaintiff by criminal courts of competent jurisdiction should be treated as an abuse of the process of the court.