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4. The assessee took the matter in further appeal to the Tribunal. Considering the matter in the light of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers case (supra) and by this Court in Jaipur Charitable Trust Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central, Delhi (1981) 127 ITR 620 the Tribunal felt that though some of the objects contained in clause 33 of the trust deed do fall within the ambit of "charitable purpose" as defined in Section 2(15) but there were other objects, like those enumerated in object clauses No.(x), (xii) (xiv) and (xvii), which could not be said to be charitable; all the objects were independent by themselves and the trustees had the discretion to utilise the funds of the trust for any of the objects, including the non-charitable ones, no fault can be found with the order of the CIT (Appeals). The Tribunal thus upheld the view taken by the lower authorities. On assessee's application, the aforenoted question has been referred.

5. We have heard Mr. B.N. Goswamy, learned counsel for the assessee and Mr. R.D. Jolly, learned senior standing counsel for the Revenue.

6. Invoking the principle of res judicata, it was submitted by Mr.Goswamy that while granting exemption certificate under Section 158 and Section 4(3) (i) of the 1922 Act on 1st April, 1958 with effect from assessment year 1958-59, the department had accepted that objects of the Trust were for charitable purpose, which certificate was in vogue even in the assessment year 1970-71 and subsequent years, and therefore, the Revenue could not be permitted to change its stand with effect from assessment year 1971-72 and subsequent years by re-opening the already concluded assessments, particularly when there was no change in the objects of the trust. In support, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Swami Satsang Vs. CIT, (1992) 193 ITR 321 and of the Madras and Orissa High Courts respectively in M.A. Namazie Endowment Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1988) 174 ITR 58 and Commissioner of Income-tax. Orissa Vs. Belpahar Refractories Ltd., (1981) 128 ITR 610. On merits, it was submitted that in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Case (supra) the assessee was entitled to exemption from tax, because the profits derived by it were utilised for charitable objects for which the trust was formed.

9. In Jaipur Charitable Trust's case (supra), the Court also referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Yogiraj Charity Trust Vs. CIT, New Delhi (1976) 103 ITR 777, wherein it was held that where there are various objects of the trust, which are all independent objects and if one of these objects cannot be described as a charitable purpose, the claim of the entire trust for exemption has to fail.

10. Thus, the basic test to be applied is whether the predominant object of the activity involved in carrying out the object of general public utility is to subserve the charitable purpose or to earn profit. Where the profit making is the predominant object of the activity, the purpose, though an object of general public utility, would cease to be a charitable purpose and on the contrary, if the predominant object is the advancement of an object of general public utility, it is this object and not accomplishment or carrying out which must involve carrying on of any activity for profit. So long as the purpose does not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit, the requirement of the definition of "charitable purpose" would be met and it is immaterial how the money is generated to achieve the predominant object. But at the same time, if any one of the objects, which is capable of being treated as an independent object, cannot be said to a charitable purpose, and the discretion vests in the trustees to use the funds of the trust for any one of the objects, then the trust cannot be held to be a charitable trust. We shall scrutinise the objects of the assessee trust in the light of the aforesaid broad principles and determine the question whether the assessee has been rightly denied exemption under Section 11 of the Act.

(xvii) To arrange for the cheap supply and publication of useful literature and for that purpose to establish printing presses and run newspapers, magazines, periodicals and other educational literature and publish books on different subjects."

13. Having perused the various objects, spelt out in the statement of the case, for which the trust was formed, we are inclined to agree with the Revenue that there is not defined dominant charitable purpose in the Trust deed to which the said objects will serve as ancillary objects and which are meant to feed the dominant purpose i.e. charitable purpose. None of the objects can be described as either primary or a dominant object or a secondary or ancillary one. Each object is independent and distinct. The object to establish a small scale industry in town or village, either on cooperative basis or otherwise, cannot be said to be a charitable purpose which in the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Act. Similar would be the position with regard to the establishment of dairies and milk centers or establishment of health restaurants etc. Clearly some of the objects of the trust are non-charitable. Clause 21 of the trust deed gives an unfettered discretion to the Chairman of the trust to spend the funds of the trust on the purchase of immovable property or any other securities or on any of the objects of the trust, whether they are charitable or non-charitable . As held in Yogiraj Charity Trust (supra) where there are several objects of a trust some of which are charitable and some non-charitable and the trustees in their discretion are to apply the income to any of the objects, the whole trust fails and no part of income is exempt from tax, in the present case, as no part of the income of the trust has been allocated specifically for a charitable purpose, exemption under Section 11 of the Act cannot be granted to the assessee. Moreover, it is also evident from the assessment orders for the relevant assessment years that the total income of the trust comprises of only dividend and interest from the investment in securities and no part of it seems to have been applied on any specific charitable purpose. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribu-