Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

8. Placing strongest possible reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in Hamdard Dawakhana , in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain and in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India , where the relevant observations in Raj Narain (supra) have been quoted with approval, Mr. Ganguly has urged that the "right to know" has been held by the Supreme Court to emanate from the "right to freedom of speech and expression" guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). Mr. Ganguly has also relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in Reliance Petrochemicals v. Indian Express where "right to know" has been traced to the "right to live" under Article 21 of the. Constitution.

9. There is no surer way to miread a judgment than to read the observations made therein-(a) divorced from the context and (b) literally as if they are legislations. In Reliance Petrochemical (supra, at 202-203), there are no doubt observations to the effect that "people at large have a right to know in order to be able to take part in a participatory development in industrial life and democracy", "right to know is a basic right which citizens of a free country aspire in the broden horizon of the right to live in this age on our land under Article 21 of our Constitution", "that right has reached new dimentions and urgency", and "that right puts greater responsibility upon those who take upon the responsibility to inform". But the question of an ordinary citizen's "right to know" or "to acquire information'' was not at all in issue in that case even remotely and what was in issue was the right of the Press to inform the people and whether the restriction, which was put in that case on the respondent Press by the order of injunction by the Supreme Court, was any longer required to be continued. The respondent Press published and was going to publish further a series of Articles alleging serious illegalities and infractions of law in the conduct of the affairs of the Petitioner Company which, according to the Company, would have adversely affected the public issue of debentures by the Company, even though the Supreme Court by its earlier order directed that the issuance of such debentures was to be "proceed with without let or hindrance". The respondent-press applied for vacation or variation of that order of injunction and the same was vacated by the two-Judge Bench as the "subscription to debentures was closed and, indeed, the debentures have been over-subscribed" and the publication of any article by the respondent was no longer likely to affect the petitioner and the order of injunction was not required to be continued on consideration of "balance of convenience".

11. The observations of Mathew, J., in Raj Narain (supra at 884), relied on by Bhagwati, J. in S.P. Gupta (supra), on which also very strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Ganguly, are as hereunder :-

"The right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any rate, have no repurcussion on public security".

The matter in Raj Narain (supra) arose out of an Election Petition where the Election Petitioner summoned the State Government and some of its officers to produce certain documents. Privilege was claimed by the Government against such production under Section 123 of the Evidence Act which was negatived by the High Court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority of four learned Judges of the five-Judge Bench, speaking through Ray, C.J., set aside the judgment of the High Court and remanded the matter to the High Court to consider as to whether the documents summoned required protection from production and to order disclosure if they do not "relate to affairs of State". I may at once say that if the case before me was also such an Election Petition where the Petitioner had summoned for production of the Observer's report, I would have had no hesitation to govern myself accordingly and to direct disclosure thereof if the document could not, under Section 123 or otherwise, claim protection from production. The majority judgment has only ruled this much only without any advertence to the question as to whether the people have any basic right to know and whether any such right flows, follows or emanates from the right to freedom of speech or expression under Article 19(1)(a). But Mathew, J. however, in his separate, though concurring, judgment made the observations extracted hereinabove only to fortify the view that any claim to secrecy must make the Court wary to determine as to whether such protection from production is to be allowed in public interest. These observations, therefore, cannot, in the manner and context in which they have been made be treated as a binding authority for the proposition that the 'right to know' is also a right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

20. Applying these tests, as I must, it may be difficult to treat a bare right to know for the sake knowing, i-e. knowledge for knowledge's sake, to be a fundamental right comprehended in the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) or in the right to life and liberty under Article 21, even though it may not be possible to exercise the latter rights effectively or meaningfully without the former right. It has been brought to my notice by the learned Advocate-General and not disputed by Mr. Ganguly that there is a proposal to include the "right to know or to acquire information" as a right expressly specified in Part III of the Constitution. Obviously, a Court is not be guided in its interpretation of the Constitution or the laws by any proposed legislative measure under contemplation of the Government. But nothing should prevent me from taking note of such a proposed measure and that, when read along with the presumption that a Legislature does not indulge in superfluity, may go to show that those who are sponsoring such an amendment are of the view that the right to freedom of speech and expression under our Constitution may not comprehend a right to know or to acquire information.