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45. In the case of State of Kerala v. Attesee (Agro Industrial Trading Corporation), AIR 1989 SC 222 : 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 733 (supra), which has been relied upon by Sri Ashok Khare, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows :

"To appreciate the contentions urged, it is necessary to make a brief reference to the principles of interpretation of an enactment which, for purposes of convenience, refers to or incorporates a provision of another. These have been discussed in various earlier decisions viz. Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society, (1932) 58 Ind. App. 259 : AIR 1931 PC 149; Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, (1961) 3 SCR 786 : AIR 1962 SC 316; Ram Sarup v. State, (1963) 3 SCR 858 : AIR 1963 SC 553; Ram Kirpal v. State, (1970) 3 SCR 233 : AIR 1970 SC 951; New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd v. Assistant Collector, (1971) 2 SCR 92 : AIR 1971 SC 454; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narasimhan, (1976) 1 SCR 6 : AIR 1975 SC 1835; Bhajiya v. Smt. Gopikabai, (1978) 2 SCR 561 : AIR 1978 SC 793; Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCR 1038 : AIR 1979 SC 798 and Western Coal Fields v. Special Area Development Authority, (1982) 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1982 SC 697. It is unnecessary to make a detailed reference to these decisions. It is sufficient to say that they draw a distinction between referential legislation which merely contains a 'reference or citation of a provision of another statute and a piece of referential legislation which incorporates within itself a provision of any statute. In the former case, the provision of the second statute, along with all its amendments and variations from time to time, should be read into the first statute. In the latter case, the position will be as outlined in Narasimhan (1976) 1 SCR 6 : AIR 1975 SC 1835, where, after referring to Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society, (1931) 58 Ind. App. 259 : AIR 1931 PC 149, this Court summed up the position thus (at P. 1841 of AIR):
"17. A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to an earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation applicable to matters covered by the later legislation. Such a legislation may either he (i) a referential legislation which merely contains a reference to or the citation of the provisions of the earlier statute; or (ii) a legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made are incorporated into the later legislation by reference. It is a referential legislation the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made in the subsequent legislation would be applicable as it stands on the date of application of such earlier legislation to matters referred to in the subsequent legislation. In other words, any amendment made in the earlier legislation after the date of enactment of the subsequent legislation would also be applicable. But, if it is a legislation by incorporation the rule of construction is that repeal of the earlier statute which is incorporation does not affect operation of the subsequent statute in which it has been incorporated. So also any amendment in the statute which has been incorporate that is made after the date of incorporation of such statute does not affect the subsequent statute in which it is incorporated and the provisions of the statute which have been incorporated would remain the same as they were at the time of incorporation and the subsequent amendments are not to be read in the subsequent legislation."
"The law on the subject is well settled. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a latter Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily transposed into it. The incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the same of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later. But this must be distinguished from a referential legislation which merely contains a reference or the citation of the provisions of an earlier statute. In a case where a statute is incorporate, by reference, into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second. The later Act along with the incorporated provisions of the earlier Act constitutes an independent legislation which is not modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act. However, where in a later Act there is a mere reference to an earlier Act, the modification, repeal or amendment of the statute that is referred, well also have an effect on the statute in which it is referred. It is equally we settled that the question whether a former statute is merely referred to or cited in a later statute, or whether it is wholly or partially incorporated therein, is a question of construction."

It further held:

"36. It is also well settled that the question as to whether a particular legislation falls in the category of referential legislation or legislation by incorporation depends upon the language used in the statute in which reference is made to the earlier decision and other relevant circumstances."

68. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that all the three State Acts have a common scheme and pattern. All the three legislations relate to town planning and development, and each one of them specifies the various schemes that may be undertaken. For acquisition of land for the purposes of any of the schemes under the said Acts, the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 has been made applicable with certain modifications as contained in the Schedule to the said Acts which are numerous and substantial. The modifications made are also similar. The Apex Court found no distinction in the three Acts which may have a bearing on the question relating to legislative incorporation of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Acts and was, therefore, of the view that what has been held by it in the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam, (1998) 2 SCC 467 : (1998) 1 UPLBEC 650 (SC), with regard to the U.P. Act holds good for the Punjab Act as well as the Nagpur Act. Consequently, it did not subscribe to the view taken in Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 368, that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have not been incorporated into the Punjab Act and that they have merely been cited or referred to in the Punjab Act.