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minial court can punish only to the extent specified in s. 64(1). Section 37(4), properly read, forbids penalty plus prosecution, but permits forfeiture plus prosecution. The word 'penalty' in its limited sense in s. 37(1) and s.37(4) does not include forfeiture which is a different punitive category. Forfeiture is a penalty, in its generic sense, but not a penalty in the specific signification in s.37(1) and (4). After all, the functionary is exercising quasi-judicial powers and not insisting on maximum exactions. Every consideration which is just and relevant must enter his verdict lest the order itself be vitiated for being unreasonable or perverse exercise of discretion. The fulfilment of the undertaking must be ensured by necessary guarantees so that the dealer may not play a double grime and the purchaser stands betrayed. We are not giving any hidebound prescriptions but stating guidelines for taxing authorities who exercise these quasi-judicial powers. There is a tendency for valiant tax executives clothed with judicial powers to remember their former capacity at the expense of the latter. In a Welfare State and in appreciation of the nature of the judicial process, such an attitude, motivated by various reasons, cannot be commended. The penalty for deviance from these norms is the peril to the order passed. The effect of mala fides on exercise of administrative power is well-established. In strict legality, once the money is forfeited to the, State, there is no obligation to make it over to the purchaser, but in the welfare orientation of our State and certain constitutional emanations we leave unexplored, such an obligation should be voluntarily undertaken. A fairly exhaustive survey of case-law has been made, consuming considerable industry of counsel and presenting a sky-view and groundview of judicial mentation in this branch of sales-tax law, bedrocked on constitutional law. While we are edified by the immense project undertaken, in these crowded days of explosive docket backlog, the fine art of miniaturization, without traumatization, may well be a crea- tive Darwinan mutation in forensic submissions for the survival of the great judicial institution. Moreover, small can be beautiful, both in judgments and arguments. But we must append our appreciation of the thoroughness, thoughtfulness, perspicacity and persuasiveness of Sarvashri Kaji, B. Sen, S. T. Desai and F. S. Nariman (for the inter- vener), the plurality of counsel presenting each a separate facet geared to the same goal of enlightening the Court. For the reasons set out above we allow the appeals, but, in the circumstances, without costs.