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6. The plaintiffs rely upon the principles of suspension of time which has been laid down in some cases. The question of suspension of the period of limitation is one upon which the authorities do not seem to be uniform. In the well-known case of Surno Moyee v. Shoshee Mukhee Burmonia (1868) 12 M.I.A. 244 the Judicial Committee in determining whether the cause of action accrued with reference to Section 32, Act X of 1859, at the end of each Fasli year when the rent became due, or at the date of the decree reversing the auction sale of the putni taluq belonging to the zemindar, decided in favour of the latter date. That therefore was a case in which the question was when did the cause of action arise for the suit, and it was not really a case of suspension of the period of limitation. The case of Hukum Chand Boid v. Pirthi Chand Lal Chaudhury A.I.R 1918 P.C. 151 is also not a case of suspension of the period of limitation. Their Lordships held that the sale had not become final and conclusive; in other words, for the purpose of the question of limitation the sale had not become absolute. On the other hand in the case of Soni Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal (1913) 35 All. 227 where there was a fusion of the interests of the mortgagor and the mortgagee for a certain period, and it was contended that limitation was suspended for that period, their Lordships observed:-" There is nothing in Act XV of 1877 which would justify this Board in holding that, once that period of limitation had begun to run in this case, it could be suspended. Their Lordships consider that if they were to hold that by reason of the fusion of interests between 1883 and 1898 the period of limitation was suspended, they would-this not being a suit to which the proviso to Section 9 of the Act XV of 1887 applies-be deciding contrary to the express enactment of that section that when once time has begun to run no subsequent disability or inability to sue shops it." But in the case of Lakhan Chander Sen v. Madhusudan Sen (1907) 35 Cal. 209 this Court acting upon the principle of the cases of Ranee Surno Moyee v. Shoshee Mukhee Burmonia (1868) 12 M.I.A. 244 and Prannath Roy Chaudhury v. Rookea Begum (1859) 7 M.I.A. 323 held that the plaintiff's right to bring an action was suspended for a certain period. The decision of this Court was approved by the Judicial Committee in the case of Nrityamoni Dasi v. Lakhan Chandra Sen A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 96. In that case two out of three brothers were dispossessed of their shares in certain properties by the third brother. One of the brothers who were dispossessed brought a suit for recovery of possession of his share as against the other two brothers as defendants. One of the defendants supported the plaintiff, and set up his own right to one-third share in the property. It appears that an issue was raised as between the co-defendants as to whether the defendant who supported the plaintiff was entitled to a certain share. The Court actually passed a decree not only in favour of the plaintiff but also declared that the defendant had one-third share. On appeal the decree of the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff was upheld) but was set aside so far as the defendant was concerned. It was in these circumstances that this Court and the Judicial Committee held that, limitation was suspended from the date of the decree of the first Court to the date when that decree was set aside on appeal. The Judicial Committee observed as follows:- " Limitation would not doubt run against them from that time. But it would equally without doubt remain in suspense whilst the plaintiffs were bona fide litigating for their rights in a Court of Justice. They had in the suit of 1896 before Mr. Justice Henderson associated themselves with the plaintiffs in that action and had asked for an adjudication in those proceedings of their rights. A distinct issue was framed in respect of their claim to which no objection scorns to have been made by the appellant. It was an effective decree made by a competent Court and was capable of being enforced until set aside. Admittedly, if the period during which the plaintiffs were litigating for their rights is deducted, their present suit is in time. Their Lordships are of opinion that the plea of limitation was rightly overruled by the High Court." A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Muthu Korarkai Chetty v. Madar Animal (1919) 43 Mad. 185 considered the decisions of the Judicial Committee on the question of suspension of limitation and one of the learned Judges (Seshagiri Ayyar, J.) observed:-" The true rule deducible from these decisions of the Judicial Committee is this: That subject to the exemptions, exclusion, mode of computation, and the excusing of delay, etc., which are provided in the Limitation Act, the language of the third column of the first schedule should be so interpreted as to carry out the true intention of the legislature, that is to say, by dating the cause of action from a date when the remedy is available to the party. This is a rule of construction and not a rule of law. I would answer the reference as above leaving each case to be dealt with in the light of these observations."