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In J.B. Chopra and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , the two Judge Bench of the Apex Court at Para 2 held as hereunder:

In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India 1986 JT (SC) 996 = AIR 1987 SC 386, the Constitution Bench has held that the Act is a law made by Parliament under Clause (1) of Article 323A to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Section 28 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court is relatable to Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A for adjudication of service matters including questions involving the validity or otherwise of such laws on the ground that they abridge the fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, and that the Administrative Tribunal set up under Section 4 of the Act is a substitute of, and not supplemental to, the High Court providing an equally efficacious alternative remedy for adjudication of such disputes. It has further held that the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal under the Act therefore takes away the jurisdiction and power of the High Court to interfere in such matters but it is not violative of the doctrine of judicial review which is a fundamental aspect of the basic structure of our Constitution because Section 28 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution preserves the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution. It accordingly follows that the Administrative Tribunal being a substitute of the High Court had the necessary jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate upon all disputes relating to service matters including the power to deal with all questions pertaining to the constitutional validity or otherwise of such laws as offending Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. That being so, the contention advanced by the petitioners that the Administrative Tribunal had no authority or jurisdiction to strike down the impugned notification dated March 15, 1980 purporting to amend Rule 4 of the Central Hindi Directorate (Class III and Class IV) Posts Recruitment Rules, 1961 reserving 100 per cent vacancies to the post of Superintendent to be filled by the Head Clerks and thereby debarring Stenographers (Sr.) from being considered for promotion to that post, as being wholly mala fide, arbitrary and irrational and thus offending Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, must therefore fail.

16. A Futile attempt was made to convince this Court that the powers of A.P.A.T. are analogous to the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and hence, A.P.A.T. to be taken to be having powers of restoration, de hors the Rules. This contention can not find favour at the hands of this Court and liable to be rejected for the simple reason that the very Constitutional scheme as envisaged by Articles 226, 227 and 323 A of the Constitution of India would disapprove such stand. The basic structure of the Constitution, the power of judicial review of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also would suggestively negative such stand. Similarity of exercise of certain powers in service matters by these Tribunals cannot be equated with the extraordinary jurisdiction in relation to the issuance of prerogative writs etc., conferred on the High Courts by the Constitution of India. Be that as it may, on a careful analysis of the scheme of the Act, the Rules framed thereunder and on the crystalization and assimilation of the whole Constitutional scheme, this Court is of the considered opinion that the powers of the A.P.A.T. in this regard cannot be equated with the powers of the High Courts under the different provisions of the Constitution of India. In Chandra Kumar's case (supra) it was held:

In Kesavancmda Bharati's case, 1973 (4) SCC 425 = AIR 1973 SC 1461, a 13-Judge Constitution Bench, by a majority of 7:6, held that though, by virtue of Article 368, Parliament is empowered to amend the Constitution, that power cannot be exercised so as to damage the basic features of the Constitution or to destroy its basic structure. The identification of the features which constitute the basic structure of our Constitution has been the subject-matter of great debate in Indian Constitutional Law. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that even the judgments for the majority are not unanimously agreed on this aspect. (There were five judgments for the majority, delivered by Sikri, C.J., Shelat and Grover, JJ., Hedge and Mukherjee, JJ., Jaganmohan Reddy, J. and Khanna, J. While Khanna, J. did not attempt to catelogue the basic features, the identification of the basic features by the other Judges are specified in the following paragraphs of the Court's judgments: Sikri, C.J. (Para 292), Shelat and Grover, JJ. (Para 582). Hegde and Mukherjee, JJ. (Paras 632, 661) and Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (paras 1159, 1161). The aspect of judicial review does not find elaborate mention in all the majority judgments. Khanna, J. did, however, squarely address the issue (at Para 1529):

In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Rai Narain , a five-Judge Constitution Bench had to, inter alia, test the Constitutional validity of provisions which ousted the jurisdiction of all Courts including the Supreme Court, in election matters. Consequently, the Court was required to express its opinion on the concept of judicial review. Though all five Judges delivered concurring judgments to strike down the offending provisions, their views on the issue of judicial review are replete with variations, Ray, C.J., was of the view that the concept of judicial review, while a distinctive feature of American Constitutional Law, is not founded on any specific Articles in our Constitution. He observed that judicial review can and has been excluded in several matters; in election matters, judicial review is not a compulsion. He, however, held that our Constitution recognises a division of the three main functions of Government and that judicial power, which is vested in the judiciary cannot be passed to or shared by the Executive or the Legislature, (Paras 32, 43, 46, 52). Khanna J. took the view that it is not necessary, within a democratic set up, that disputes relating to the validity of elections be settled by Courts of Law; he, however, felt that even so the legislature could not be permitted to declare that the validity of a particular election would not be challenged before any forum and would be valid despite the existence of disputes. (Para 207). Mathew, J. held that whereas in the United States of America and in Australia, the judicial powers is vested exclusively in Courts, there is no such exclusive vesting of judicial power in the Supreme Court of India and the Courts subordinate to it. Therefore, the Parliament could, by passing a law within its competence, vest judicial power in any authority for deciding a dispute. (Paras 322 and 323). Beg J. held that the power of Courts to test the legality or ordinary laws and constitutional amendments against the norms laid down in the Constitution flows from the supremacy of the Constitution which is a basic feature of the Constitution. (Para 622). Chandrachud, J. felt that the contention that judicial review is a part of the basic structure and that any attempt to exclude the jurisdiction of Courts in respect of election matters was unconstitutional, was too broadly stated. He pointed out that the Constitution, as originally enacted, expressly excluded judicial review in a large number of important matters. The examples of Articles 136(2) and 226(4) (exclusion of review in laws relating to armed forces), Article 262(2) (exclusion of review in river disputes), Article 103(1) (exclusion of review in disqualification of Members of Parliament), Article 329(a) (exclusion of review in laws relating to delimitation of constituencies in laws relating to delimitation of constituencies and related matters), were cited for support. Based on this analysis. Chandrachud, J. came to the conclusion that since the Constitution, as originally enacted, did not consider that judicial power must intervene in the interests of purity of elections, judicial review cannot be considered to be a part of the basic structure insofar as legislative elections are concerned.