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1. We have heard Shri Mahipal Singh Rana the alleged contemnor, Advocate in defence to the reference of this Criminal Contempt Petition at length. His Counsel Shri R.N. Singh, Senior Advocate had earlier addressed the Court in support of preliminary objections to the interim order dated 28.10.2004, restraining him to enter the Court premises of judgeship at Etah. Shri Vijay Shanker Misra, learned G. A. and Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, learned A.G.A. has made submissions on behalf of State of U.P.

2. Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, the then Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah, made a reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1972 (in short the Act) to this Court through District Judge, Etah on 7.6.2003 recording two separate incidents dated 16.4.2003 in his Court in which the contemnor Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate appeared before him and conducted himself in a manner which falls within the definition of criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act. These references were forwarded by the District Judge, Etah to the Registrar General of this Court vide his letter No. 105/P.A. Ist/2003 dated June 16, 2003 and were received by S.O. Admin. in the office of Registrar General of this Court on 19.6.2003. Under the standing orders of Hon'ble the then Chief Justice, to place such matters first before the Administrative Judge of the concerned judgeship, the matter was placed before the Administrative Judge, Etah on 7.7.2003. His Lordship vide order dated 18.6.2004 perused the records and directed the matter to be placed before Hon'ble Chief Justice. The Registrar General submitted report to Hon'ble Chief Justice on 7.7.2004, who passed an order on 11.7.2004 as follows;

On the basis of aforesaid letters, the Administrative Judge, Etah was of the view that criminal contempt proceedings be initiated against the contemnor Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate.

The question about limitation has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pallav Seth v. Custodian .

We are prima facie of the view that the contemnor Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate, Etah has committed gross contempt of Court and hence we are issuing notice against him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of Court.

5. Shri R.N. Singh, Senior Counsel addressed the Court on preliminary issues of restraining an advocate from practising in the Court on the basis of judgement of Supreme Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Anr. in which the earlier judgement in Re: Vinai Chandra Misra was reviewed. He also placed reliance upon judgement in Advocate General of Madras v. Ammanullakhan, Advocate wherein it was observed while parting with the case, that every lawyer practising in a Court is an officer of the Court and may be to certain extent, subject to supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. In a matter arising out of a reference of a criminal contempt against 13 advocates in the respect of instance in the Judgeship at Allahabad dated 22.9.2004, similar arguments were raised before a Larger Bench of Five Judges, and thus we found it desirable to reserve our orders on the issue. The matter was thereafter listed on 31.3.2005, 28.4.2005, 30.9.2005, and on 21.10.2005, the contemnor made a request to be heard in person. We heard him for two full hours and reserved the judgement.

19. In Supreme Court Bar Association (Supra), the Supreme Court, held that the powers of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of Court though quite wide are not un-limited and cannot be expanded to include the power to determine whether an advocate is also guilty of professional misconduct, in a summary manner, giving a go bye to the procedure prescribed under the Advocates' Act.

20. The Supreme Court, however, in para, 54, 78 and 79 carved out an exception as follows;

54.... In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committing contempt of Court may also be guilty of committing "professional misconduct", depending upon the gravity or nature of his contumacious conduct, but the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct and exercisable by different forums by following separate and distinct procedures. The power to punish an Advocate, by suspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll of the State Bar Council, for proven professional misconduct, vests exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of Court vests exclusively in the Courts. 78. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the high Court, to prevent the contemner Advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practice as an Advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record, this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-on-Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an Advocate in other Courts or Tribunals. 79-80. We are conscious of the fact that the conduct of the contemner in V.C. Misra's case 1995 AIR SCW 3488 was highly contumacious and even atrocious. It was unpardonable. The contemner therein had abused his professional privileges while practising as an Advocate. He was holding a very senior position in the Bar Council of India and was expected to act in a more reasonable way. He did not. These factors appear to have influenced the Bench in that case to itself punish him by suspending his licence to practise also while imposing a suspended sentence of imprisonment for committing contempt of Court but while doing so this Court vested itself with a jurisdiction where none exists. The position would have been different had a reference been made to the Bar council and the Bar Council did not take any action against the concerned Advocate. In that event, as already observed, this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, might have exercised sue moto power and sent for the proceedings from the Bar Council and passed appropriate orders for punishing the contemner Advocate for professional misconduct after putting him on notice as required by the proviso to Section 38 which reads thus:-