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Under a warrant of possession issued under Rule 35 (1) in Form No. 11 of Appendix E, only a person bound by the decree may be removed from the property.
A sub-tenant is bound by the decree for eviction of the tenant if the decree is based upon a ground which determines the sub-tenancy and he may then be removed in execution of the decree under Rule 35 (1). (See Sailendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. Bijan Lal Chakravarty, 49 Cal WN 133) = (AIR 1945 Cal 283). On the other hand, a sub-tenant, who claims a statutory right to occupy the property independently of the tenant under the Rent Control Laws, e.g. under Section 13(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, is not a representative of a judgment-debtor and is not bound by the decree for ejectment and he may not, therefore, be removed in execution of a decree against the tenant, he is, therefore, entitled to resist execution of the warrant and if he is dispossessed he may apply under Rule 100 of Order 21 for restoration of possession. (See S. N. Talapatra v. Bengal Bonded Wirehouse, . But he has no right to apply under Rule 97 of Order 21 for declaration of his right. (See Sukhan Singh v. Baijnath Goenka, (1908) 12 Cal WN 115). Section 11 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1948 or Section 13 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, gives him no right to intervene in the proceedings between the landlord and the tenant: (See Thakurdas Pushparaj v. Dwarka Prasad, (1951) 87 Cal LJ 181 and Bhupesh Chandra Dutta v. Dr. M. N. Bose, . He has no right to apply under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code for an adjudication of his rights and for a quia timet order restraining his removal and his remedy is to institute a separate suit for adjudication of his rights. (See Nityananda Kapuria v. Parbati Nath Dutta, (1954) 58 Cal WN 407 and Khetramohan Manimohan Saha v. Parbaty Nath Dutta, . At the same time this Court has also held that Order 21 provides a complete procedure for the protection of his rights and that ordinarily he should adopt that procedure and not the procedure of a separate suit for such protection and for injunction. (See Narendra Krishna Bose v. Great Eastern Hotel Ltd., , and sec also Rajani Kanta Das v. Daval Chandra Das, .) If the execution of the warrant of possession is resisted and the decree-holder is prepared to say that the resistance is by the judgment-debtor or by some persons bound by the decree or at their instigation, he may apply under Rule 97 complaining of the resistance."
The next question is whether the ex parte decree for ejectment obtained by Raghubansi Private Limited against Land and Bricks Limited is binding upon the plaintiff. As the ground of ejectment was that a valid notice to quit had been served by Raghubansi Private Limited on Land and Bricks Limited and if this notice effectively determined not only the lease but also the sub-lease, the decree for ejectment is binding-upon the plaintiff sub-lessee and can be executed against him though he was not a party to the suit in which the decree was passed, unless he succeeds in showing that the decree was vitiated by fraud or that the lessee Land and Bricks Limited collusively suffered the decree to be passed against it. (See 49 Cal WN 133 (141) = (AIR 1945 Cal 283 (291-292))". It may be noted that an appeal had been p referred to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Court of Appeal and the decision of the Supreme Court is reported in AIR 1984 SC 1889. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal and observed at page 1892- "It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that in all cases where the landlord institutes a suit against the lessee for possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lessee and does not implead the sub-lessee as a party to the suit, the object of the landlord is to eject the sub-lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such an object is quite legitimate. The decree in such a suit would bind the sub-lessee. This may act harshly on the sub-lessee; but this is a position well understood by him when he took the sublease. The law allows this and so the omission cannot be said to be an improper act,"