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20. It is finally submitted that in the present case, the essential ingredients of Sections 417 and 420 IPC are entirely absent. There is no allegation of any false statement, deception or misrepresentation. Each entity possessed a valid Import-Exporter Code issued by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), which has been duly renewed and remains subsisting. Licences granted by the Central Bureau of Narcotics have not been cancelled. There is no allegation of incorrect documentation or false disclosure to any statutory authority and in the absence of any such material, continuation of the criminal proceedings amounts to abuse of process of law. . In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that the impugned FIR NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:2035 18 MCRC-43784-2025 No. 421/2023 dated 16.06.2023 registered at Police Station Murar, Gwalior, be quashed.

21. On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for respondent No. 2, while placing reliance on the Guidelines for Registration of Sales Contracts for import of poppy seeds from China dated 25.10.2021, submitted that Clause II(iv) clearly mandates that each importer having a specific Importer-Exporter Code (IEC) shall submit only one application indicating the total quantity of poppy seeds sought to be registered, and submission of more than one application by an importer with the same IEC would result in rejection of all such applications. It is contended that the petitioner deliberately circumvented the said guideline by routing imports through nine separate entities in order to secure additional quantities of poppy seeds. As borne out from the FIR, the allegation against the present petitioner is that he in connivance with officials of the Central Bureau of Narcotics, Gwalior, officials of Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank, and other co-accused, committed cognizable offences by deceiving government authorities and fraudulently obtained import authorisations in the names of benami entities. Such acts prima facie attract offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 417, and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

32. Equally significant is the fact that the allegations, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie disclose the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 417 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Cheating postulates deception and dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction. The FIR does not allege any false representation, forged document, or misstatement made by the petitioner to the licensing authority. It is an admitted position that each of the entities referred to in the FIR possessed a valid Importer-Exporter Code issued by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade, that sales contracts were registered with the Central Bureau of Narcotics, and import authorisations were granted by the competent authority and continue to subsist. Mere alleged circumvention of executive guidelines, absent of demonstrable deception or inducement, cannot ipso facto give rise to a criminal offence under Sections 417 or 420 IPC. This principle has been reiterated in Vijay Kumar Ghai (supra) and Prof. R.K. Vijayasarthy (supra).

37. This Court also finds the foundational premise of the prosecution that the entities in question are benami merely because they operate from the same address or commercial complex--to be legally untenable and factually unsustainable. The impugned FIR proceeds on the assumption that commercial proximity or operational interdependence ipso facto establishes NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:2035 28 MCRC-43784-2025 benami ownership. Such an assumption runs contrary to settled principles of law governing both criminal liability and benami transactions. It is not in dispute that each of the nine entities referred to in the FIR is a separately constituted proprietorship concern, each holding an independent Importer- Exporter Code issued by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade, maintaining distinct bank accounts, executing separate import contracts, and being recognised as independent importers by statutory authorities including the Central Bureau of Narcotics and Customs authorities. The mere fact that these entities operate from separate shops located within the same commercial complex does not, by any stretch of legal reasoning, establish that they are benami concerns of the petitioner. Significantly, the petitioner has specifically demonstrated by reference to the very data that several other importers, unconnected with the petitioner, share identical registered addresses. Entities listed at Serial Nos. 11-14, 16-17, 21, and 24 in the official list of importers from China are registered at the same address. Likewise, entities at Serial Nos. 15, 17, 30, 33, and 34 operate from another common address, while entities at Serial Nos. 31 and 32, as well as Serial Nos. 35 and 36, are also registered at shared addresses. This factual assertion has not been disputed or controverted by the respondents. If common address were to be treated as conclusive proof of benami ownership, the same logic would have to be uniformly applied to all such entities, which the prosecution conspicuously does not do. Criminal law cannot be set in motion on the basis of conjectures and surmises, as authoritatively held in Rajiv Kapoor (supra). To permit prosecution to proceed on the fragile footing of NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:2035 29 MCRC-43784-2025 shared addresses and commercial proximity would amount to endorsing a standard of liability alien to criminal jurisprudence. Such an approach would not only be legally impermissible but would also have a chilling effect on legitimate business arrangements operating within shared commercial spaces. This Court is therefore of the considered view that the allegation of benami ownership, insofar as it is predicated merely on common address or commercial reliance, is wholly misconceived and does not disclose any cognizable offence. Even assuming the allegations of regulatory or policy violations to be correct, such allegations cannot be artificially elevated or dressed up as offences of cheating or criminal conspiracy merely to confer jurisdiction upon the police. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basir- ul-Huq (supra), a jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by mischaracterising or misdescribing the true nature of the allegations. Where the foundational facts necessary to attract the penal provisions are absent, the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.