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Under clause 4 (2) it was provided that :

"The trustees shall be at liberty to utilise the corpus of the trust property or any part thereof for any one or more of the objects aforesaid and in such proportion as they may in their absolute discretion think fit."

2. It will appear clear that one of the objects of the trust as mentioned in clause 4 (1) (iv) was to provide for welfare of the employees of the trust or any institutions conducted by the trust and obviously that object could not be regarded as an object of any public charitable trust, and under the provisions of clause 4 (2) the trustees could if they thought fit in their absolute discretion spend not merely the entire income but even the entire corpus of the trust over any particular object of the trust.

4. We have already set out above the objects clause, viz., clause 4 (1) of the deed of indenture dated June 12, 1959. It is true that the objects mentioned in sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (v) and (vi) of clause 4 (1) would be objects of a public charitable trust. But even Mr. Patil did not dispute before us that the object mentioned in sub-clause (iv) of clause 4 (1) could not be regarded as an object of a public charitable trust. The other material provision in the deed is to be found in clause 4 (2), which runs as follows :

8. Mr. Patil also contended that after all sub-clause (iv) of clause 4 (1) merely provided that the trustees should out of the income of the trust property provide for welfare of the employees of the trust or any institutions conducted by the trust. That is to say, the clause provided for normal obligation which the trustees would be required to carry out, namely, for making a provision for the employees of the trust or employees of any institution conducted by the trust and even without sub-clause (iv) it would have been obligatory upon the trustees to maintain staff of the trust or the staff of any institution conducted by the trust and to incur expenditure for their welfare and looked at from this angle the said sub-clause should be regarded as incidental or ancillary. Moreover, according to Mr. Patil, under clause 1 of the deed, it was provided that "the settlors in pursuance of the said desire and for the purpose of carrying out charitable objects hereinafter mentioned and diverse other good causes and considerations moving unto them do hereby declare that they have before the execution of these presents transfer and delivered unto the trustees of the said sum of Rs. 5,000 (rupees five thousand) and all their right, title and interest therein", and object clause 4 follows clause 1 of the deed. In other words, according to Mr. Patil, the dominant intention of the settlors in executing this indenture was obviously to carry out charitable objects mentioned in the deed and such charitable objects were specified in detail in clause 4 (1) of the deed and amongst the charitable objects undeer sub-clause (iv) thereof it was provided that the trustees shall out of the income of the trust property provide for welfare of the employees of the trust or any institutions conducted by the trust. In other words, according to Mr. Patil, this sub-clause (iv) should be regarded, if at all, as incidental or ancillary object and since the main or dominant object of the deed was to do charity and since several other sub-clauses of clause 4 indicate what those charitable objects were, it should be held that notwithstanding sub-clause (iv) of clause 4 (1) the trust should be regarded as one having been created wholly for charitable purposes. It is not possible to accept this submission of Mr. Patil either. In the first place, there is nothing to indicate in clause 4 (1) of the deed that the object mentioned in sub-clause (iv) thereof is incidental or ancillary to other objects mentioned in the other sub-clause of clause 4 (1). Secondly, clause 4 (2) in terms elevates the object mentioned in sub-clause (iv) to the same level as the other objects mentioned in sub-clauses of clause 4 (1), for, under sub-clause (2) of clause 4, the trustees have been given liberty to utilise the corpus of the trust property or any part thereof for any one or more of the objects mentioned earlier and in such proportion as they may in their absolute discretion think fit. At least while conferring such power upon the trustees some indication could have been given by the settlors if they wanted to regard sub-clause (iv) as incidental or ancillary, but nothing of the kind has been done. In other words, sub-clause (2) of clause 4 has conferred abosolute discretion upon the trustees to spend the entire corpus of the trust property or any part thereof upon any one or more of the objects mentioned in sub-clause (1) of clause 4. Further, it is not possible to accept Mr. Patil's contention that sub-clause (iv) of clause 4 (1) provides for management expenses, such as remuneration payable to the employees of the trust and that normally the trustees would have incurred such expenditure on the employees during the course of management of the trust. In fact, clause 4 (1) separately provides for expenses for management and maintenance of the trust property. In terms, clause 4 (1) provides that the trustees shall pay out of the rents, profits, interest, dividends and income all outgoings payable in respect of the trust property including all ground rent, rates, taxes and costs of repairs of any immovable property forming part of the trust property, premium for insurance or any other costs, charges, expenses and outgoings of and execution of the trusts therein contained including the wages and salaries of employees and it is after payment of such outgoings and other expenses that the trustees have been directed to spend the income of the trust property over the objects which have been specified in sub-clause (i) to (vi) of clause 4 (1). In a way this independent provision for meeting the expenses of the management and maintenance of the trust property including wages and salaries of the employees on the contrary suggests that the settlors had in mind while incorporating sub-clause (iv) in clause 4 (1) that it was an independent object of the trust for which the trustees were given liberty to spend the income of the trust property. Having regard to the above position which obtains very clearly on reading of the deed of trust as a whole, it is difficult to accept Mr. Patil's contention that sub-clause (iv) of clause 4 (1) should either be regarded as not providing any object at all or as providing for an incidental or ancillary object. It is clear to us that the object mentioned in sub-clause (iv) is also one of the independent objects on which the trustees have been given power to spend the income of the property or even the entire corpus of the trust property by virtue of clause 4 (2) of the deed and if that be so, it is clear that the trust in question cannot be regarded as being one created wholly for the purpose of the charitable objects.

"The words 'wholly for religious or charitable purposes' in section 4 (3) (i) show that the income from the trust property would only be exempt if all the objects of the trust are of a religious or charitable nature. In case a trust has ten distinct and separate objects and nine of them are of a religious or charitable nature, but the tenth is not of a religious or charitable nature and there is nothing to prevent the trustees from applying the property of the trust in carrying out any of the objects of the trust including the object which is not of a religious or charitable nature, the income derived from the property of the trust would not be exempt from taxation under section 4 (3) (i). The reason for that is that the trustees in such an event can apply the property of the trust exclusively for that object of the trust which is not of a religious or charitable nature. ...... The only relaxation which has been permitted, in such cases, is that if all the primary objects of the trust are of a religious or charitable nature, the existence of an ancillary or secondary object which is not of a religious or charitable nature but which is intended to subserve the religious and charitable objects would not prevent the grant of such an exemption."