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3. The courts below, in these circumstances, concurrently came to the conclusion that the complainant has succeeded in establishing all ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. and that the accused has not succeeded in discharging the burden, which is there on him. Accordingly they proceeded to pass the impugned concurrent judgments.

4. Called upon to explain the nature of challenge which the petitioner wants to mount against the impugned concurrent judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the courts below erred in accepting and acting upon the oral evidence of PW1. The accused is entitled to take up inconsistent defences. The fact that a different version has been narrated in Ext.P6 and in the course of cross examination of PW1 and later when DW1 was examined, will not in any way dis-entitle the accused to simultaneously take up all the contentions. In these circumstances it is prayed that benefit of doubt deserves to be granted in favour of the petitioner. He further submits that the petitioner did not get an opportunity to confront PW1 with Ext.D1 and therefore a further opportunity may be granted, it is prayed. No explanation is offered as to why PW1 was not confronted with Ext.D1 when he was in the witness box. I find absolutely no merit in this contention.

5. Primarily we have the oral evidence of PW1 about the circumstances under which the cheque leaf issued to the petitioner by his bank to operate his account with the signature of the petitioner thereon found its way from the possession of the petitioner to the possession of PW1. His evidence is entitled to respect considering that circumstance. The accused has taken up inconsistent and contradictory defences. Of course, the principles of criminal law perhaps do permit an indictee to simultaneously take up a defence alibi and of private defence. But those principles cannot obviously be imported blindly in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, where the presumption under Section 139 stares at the accused and it is for him to "prove" his case and rebut the presumption". It is idle now to contend that inconsistent defences can be taken up by an accused in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In theory this is correct, but in its practical application one cannot ignore the fact that the burden on the accused must be held to be not discharged when such irresponsible and contradictory defences are raised. The petitioner is not entitled to succeed. No other contentions are raised on merits.