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26. In the present case, the admitted position is that the original lease was granted to Adhir Kumar Ganguly for 999 years. All subsequent transfers, including the transfer at hand, thus, pertain to leasehold rights and not to ownership of property. Contrary to the arguments of the petitioner, a lease, for whatever period, cannot be elevated to the plane of 'property' as envisaged in Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, which governs gifts. In the absence of any definition of 'gift' in the Stamp Act itself, the definition as provided in the Transfer of Property Act, which is the general statute governing transfers of property, has to be taken as a guide. A 'lease', as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, on the other hand, is a transfer of a 'right to enjoy' such property, made for a certain time, as opposed to the transfer of the property itself. Even transfers of such right in perpetuity have been contemplated within the purview of "lease" under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Thus, whatever expression has been used in the nomenclature of the transfer deed-in-question, the transfer pertains to the half share of the petitioner's leasehold rights in the property and not the ownership thereof.

31. Article 33, in contra-distinction, envisages 'gifts', which must necessarily be defined as the transfer of movable or immovable "property", as defined in Section 122 of the Transfer of Property and not a transfer of the "right to enjoy" such property (whether perpetual or for a limited period) as reflected in Section 105 of the said Act.

32. Even if original leasehold rights of the initial lessee was transferred by the transaction-in-question, the stamp duty would be same as a convenience in terms of Article 23, as stipulated in Article 35 of Schedule IA. By the same logic that an original lease of more than 30 years is chargeable at the same rate as a conveyance under Article 23, the duty payable on a subsequent assignment of such leasehold interest cannot vary from that payable for the original lease deed at the juncture when the gift deed-in-question was executed.

34. S. N. Mathur (supra) also reasserts the principle laid down in Section 6 of the Stamp Act, as discussed above.

35. As far as Pran Krishna Dey (supra) is concerned, with utmost respect, Section 6 of the Stamp Act and/or the G.O. dated June 15, 2010 were neither considered by the learned Single Judge, nor argued, at least as reflected in the said report. Hence, the said judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent in the present context, since the said provisions have been specifically argued and form an integral part of the reasoning process in rendering the present judgment. Moreover, even if the proposition laid down in the said report was to be accepted, the same would be irrelevant in view of Section 6 of the Stamp Act having overriding effect. Even assuming that a gift of leasehold rights falls within the ambit of Article 33 of Schedule IA, it would also be covered by Article 63 thereof, which attracts Section 6, thus, mandating the higher duty of the two to be deposited.