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Showing contexts for: section 156 crpc in Manohar Singh & Anr. vs State & Ors. on 10 April, 2013Matching Fragments
6. To assert that Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. can be exercised at pre- cognizance stage whereas power under Section 202 of Cr.P.C. can be invoked by taking cognizance while issuing the process and Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. provides for a check by a Magistrate on police to perform their duties and that examination of complainant before passing of order under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. is not necessary, reliance was placed on behalf of petitioners upon decisions in Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat AIR 2010 SC 1877 and Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 642.
8. Learned senior counsel for respondent-accused persons had relied upon a recent Apex Court's decision in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia and Anr. v. Shailesh Bhai Mohan Bhai Patel and Anr. 2013 CRI. L.J.144 to assert that a criminal revision is very much maintainable against an intermediate order like trial court's order and so, reliance placed by petitioners' counsel upon Full-Bench's decision in Father Thomas (supra) is of no avail. Reference was made to Apex Court's decision in M/s. Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny & Ors. 2012 CRI.L.J. 438 to contend that where order passed under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. suffers from a grave error, then the error so committed by trial court can be corrected while invoking provision of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and impugned order rejecting petitioners' prayer under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. is well justified on merits. Reliance was placed on behalf of respondent-accused upon decision in Omprakash & Ors. v. State and Anr. 2012 [1] JCC 702 wherein guidelines governing an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as laid down in Subhakaran Kuharuka & Anr. v.State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) & Anr. 2010 [3] JCC 1972 were applied and an application under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. was rejected as the order allowing it disclosed utter non-application of mind.
The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of restriction." (underlined to supply emphasis).
16. Now what is required to be seen is whether trial court order directing registration of FIR while exercising its power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order or an intermediate order. No doubt in Father Thomas (supra), an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been held to be an interlocutory order being non-revisable, but Apex Court in Kishan Lal v. Dharmendra Bafna & Anr. 2009 (9) Scale 768 in respect of such an order, has ruled as under:-
19. The object of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is to ensure a fair investigation. Trial court had called for a status report on petitioners' application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and upon its perusal had directed petitioners' to give a specimen signature in FIR case pending against them at the instance of respondent-accused herein. Having done so, it was not a proper exercise of discretion under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to have directed registration of an FIR as petitioners' complaint was infact the defence to the FIR case against them instituted at the instance of respondent-accused herein.