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Starling, J.

10. About 50 years ago a certain thikan was held, as to one moiety by one Kaji Abdul Rajak and as to the other by one Kaji Ali and one Kaji Mohidin. This thikan seems to have consisted of three pieces of land which had apparently been granted in 1641 and confirmed by a firman registered in 1334 to the ancestors of the above named three persons. One of the pieces of land in respect of a moiety of which this suit is brought was described in the firman as being set apart for the lighting of a mosque to which another of the pieces of land was also dedicated. It is to my mind clear that as to the piece of land now in dispute the grantees were trustees to receive the income of the land and to apply it in or towards the lighting of the mosque, and the fact that after providing sufficiently for the carrying out of that purpose there might be a surplus left which the grantees, not unlawfully, might apply to their own use for services rendered by them in that behalf does not make them any the less trustees. It was argued that although they might be trustees yet the interest of each successive generation was only a life-interest. A life estate, however, is unknown to Mahomedau Law. The Hedaya lays down in Volume III, Book xxx, Chap. 2, page 489 of Grady's Edition, that an amree or life grant "is nothing but a gift and a condition; and the condition is invalid; but a gift is not rendered void by involving an invalid condition"; consequently the donee, with a life condition added to the gift, becomes the absolute owner. This principle is recognized by the Privy Council as law in Mussamut Humeeda v. Mussamut Budlan (1872) 17 Cal. W.R. 525, which WBB followed in Abdul Gafur v. Nizamudin (1892) L.R. 19 I.A. p. 178 : 17 Bom. 1 affirming the decision in Nizamudin v. Abdul Gafur (1888) 13 Bom. 264. Therefore the grantees did not hold the property by a aeries of life estates. In fact, the firman itself seems to treat them as the owners of the land and, except as to the office of peshnimaz which was provided for by a separate royal grant, not as mere mukhtyars managing the property on behalf of the grantor according to the terms imposed by him. This distinguishes it from the case of Jewun Doss v. Shah Kubeer-ood-deen (1840) 2 Moore's I.A. 390, the firman in which case to be found at page 419, distinctly showing that the grantee was only to be in occupation of the lands granted in order to apply their produce as directed therein, in fact, that he was not one owner of the lands, and had not the legal estate in himself, but was merely a mukhtyar, and that in the event of his heirs being in possession of the lands under the firman, they would be in possession merely as mukhtyars for the time being. In the present case there is a grant of three pieces of land to the grantee as inamdar, and to my mind as full owner of the legal estate, one piece being described for the mosque, another for -lighting of the mosque, and the third being unfettered by any trust or condition. Consequently I am of opinion that this is not a wakf strictly so called with the quality of absolute inalienability attached to the lands, but that the grantees were in the position of ordinary trustees. If the grantees be ordinary trustees, then Article 134 of Act XV of 1877 applies, and as the defendants have bean in possession under their mortgage more than twelve years, the plaintiff's suit would be barred. The respondents-plaintiffs relied upon the case of Trimbak v. Narayan (1882) 7 Bom. 188 which was, however, disapproved of in Ganansambanda v. Velu Pandaram (1899) L.R. 27 I.A. at p. 78, and I do not therefore consider that it affords any guide to the Court in the present case. There is, however, a recent case of Dattagiri v. Dattatraya (1902) 4 L.R. 743 ante p. 363, which seems to me to be on all fours with this case, and, after taking into consideration all the authorities and arguments brought to the notice of the Court, I am of opinion that the plaintiffs' suit is barred and the decree of the lower Court must be reversed with costs and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored.