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for short). It is submitted that the provisions of Rule 41 of the said Rules provides that, except in case of exceptional circumstances and without recording the reasons in writing, midterm transfers should not be effected. It is further submitted that, Respondent Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Pune runs various schools and colleges. These schools and colleges receive the grant from the Government of Maharashtra and therefore they are amenable to the writ jurisdiction. It is submitted that the service terms and conditions of teachers are governed by the MEPS Rules, 1981 and therefore it is not open for the Respondents to have their own Service Terms and Conditions. It is further submitted Jvs. WP.1044.2012. judgment.doc that, Respondent No. 1 is also discharging the duty of implementing the right to education, which is accepted as the fundamental right now. It is further submitted that Respondent No. 1, while discharging the public duty is working as a State, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and while exercising the powers, it cannot discriminate against any person, on the ground of religion, caste, place of birth or any of them. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner invited our attention to Para 8 of the exposition of the Supreme Court in case of Manmohan Singh Jaitla vs. Commission, Union Territory of Chandigarh and Ors, 1984 (Supp) SCC 540 and submitted that, Respondent No. 1 herein is the Aided School receiving grant from the public exchequers and it is subject to regulations made by the Education Department and appointments of the said schools are required to be approved by the Respondent State Authorities, would certainly be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The Learned Counsel further invited our attention to the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1981 and submitted that midterm transfers are not permissible. According to the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, midterm transfers not only causes inconvenience to the concerned employees, however, such transfers are also not permissible. Learned Counsel further submits that as per the provisions of Secondary Schools Jvs. WP.1044.2012. judgment.doc Code if the directions issued by the Respondent Authorities are not followed by the Respondent No. 1, the recognition of Respondent No. 1 institution can be withdrawn. The Learned Counsel, in support of this contention, pressed into service provision of Clause 7.1 of Secondary Schools Code and submitted that when a school, including a permanently recognised school, has ceased in the opinion of the Department, to fulfill any of the condition of recognition, recognition of that school may be withdrawn.
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Jvs. WP.1044.2012. judgment.doc The sum and substance of the arguments of the Counsel appearing for the Petitioners is that, Respondent No. 1 is bound to follow the directions issued by the State Authorities from time to time. The transfers of the Petitioners are midterm transfers, which have caused not only inconvenience to the Petitioners but same are also not permissible. It is submitted alternatively that even it is assumed for the sake of argument that the term would be of 6 months, even then it is also midterm transfer which has been effected after 11th November, 2011 and such transfers were violative of Rule 42 of the MEPS Rules.

4) It is further submitted that the transfer orders have been issued in compliance with Rule 41 of the MEPS Rules framed under the MEPS Act. It is denied that the transfers are midterm transfers. The Learned Counsel invited our attention to Clause 52.1 of the Secondary Schools Code, which defines the School Terms. Relying upon said Jvs. WP.1044.2012. judgment.doc clause, Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 submits that the School year will be divided into two terms. First term shall be from June to October and the Second term shall be from November to April. The Counsel further submits that in the academic year 2011-12, the second term was to commence on 14th November, 2011. The transfer orders were issued on the same day. However, as per the direction of the Government dated 5th November, 2011, all the schools were required to commence their term on 11th November, 2011 in order to celebrate and co-memorate the 100th Birth Anniversary of Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad. Said direction is dated 5th November, 2011 and the message of the Hon'ble Prime Minister was to be readout in the schools on 11th November, 2011. Therefore, the transfers effected on 14th November, 2011 were not and cannot be considered as midterm transfers. The Counsel invited our attention to the averments in affidavit in reply and factual position, under which circumstances transfers were required to be effected. It is submitted that, the allegation that the transfer orders have been issued on the communal basis by the Respondents, is totally false and fictitious and the same is not acceptable to the Respondents.

The contention of the Counsel for the Petitioners that, the transfer of the Petitioners is midterm transfer, has no any force and said contention deserves to be rejected in the facts and circumstances of this case. Even, according to the Counsel for the Petitioners, the 'Term' has not been defined under the provisions of MEPS Act and MEPS Rules. However, according to the Counsel for the Petitioners, the Term would mean the complete academic year and therefore, the Rule 41 of the MEPS Rules prohibits the Respondent Management from transferring a person, midterm. In our opinion, the transfer of the Petitioners is not midterm transfer. We find force in the argument of the Counsel appearing for Respondent Nos.1 to 4 that as per Clause 52.1 of the Secondary Schools Code, which applies only to Secondary Schools, the school year will be divided into two terms.