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PG NO 834 In this matter by our order dated 9th January, 1988 we had directed that this special leave petition should be heard first in these series of matters. We do so accordingly. We grant leave and dispose of the appeal by the judgment herein along with other appeals.

This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court, dated 26th April, 1~82 dismissing the second appeal. The High Court observed that the learned Judge had followed the judgment of the said High Court in Khalubai Nathu Sumra v. Rajgo Mulji Nanji and others, AIR 1979 Gujarat 171 where the learned Single Judge in the background of a mortgage, where the mortgagor was financially hard-pressed and the mortgage was for 99 years and the term gave the mortgagee the right to demolish existing structure and construct new one and the expenses of such to be reimbursed by mortgagor at the time of redemption, it was held that the terms were unreasonable, unconscionable and not binding. In order, however, to appreciate the contentions urged therein, it will be necessary to refer to the decision of the first Appellate Court, in the instant case before us. By the judgment, the Assistant Judge, Kutch at Bhuj in Gujarat disposed of two appeals. These appeals arose from the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Bhuj, in Regular Civil Suit No. 35/72 by which the decree for redemption of mortgage was passed and the tenants inducted by the mortgagees were also directed to deliver up possession to the mortgagors. The plaintiffs had filed a suit alleging that the deceased Karsandas Haridas Purohit was their father and he died in the year 1956, he had mortgaged the suit property to Kanasara Soni Shivji Jotha and Lalji Jetha for 30,000 Koris by a registered mortgage deed dated 20th April, 1943. The moltgage deed was executed in favour of Soni Govindji Nalayanji who was the power of attorney holder and manager of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The defendant No. 3 is the heir of said Govindji Narayanji and he was also managing the properties of the defendants Nos I and 2. The mortgage property consisted of two delis in which there were residential houses, shops etc. The mortgagees had inducted tenants in the suit property and they were defendants Nos. 4 to 9 in the original suit When the mortgage transaction took place, thc economic condition of the father of the plaintiffs was weak. he was heavily indebted to other persons. It was alleged and it was so held by the learned Judge and upheld by the Appellate Judge that the mortgagees took advantage of' that situation and took mortgage deed from him on harsh and oppressive conditions. They got incorporated long term of 99 years for redemption of mortgage. It is further stated that though possession was to be handed over to the mortgagees, they took condition for interest on the part of principal amount in the mortgage PG NO 835 deed. Moreover, the mortgagees were given liberty to spend any amount they liked for the improvement of the suit property. They were also permitted to rebuild the entire property. Thus these terms and conditions, according to the Appellate Judge, were incorporated in the mortgage deed to ensure that the mortgagors were prevented for ever from redeeming the mortgage. The terms and conditions, according to the Assistant Judge, Bhuj, being the first Appellate Court were unreasonable, oppressive and harsh and amounted to clog on equity of redemption and, as such, bad and the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem the mortgage even before the expiry of the term of mortgage. A registered notice to the defendants Nos. I and 2 was given to redeem the mortgage but they failed to do so, hence, the present suit was filed to redeem the mortgage and to recover actual possession from the defendants Nos. 4 to 9 who were the tenants inducted by the mortgagees.

PG NO 846 The reason justifying the Court's power to relieve a mortgagor from the effects of his bargain is its want of conscience. Putting it in more familiar language the Court's jurisdiction to relieve a mortgagor from his bargain depends on whether it was obtained by taking advantage of any difficulty or embarrassment that he might have been in when he borrowed the moneys on the mortgage. Length of the term, according to Sarkar, J. in the aforesaid decision, was not by itself oppressive and could not operate as a clog on the equity of redemption. There was a term in the mortgage deed that the mortgagees could spend any amount on repairs and those expenses would be paid, according to the account produced by the mortgagees. All that it meant was that in claiming moneys on account of repairs and construction the mortgagees had to show from their accounts that they had spent these moneys. This Court on that basis held that the clause which provided that the mortgage had to be redeemed within the specified period of six months was bad. The principle, however, is that it was not an unconscionable bargain and it did not in effect deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem the mortgage or so to curtail his right to redeem that it has become illusory and non-existent, then there was no clog on equity of redemption. It has to be borne in mind that the English authorities relied upon by Sarkar, J. and the principles propounded by this Court in the case of Seth Ganga Dhar's, case (supra) were in the background of a sedate and fixed state of affairs. The spiral and escalation of prices of the immovable properties was not then there. Today, perhaps, a different conspectus would be required to consider the right to redeem the property after considerable length of time pegging the price to a small amount of money, the value of which is fast changing.

PG NO 847 The doctrine clog on the equity of redemption" is a rule of justice, equity and good conscience. It must be adopted in each case to the reality of the situation and the individuality of the transaction. We must take note of the time, the condition, the price spiral, the term bargain and the other obligations in the background of the financial conditions of the parties. Therefore, in our opinion, in view of the evidence it is not possible to hold that there was no clog on the equity of redemption in these cases.

PG NO 858 We have noticed the view of the Full Bench of the Rajasthan A High Court on this aspect. This question was again envisaged by this Court in the background of the Rajasthan Premises Act in Om Prakash Garg v. Ganga Sahai & Ors., [1987] 3 SCC 553 holding that on passing of the final decree of redemption of the mortgage, the lease did not subsist and the tenant is not entitled to protection under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950. Again viewing this question in the context of the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 in Jadavji Purshottam v Navnitbhai Amaratlal & Ors., [1987] 4 SCC 223, in which the judgment was delivered by Natarajan J., and one of us was a party to that decision, it was held that it was recognised by this Court in a number of cases that the question of imprudent management of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee would not arise where the rights of the tenant were enlarged by the tenancy legislation enacted after the tenant was put in possession by the mortgagee. Hence, in that case the question was whether the tenancy rights of the appellant-tenant, who was inducted by the mortgagee, came to be enlarged by tenancy legislation after he was put in possession by the mortgagee. The fact founding that case was that the tenant-appellant was not inducted into possession soon after the execution of mortgage deed and the mortgagee was put in possession of the property but long thereafter. In fact, there was already a tenant on the mortgage Property when the mortgagee was put in possession. During the period o f tenancy of that tenant the Saurashtra Act 22 of 1951 came to be enacted and gave protection to the tenants from paying exorbitant rent and from unreasonable eviction. Despite the enlargement of his tenancy right by the Act. that tenant vacated the lease premises in 1956 and thereafter the mortgagee inducted the appellant in possession. It was held that that was a case where the Saurashtra Act was already in force when the appellant cannot be inducted into possession. The tenancy rights of the appellant cannot be said to have become enlarged after the mortgagee granted him the lease by subsequent legislation enacted for affording protection to tenants. The fact that the mortgagee had granted lease only for period of one year will not alter the case in any manner as not only had the mortgagee executed the lease deed after the expiry of the lease period but also because the restriction of the lease period to one year was of no consequence in view of the provisions contained in the Saurashtra Act 22 of 1951. The enlargement of the tenancy rights cannot also be claimed on the basis of the fact that the Bombay Rent Act had been enacted after the appellant was inducted into the property because the Saurashtra Act was already In force when the mortgagee granted lease to the appellant and it was only from January' 64 the Bombay Rent PG NO 859 act came to replace the Saurashtra Act. In Civil Appeal No. 9993 of 1982, Pomal Kanji Govindji & Ors. v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit ,& Ors., Shri B.K. Mehta took us to the factual background. The appellants who are tenants in the mortgage properties being defendants Nos. 4 to 9 in the original suit had resisted the suit for redemption and contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession from them since their rights are protected under the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and the said Act has applied to the area of kutch in the Bombay State. Therefore, no decree for eviction could be passed against them except in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. The High Court held that redemption of mortgage was possible and the suit was maintainable as mentioned hereinbefore. However, as regards the question of protection of the tenants under the Bombay Rent Act, Shri Mehta proceeded to submit that the learned Judge did not make any finding as to when the tenants were inducted nor did he express his opinion about the evidence of respondent No. 5. Shri Mehta further submitted that the learned Judge did not make any finding as to when their tenants were inducted, either before or after the rent restriction Act was made applicable to the area of Kutch. On that basis, following the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Lalji Purshottam v. Thacker Madhavji Meghaji, (supra), the courts below rejected the claim of he tenants. Shri Mehta submitted hat the High Court has erred in not following the settled legal position entrenched by a line of decision of this Court that he rights of a tenant inducted by a mortgagee with possession would enure beyond the period of redemption of the mortgage if his rights are enlarged by subsequent tenancy legislations in force in the area in which the property is situated. He drew our attention to the decision in the case of Mahabair Gope v. Harbans Narain, (supra). There as mentioned hereinbefore this Court had found that the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Bihar Tenancy act, did not apply to the lessees since they were not `settled raiyats'. Shri Mehta also drew our attention to the observations of this Court in Asa Ram v. Mst. Ram Kali, (supra). He also drew our attention to Dahya Lal v. Rasul Mahommed, (supra) which we have discussed hereinbefore. Similar, was the position in Prabha v. Ramdev (supra) which is also being discussed hereinbefore. Reference was made to the decision in All India Film Corporation v. Gyan Nath, (supra), the basis of which has been explained hereinbefore. The said decision will not be applicable in respect of the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the terms of the renancy. Our attention was drawn by Shri Mehta to the observations of this Court in Madan Lal v. Badri Narain and others, [1987] 3.S.C.C. 460. In that case, it was contended before this Court that there PG NO 860 was no such rule of general acceptance that a lease of urban property by the mortgagee in possession cannot be regarded to be an act of prudent management within the meaning of section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act which carves out an exception to the general rule that a mortgagee in possession cannot create, in the tenant inducted by him, a right to continue in possession beyond the period of redemption. Before this Court, in that case, a reference was made to the Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Devkinandan v. Roshan Lal, (supra). But in view of the facts that there was no definite finding the question whether the alleged lease was an act prudent management on the part of the mortgagee in possession in terms of section 76(a) was left open and that to be determined by the learned trial Judge. It has been held by this Court in numerous decisions that in case of immovable properties in urban areas, unless the leases specifically and categorically make an exception in favour of the tenant that they would continue in possession even after the expiry of termination of the leases, and those leases were acts of prudent management, in no other case, the tenants inducted by the mortgagee would be titled to the production under the Rent Act after the redemption of mortgage.