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9. The Petitioner was, evidently, in the Police Service till his appointment as a Munsif on 1-06-1981. He having been released from the Police Service and his lien in the said service having since been suspended on his substantive appointment as a Munsif, he could neither be proceeded against by the High Court as a Judicial Officer for his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer. It is contended that his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer could not be deemed to be his misconduct as a Judicial Officer. It is further contended that since the conditions of service of a Police Officer and the conditions of service of a Judicial Officer are completely different, any lapse allegedly committed by the Petitioner as a Police Officer cannot be considered to be a lapse on his part as a Judicial Officer, since a Police Officer is appointed under Police Act (V) of 1861 and his service conditions are regulated by the Police Regulations of Bengal, 1943. It is thus contended that initiation of a disciplinary proceedings by the High Court against the Petitioner as a judicial Officer for his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer is without the authority of law. The alleged misconduct of a Police Officer could neither be treated as misconduct of a Judicial Officer. As held by the Supreme Court in the decisions and AIR 1988 Supreme Court 505 if misconduct is defined in the Service Rule and/or in the Standing Order, the employer cannot have any arbitrary power to act beyond the Rules/Standing Order and treat each and every lapse of a Government employee as misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings against him. It has further been held by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1988 Supreme Court, 504 that unless in the Service Regulation or certified Standing Order an act or omission is prescribed as misconduct it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct of a Government employee as misconduct It is thus contended that the Petitioner could neither be proceeded against in his capacity as a Judicial Officer for his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer. It had also been urged on behalf of the Petitioner that while he was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police his appointing authority was the Superintended of Police concerned, who was his disciplinary authority for his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer. But the Governor of West Bengal is his appointing authority while he had been appointed as a Munsif in the West Bengal Civil Service (Judicial) in 1981. The Governor is his dismissing authority and the High Court is his disciplinary authority. The High Court could not conceivably proceed against him for his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer.

10. It is further reiterated by the petition that while a Sub-Inspector of Police is guided, regulated and controlled by the provisions of the Police Regulation of Bengal, 1943 and the Police Act (Act V) of 1861 a Proceedings for his misconduct in the discharge of his official duties as a Police Officer could be initiate by the Superintendent of Police concerned, his disciplinary authority under the aforesaid Regulations. After his appointment as a Munsif by the Governor of West Bengal, being his appointing authority, he (Petitioner) could only be proceeded against for any misconduct in relation to his service as a Judicial Officer. As contended by him, the misconduct of a Police Officer cannot be treated as misconduct of a Judicial Officer. The Petitioner having been released from the Police department and his lien in the said service having been suspended on his successful completion of the probationary period as a Munsif and on his passing the departmental examination, he could not be proceeded against by the High Court for his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer in his capacity as a Judicial Officer. He having ceased to be a Police Officer, in the aforesaid circumstances, no Proceedings could either be initiated against him for his alleged misconduct as a Police in analogy to the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1971 under which no proceeding can be initiated against a retired Government employee over an incident which took place prior to four years before his retirement. The Petitioner having been released from the Police Service in 1981, the relevant Proceedings initiated against him in February, 1989 for his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer in 1975 is, therefore, wholly untenable according to law.

11. True it is, there is nothing in Article 235 of the Constitution to restrict the control of the High Court in respect of Judges, other than District Judges, in any manner, and the administrative, Judicial and disciplinary control over the Members of the judicial service is vested solely in the High Court, as held by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand and Ors., . The Supreme Court in the State of West Bengal and Anr. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, has also clearly held that the word "control" in the aforesaid Article, though not defined in the Constitution at all, must obviously mean disciplinary control or disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court. It has been held therein that "control" is vested in the High Court to effectuate a purpose, clearly, securing the independence of the subordinate Judiciary. And, unless it included a disciplinary control as well the very object would be frustrated. The word "control", accompanied by the word "vest" clearly show that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the Judiciary. Control is not merely the power to arrange the day-to-day working of the Subordinate Courts, but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over the Presiding Judge. Article 227 of the Constitution gives to the High Court superintendence over these Courts and enables the High Court to call for returns etc. The word "control" in Article 235 has a different content. It includes something in addition to mere superintendence. It is control over the conduct and discipline of the Judges. The word "deal" therein also points to disciplinary and not mere administrative jurisdiction. It has further been held therein that the word "Court" is compendiously used therein to denote not only the Court proper, but also the presiding Judge. The latter part Article 235 talks of the man who holds the Office. What is vested in the High Court includes disciplinary jurisdiction. Control is useless if it is not accompanied by disciplinary powers. It has thus been held therein that the High Court has disciplinary jurisdiction over the presiding Judges of the subordinate Courts, which could never be disputed. As held in the aforesaid decision the High Court has power of control under Article 235 of the Constitution over the conduct and discipline of the presiding Judges of the subordinate Courts. But unhappily for the contending Respondent No. 2, no authority whatsoever could be cited by their learned Advocate, despite ample opportunities granted to them, to satisfy the Court that the High Court's power of control and disciplinary jurisdiction extends to conduct and discipline of a Judicial Officer in relation to an alleged misconduct not in his capacity as Judicial Officer but in his capacity as a Police Officer. Plainly read. Article 235 of the Constitution does not seem to indicate that the High Court would have disciplinary control/ jurisdiction over a Police Officer or in respect of an alleged misconduct of a Judicial Officer, not in his capacity as a Judicial Officer, but while serving as a Police Officer. With things as they are, It would, therefore, be difficult to hold that the High Court would have disciplinary control/jurisdiction in respect of an alleged misconduct of a Police Officer.

12. Even most charitably assuming for the sake of argument that the High Court has power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner for his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer, the relevant disciplinary proceedings initiate against him by the High Court on the basis of the Chargesheet issued against him in February, 1989 for his alleged misconduct in October 1975 has rendered the entire Proceedings vitiated. As held by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Samarendra Narayan Ghosh v. The State of West Bengal and Ors., 1984(1) CLJ 56 admitted and unexplained delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings constitutes violation of the principles of natural justice. It had similarly been held by another learned Judge of this Court in Sri Binayak Dutta v. State of West Bengal and Ors., 1991(1) CLJ 291 that the disciplinary proceedings started in April, 1988 in connection with an occurrence of 1976 was an inordinate delay in commencing and concluding the proceedings, which is a ground for quashing the entire proceedings. It has also been held in the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh, that it would be unfair to permit departmental enquiry to be proceeded within 1986 in respect of irregularities stated to have taken place in the year 1975-77 in the absence of any explanation for inordinate delay of 12 years. Another learned single Judge of this Court in Subhas Chandra Basu v. Bank of Baroda and Ors., 1992(1) SLR 38 had also quashed a disciplinary proceedings where there had been delay of six years in issuing Chargesheet for which no explanation had been issued. In view of the aforesaid decisions, with which I completely concur, the alleged misconduct of the Petitioner allegedly committed by him as a Police Officer on 22nd October, 1975, as appearing from the materials on record, could not clearly be enquired into after 14 years with the Chargesheet issued against him in February, 1989 without any explanation for such long delay, since the charges and/or the allegations levelled against him have become too stale and remote for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him. It is thus submitted that the incidents of 1975 were too stale and remote and the Chargesheet issued on that basis in 1989 would mean want of nexus vitiating the entire proceedings against the Petitioner. The relevant proceedings initiated against the Petitioner on the basis of the Chargesheet issued in February, 1989 in respect of his alleged misconduct as a Police Officer in October, 1975, is accordingly liable to be quashed.