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9. The learned District Judge has, on the evidence on record, held that the institution is a public trust belonging to all classes of people in Shimoga Town, that it has been in the management of Muslims only all along, that the plaintiffs cannot claim possession of the properties or any right in the management of the institution and that what they can ask for is only for accounts and better management of the institution as beneficiaries; and in the light of this finding he has proceeded to consider the question of limitation. He has held thai the defendants are not express trustees but trustees de son tort that Section 10, Limitation Act, does not apply to save the plaintiff's suit from the bar of limitation and that the suit is, therefore, not in time. He has referred to certain authorities and observed that there is a conflict of decisions on the point of limitation against trustees de son tort and has chosen to follow what he considers is the view of the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts and the Chief Court of Oudh in preference to the views held by the Madras and Calcutta High Courts. But even the cases he has referred to in his judgment do not seem to support the entire dismissal of the suit like the present.

10. Behari Lal v. Shiv Narain, 84 Ind. Cas. 631 : A. I. B. (11) 1934 ALL. 884, which is a case decided by the Allahabad High Court, has merely applied Article 120 of Schedule I, Limitation Act, for a suit for accounts against a defendant who was held to be a trustee de son tort and observed that Section 10 will not apply as it applies to cases of express trustee only. They have followed" Rajeshwara v. Ponnusami, A. I. E. (8) 1921 Mad. 125 and Krishnan v. Lakshmi, A. I. B. (9) 1922 Mad. 57. They have, however, held in the same case that there is no limitation for suits for the recovery of property from trustees and given the benefit of Section 10 to the plaintiffs though one of the defendants was only a trustee de son tort with reference to a part of the property which was in his possession. They made a distinction between the period of limitation for which he could be called upon to account but did not dismiss the suit with regard to possession of the property; and though they held that the latter was appointed a manager and not a trustee, they did not bold that the suit for possession was barred by time as against him. Ramacharya v. Shrinivasacharya, 46 ind, Cas. 19 (Bom.) wag a case in which the managers of a temple had made a gift of the temple property to the predecessors of the defendants in consideration of that latter performing certain religious service at the temple. The suit was brought half a century after the date of the gift by the donor's successors alleging that they were no longer to accept the services of the defendant in connection with the temple. It was held that the defendants were transferees for valuable consideration, the consideration being the performance of certain services and that, therefore, Section 10, Limitation Act, was not applicable to the case but Article 134 of Schedule I. Bachelor, Ag. C. J. observed is that case that Section 10, Limitation Act, is in the main designed to meet a suit brought for the purpose of valuing misapplied trust funds for the benefit of the trust and does not apply to assigns for valuable consideration from the express trustees. That case does not help the defendants.

"It seems to be established clearly that if express trusts are created and some outside trespasser who has no business to interfere does interfere then be becomes a trustee de son tort and as such the Court will make him account as if he were the rightful trustee."

It is observed that no man should assume the administration and function of a trustee and when called upon to account for his administration say that he acted wrongfully and that he would be always treated as if his acts were lawful and not unlawful. In support of that position they refer to a passage in Lewin on Trusts. This case fully supports the plaintiffs' contention that either as express trustees or as trustees de son tort the defendants are liable to account and cannot set up the bar of limitation.

12. In Peary Mohan v. Manokar, A. I. R. (11) 1924 cal. 160 Mukerjea and Rankin JJ. held that if a person by mistake or otherwise assumes the character of a trustee when it really does net belong to him and so becomes a trustee de son tort, he may be called to account by the cestui que trust for the monies he received under the colour of trust and such a person cannot be heard to say for his own benefit that he had no right to act as a trustee. Chandrika Bakhsh v. Bhola Singh, 168 Ind. Cas. 593 : (A. I. E. (24) 1937 oudh 373) was a case of a suit for possession of properties from a she bait who had been appointed by the founder of a religious endowment to manage the property in trust for such endowment. The suit was brought by the heirs of the founder on the death of the latter for possession of the trust property against the heirs of the shebait then in possession. It was held that the suit was governed by Article 144, Limitation Act, or Article 134, and not by Article 120, and was, therefore, in time and the application of Section 10, Limitation Act, to assist the plaintiffs to get a decree for possession was not required. It is only in connection with the period during which the defendants wore liable to account Section 10 was considered and it was observed that Section 10 applies only to express trustees and their representatives and not to trustees de son tort. Their Lordships did not choose to follow the case in Dhanpat v. Mohesh, A. I. R. (7) 1920 cal. 558 in which the opinion was expressed that a trustee de son tort stands in the same position as an express trustee but preferred to follow the contrary opinion expressed in 47 ALL. 17. That case is no authority for the position that the suit of the plaintiffs ought to be dismissed as barred by time.