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Showing contexts for: enemy countries in Seethalakshmi Achi And Ors. vs V.T. Veerappa Chettiar on 3 April, 1951Matching Fragments
This definition has judicial approval in 'DRIE-FONTEIN CONSOLIDATED GOLD MINES LTD. v. JONSON', (1900) 2 Q. B. 339 at p. 343. War, therefore, is a "contest between two or more states through their armed forces with the ultimate object of each contestant or each contestant group vanquishing the other or others and imposing his own conditions' of peace."
14. Who is an Enemy? It is important to consider the test which determines the enemy character of a psrson. Under the law in England the test of enemy character is not nationality '-hut residence or even living in enemy ter-ritory for whatever purpose it may be. It is not necessary that the person, even if he is a British subject, should have a domicile in the sense of the civil law, viz,,- the place of a man's permanent house, or even of an indefinite residence. If a person, whether a neutral or a Bri-tish subject, lives in enemy territory even for purposes of business, he is treated in law as an "enemy subject." Of course what applies to enemy territory applies equally to enemy occupied territory. The test of enemy character has nowhere been so clearly laid down as by Lord Lindley in 'JONSON v. DRIEFONTE1N CONSOLIDATED MINES LTD.', (1902) A. C. 484 at page 505 where the learned Lord summarised the tests in these words: "When considering questions arising with an alien enemy, it is not the nationality of a person, but his place of business during war that is important. An Englishman carrying on business in an enemy's country is treated as alien enemy in considering the validity or Invalidity of his commercial contracts: 'Mc CONNELL v. HECTOR', (1802) 3 B & P 133: 6 R. R. 724. Again, the subject of a State at war with this country, but who is carrying on business here or in a foreign neutral country, is not treated as an alien enemy; the validity of his contracts does not depend on his nationality nor even on what is his real domicile, but on the place or places in which he carries on his business or businesses; 'WELLS v. WILLIAMS', 9 W. 3: 1 Id.
Raym. 282. As observed by Sir William Scott in 'THE YONGE KLASSINA', (1804) 5 Ch. Rob. 302-3 a man may have mercantile concerns in two countries, and if he acts as merchant of both he must be liable to be considered as a subject of both with regard to the transactions originating, respectively in those countries. That he has no fixed counting house in the enemy's country will not be decisive. See also The Portland' (1800) 3 Ch. Rob. 41." From this passage it is evident that the term "domicile" is used in a twofold^sense; one is in relation to the person without reference to his commercial intercourse and the second is in regard to the place of business which is styled by Dicey as a "commercial domicile" of a person. In particular cases the two domiciles of persons may be the same, or may be different, "but it is impossible to ignore the distinction. The subject is more elaborately discussed by Professor Mcnair on Legal Effects of War in Chapter II. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn. (Lord Hailsham), at page 447 it is stated that "An alien enemy is one whose Sovereign or State is at war with the Sovereign of England, or one who is voluntarily resident or who carries on business in an enemy's country even though a natural-born British subject or a naturalised British subject." In the case of a company incorporated in the United Kingdom as stated in Volume I of Hals-bury's Laws of England, at page 447: "It does not become an alien enemy merely because its shares are held by alien enemies, but becomes an alien enemy if its agents or the persons in 'de facto' control are alien enemies or it it carries on business in an enemy country. 'Daimler Co. Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd.', (1916) 2-A.C. 307. The same applies to a company incorporated in an allied state, A company incorporated in an enemy country is an alien enemy regardless of how its shares are held." In 'Sovfracht (V/O) case', (1943) AC 203 Viscount Simon L. C. defined a subject of a state at War with England as "a person of whatever nationality, who is carrying on business in, or is voluntarily resident in, the enemy's country" and he pointed out at page 211:
"The proposition of law" says the learned Lord "on which the judgment of the Courts is based is that a state of war between this kingdom and another country abrogates and puts an end to all executory contracts which for their further performance require, as it is often phrased, commercial intercourse between the one contracting party, subject of the King, and the other contracting party, art alien enemy, or any one voluntarily residing in the enemy country. I use the expression "often phrased commercial intercourse" because I think the word "intercourse" is sufficient without the epithet "commercial".
25. The intercourse prohibited is across. the line of war, and, as pointed out by Lord Wright in the passage already cited, the common law of England, which of course cannot apply to the enemy country, does not and cannot prohibit intercourse or internal commerce and ordinary activities of these in the enemy occupied territory inter se so long as they are on the same side of the line of war, even if such activities and such trade have the effect of conferring an advantage upon the enemy and strengthening his war effort.