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6. To continue the narrative, the Advocate General denied that there was any sinister design or ulterior motive in appointing Administrators to the Panchayat. It was all done, according to the Learned Advocate General, in the usual course upon noticing that the tenure of the office of the Panchayat had expired and a new Panchayat yet to be constituted. Since it was feared that if no alternative arrangement was made, it would lead to a vacuum, the Government, it is submitted, therefore asked the Deputy Commissioner to act under Section 8 to appoint Administrators as and when the tenure of office of the Mandal Panchayats coming under their jurisdiction drew to a close. Therefore, it is submitted that the Deputy Commissioners only performed their duties, acted only in consonance with the law and had done nothing other than what the law enjoined. It is made clear in the submissions made on behalf of the Government due to certain expediency the holding of elections to constitute Mandal Panchayats was rendered impermissible with the result the amendment became necessary so that it could harmonise with the situation but for which the position of the State would have become indefensible. Learned Advocate Genera! denied the motives attributed to Government in seeking to amend the law and also denied that it is a political decision swathed in legislative apparel. It was submitted that if the impugned legislation waltzed successfully over the twin hurdles of legislative competence and Constitutional validity, the legislation cannot be imperilled or thwarted on the ground that it ran counter to the Preamble of the Constitution or it tried to or altered the basic structure of the Constitution or on the ground that it was violative of the Directive Principles enshrined in the Constitution,

29. But another argument of a kindred nature canvassed by Sri B.T.Parthasarathy, Sri Ko.Channabasappa, Sri P.V. Shetty and Sri Veerabhadrappa is that in any view of the matter, the provisions of Act 1 of 1992 offending as it does, Article 40 of the Constitution has resulted in the transgression of the basic structure of the Constitution and, therefore, if not for anything else atleast on this solitary ground the impugned piece of legislation must be struck down.

Per Contra, the contesting respondents join-in and submit just as the Preamble is no limitation on power to legislate likewise the circumstance of a legislation being contrary to any of the Directive Principles of State Policy cannot render the legislation invalid,

32. A kindred argument based on the same drift is the submission that the impugned law offends the basic structure of the Constitution and is, therefore, invalid and unconstitutional. The point is highlighted in particular by Sri Channabasappa. He urged that the perennial run of the process of democracy being the cherished objective of the Constitution and being something which the Constitution had assured at all times, any incision or clipping of that ideal injured the very fabric of the Constitution, for which reason alone the law is liable to be branded as unconstitutional and invalid. I am afraid the argument assumes too much. In these cases, the process of democracy will but remain suspended for a period of one year only, thereafter to be revived in all its effulgence and, therefore, cannot be treated as an onslaught on the basic structure of the Constitution. Besides the Constitution itself provides for a situation in which the process of democracy can remain suspended. To cite an instance viz, the prevalence of emergency, breaking down of law and order necessitating the suspension of the Legislature are instances in point although they may not be in direct parlance with the present situation. If I have adverted to these aspects, it is only to assess the credibility and tenability of the argument that on the democratic horizon, even the sun shall not set after dusk, But then it is not necessary to go into the sublime claim created by an atmosphere of idealism, for the Supreme Court in more than one Decision has laid down that in interpreting the provisions of a statute consideration such as the basic structure of the Constitution is too alien. The learned Advocate General who sponsored this argument relied on a Decision of the above Court in BHIM SINGHJI v. UNION OF INDIA, . That was a case in which Supreme Court was considering the Constitutional Validity of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 33 of 1976. It upheld the validity of all Sections except Section 27 of the said Act Therein Krishna Iyer J., as his Lordship then was, agreed with the majority of the Court and rejected the argument based on the breach of the basic structure of the Constitution aimed at getting a declaration from the Court declaring the act as unconstitutional and invalid. At page 242 and para 21 of the Judgment his Lordship sums up in his own inimitable style, his views as follows:

As pointed out in the foregoing passage the basic structure of the Constitution does not provide a distinct ground to examine the validity or otherwise of the statute. The validity or otherwise of an ordinary statute can only be examined under two circumstances viz., (i) whether it is within the competence of the Legislature that enacted it (ii) whether it offended any of the Fundamental Rights. Otherwise there can be no challenge much less can there be a challenge founded on the alleged violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. For the reasons mentioned above the foregoing submissions by Counsel for the petitioners fail and stand rejected. Therefore, it is, I answer Point No. 1 in the negative.