Karnataka High Court
Cauvery Grameena Bank And Anr. vs Ningaiah on 1 July, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005(5)KARLJ27
Author: V. Jagannathan
Bench: V. Jagannathan
JUDGMENT V. Jagannathan, J.
1. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge quashing the order of dismissal and granting consequential relief with full salary to the respondent, Cauvery Grameena Bank, the appellant herein, has preferred this appeal.
2. The factual matrix that has given rise to this appeal, in brief, is as under:
The respondent joined the services of the appellant-Bank as a File Supervisor on 26-9-1977 and was promoted as an officer on 1-9-1986. The appellant-Bank initiated disciplinary proceedings against the respondent as per the charge-sheet dated 14-11-1991 to look into the charges relating to the period during which the respondent was the Manager of Hoogia and Naganahalli Branches of the Bank. As many as eight charges were framed in respect of Hoogia Branch and three charges pertain to Naganahalli Branch. A departmental enquiry was ordered. In the enquiry, out of eight charges pertaining to Hoogia Branch, charges 1, 2, 5 and 7 stood proved and as regards Naganahalli Branch, all the three charges were found to be proved. The report submitted by the Enquiry Officer was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority, and without a second show-cause notice being issued, the appellant dismissed the respondent. Against this dismissal order, the respondent approached this Court in W.P. No. 7841 of 1994 and this Court remitted the matter to the appellant to issue second show-cause notice, before passing the final order.
3. Thereafter, a second show-cause notice was issued to the respondent on 26-7-1994 and, after receipt of the explanation offered by the respondent, the Disciplinary Authority passed the order dated 29-8-1994, imposing the penalty of dismissal from service in respect of charges 1 and 2 relating to Hoogia Branch and in respect of rest of the charges pertaining to Hoogia and Naganahalli Branches, the penalty of degradation to a lower stage was imposed, and it was made clear in the order that these penalties would run concurrently. Aggrieved by the above said order of the Disciplinary Authority, the respondent preferred a writ petition challenging the order of dismissal from service.
4. Before the learned Single Judge it was urged that the enquiry conducted was not fair and proper and there were many defects in the procedure that was followed during the enquiry and, therefore, the respondent sought quashing of the impugned order passed by the appellant-Bank, and for consequential relief.
5. The learned Single Judge, after considering the contentions put forward by both sides, and having regard to the case-law bearing on the contentions put forward, came to the conclusion that the enquiry conducted against the respondent herein was vitiated for more than one reason. The learned Single Judge, after careful consideration of the material placed, held that the enquiry was vitiated due to depriving the respondent from having the assistance of a legal practitioner to defend him in the enquiry; secondly, the documents sought for by the respondent were not furnished to him; thirdly, the Investigating Officer was of higher rank than the Enquiry Officer and, finally, on merits found that the Bank itself had given a statement before the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited ('DICGCI' for short) to the effect that there was no mis-utilization of the loan amount advanced by the Bank to the loanees and, therefore, the question of the respondent committing the irregularities in the disbursement of loan amounts will not arise, and based on such findings, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and the impugned order of penalty came to be quashed. The respondent was granted consequential benefits, including full salary. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge, the Bank has preferred this appeal.
6. Heard both sides.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellant Sri Puttige R. Ramesh submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge requires to be interfered with for the following reasons. It was contended that as per the Regulations of the Bank, the delinquent employee is not entitled to the services of an Advocate and, secondly, the statement made by the Bank before the DICGCI cannot be taken advantage by the respondent and, thirdly, the facts of the case would reveal that the Investigating Officer was not of a higher rank than the Enquiry Officer. As regards non-furnishing of documents, it was contended that the enquiry records would go to show that the delinquent officer had access to the relevant documents. It was also contended that the learned Single Judge has examined the whole matter as if sitting in appeal. The last two contentions urged are that, in financial matters, the approach of the Court should be very cautious and assuming that there were defects in the enquiry, the learned Single judge ought to have remanded the matter. In support of the above contentions, the learned Counsel Sri Puttige R. Ramesh placed reliance on several judgments, which would be referred in the course of this judgment.
8. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent Sri P.S. Rajagopal submitted that, the enquiry held by the bank is vitiated due to several procedural defects giving rise to violation of principles of natural justice. By referring to the enquiry proceedings, it was pointed out that assistance of an Advocate was not given to the delinquent officer and the Investigating Officer was the Area Manager at the relevant point of time and he was senior to the Enquiry Officer and therefore, it is not possible to expect the Enquiry Officer to function without any bias. Moreover, the Area Manager conducted the preliminary investigation and submitted the report and thereafter, he also gave evidence before the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, this procedure followed in the enquiry goes to the root of the matter.
9. Nextly, it was contended by the learned Counsel that the delinquent officer was not furnished with the documents sought for by him. The charge-sheet itself did not contain the list of witnesses or documents on which the management relied. The explanation given by the Bank for not furnishing the documents, cannot be accepted as reasonable. Even the Bank went to the extent of preventing the respondent from producing the documents. Hence, there was denial of opportunity as regards documents.
10. So far as the misconduct alleged against the respondent is concerned, the learned Counsel Sri Rajagopal submitted that the Bank itself made a statement before the DICGCI to the effect that there was no misutilisation of the funds in respect of the loans disbursed and therefore, in view of the said stand taken by the bank, it is obvious that there were no irregularities committed by the respondent. In this regard, our attention was drawn to relevant clauses of the scheme. It was then submitted that the Bank did not examine even a single borrower as a witness, but, on the other hand, the respondent examined 24 borrowers as defence witnesses and the Enquiry Officer has not referred to this aspect of the matter. Referring to the above defects, Sri Rajagopal submitted that the enquiry was vitiated and the learned Single Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry cannot be upheld for non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. In support of all the above contentions, the learned Counsel referred to number of judgments.
11. In the light of the contentions put forward by the respective sides and having considered the rulings referred in the course of the arguments, the following points arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the enquiry conducted by the appellant-Bank was vitiated for want of compliance with the requirements of principles of natural justice?
(ii) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the order of the dismissal passed by the Bank by granting consequential benefits to the respondent?
12. Point No. 1.--It is well-settled that observation of principles of natural justice is a sina qua non for an enquiry to be termed fair and proper. The Apex Court in a number of judgments has laid down various guidelines that are to be followed by the Enquiry Officer in conducting an enquiry. The essential requirements of a fair enquiry, as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Limited v. Their Workmen, are the following.--
(i) The employee proceeded against has been informed clearly of the charges levelled against him;
(ii) The witnesses are examined in the presence of the employee in respect of the charges;
(iii) The employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examining the employer's witnesses;
(iv) He is given a fair opportunity to put up his defence by examining defence witnesses, including himself, if he so wishes; and
(v) The Enquiry Officer makes a report recording his findings and the reasons thereof.
13. In the above backdrop, let us examine the material placed on record as regards fairness or otherwise of the enquiry held by the Bank.
14. The first salvo fired against the fairness of the enquiry is that, the assistance of an Advocate was not given to the respondent and therefore, the enquiry is defective. As regards this, learned Counsel for the respondent referred to the regulation of the Bank to contend that there is no bar in taking the assistance of an Advocate, because of the word 'may' found in the regulation. No doubt, Regulation 30(3) mentions that the delinquent employee 'may' not engage a legal practitioner to defend him in the enquiry. The said clause also came for interpretation before this Court in the case of R. Janardhan Naidu v. Cauvery Grameena Bank, 1989 (1) BLJ 84 and this Court held that a delinquent employee is entitled for the service of a legal practitioner to assist in the enquiry.
15. From the material placed before us, the facts that are not disputed are that the presenting officer for the Bank was neither a legally trained person nor did he possess qualification in law. Such being the case, the contention that the respondent was not given the assistance of a legal practitioner and therefore, the enquiry is vitiated, does not appeal to us as having enough substance in it. For the above said conclusion, we draw support from the recent judgments of the Apex Court. In the case of Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited v. Ram Naresh Tripathi, , the Supreme Court has held thus:
"A delinquent must be given an opportunity of presenting his case in such way suitable to the character of the enquiry which would ensure a fair hearing resulting in fair dispensation of justice. But that does not extend to the right to be represented through Counsel or agent. The right to be represented by a Counsel or agent of one's own choice is not an absolute right and can be controlled, restricted or regulated by law, rules, regulations or standing orders".
(emphasis supplied)
16. In the case of CIPLA Limited and Ors. v. Ripu Daman Bhanot and Anr., the Apex Court has held that assistance of an Advocate could not be claimed as of right. In the said case, Supreme Court also referred to the law laid down in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and Ors., wherein, it has held that "a delinquent employee has no right to be represented by his Advocate in the departmental proceedings and that, if a right to be represented by a co-workman is given to him, the departmental proceedings would not be bad in law for the reason that the assistance of an Advocate was not provided to him".
17. Such being the position in law, as regards engaging an Advocate to assist in the enquiry, having regard to the fact that Regulation 30(3) of the Regulations providing that an officer or employee 'may' not engage a legal practitioner, it cannot be said that the enquiry is vitiated merely because, assistance of an Advocate was not given to the respondent. A Division Bench of this Court having taken note of the above said regulation and the decision of this Court in Janardhan Naidu's case, as in the case of D.J. Jagadish v. Cauvery Grameena Bank, W.A. No. 997 of 1998, DD: 16-10-1998 (DB) opined that when the charges framed against a delinquent were in respect of various irregularities committed by the delinquent and which were in his exclusive knowledge and when the presenting officer was a non-law graduate, it is no longer open to the delinquent to contend that denial of the assistance of an Advocate has vitiated the enquiry. For the above said reasons, in the facts and circumstances of the case, with due respect, we disagree with the learned Single Judge's view on this aspect.
18. The second ground on which the fairness of the enquiry has been challenged is that the Investigating Officer was of a rank higher than that of the Enquiry Officer. In the case on hand, the Investigating Officer was one Sri Shivashankar and the Enquiry Officer was one Sri S.R. Ranganath. During the course of the hearing, learned Counsel Sri Puttige R. Ramesh made available to us the seniority record of the Bank indicating the seniority of the above two officers. From it we notice that the seniority of the Enquiry Officer was at Sl. No. 1 and that of the Investigating Officer Shivashankar was at Sl. No. 36. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant-Bank that the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the Enquiry Officer was junior to the Investigating Officer is factually incorrect has to be accepted. So far as examination of the Area Manager as a witness before the enquiry is concerned, there is a specific stand taken by the appellant-Bank in its objections to the writ petition to the effect that the witness Ishwar was not senior to the Enquiry Officer. This stand of the bank has not been disputed by the respondent in the writ proceedings. On the other hand, the stand taken by the respondent in the writ petition is that Ishwar submitted a report against the delinquent officer and therefore, when the same person gives evidence before the Enquiry Officer, the Enquiry Officer was bound to be biased. We have carefully examined this aspect of the matter, with reference to the enquiry proceedings and other materials placed before us and the case-law bearing on the point. No doubt, in the case of Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School and Ors., the Supreme Court has held that, where one of the members of the Enquiry Committee also deposed as a witness in support of one of the charges against the delinquent, the entire disciplinary proceeding gets vitiated. The Apex Court has further observed in the said case that "the deciding authority must be impartial and without bias and a predisposition to decide for and against one party without proper regard to the merits of the dispute is biased and that the test is not whether in fact bias has affected the judgment, but the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal". In another decision, referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondent this Court in Union of India v. Srinath,1978(2) Kar. L.J. 66 has observed thus:
"When the higher authorities like Colonel, Major and Captain have held that the respondent was guilty of the accusation it would not be reasonable to imagine that there was no likelihood of bias against the respondent in the mind of the Lieutenant who held the Departmental enquiry. Lieutenant being a Junior Officer, could not have gone against the opinion of guilt expressed by his superiors in the Army notwithstanding the evidence adduced before him".
19. Examined in the light of the above proposition of law, we find that, although the appellant-Bank has stated in its objections that Ishwar was not senior to the Enquiry Officer, unfortunately, the Bank has not placed sufficient material to support this pleading. In view of the pleading on this particular aspect being bereft of sufficient material to support the said stand and the further fact that the said Ishwar was the Area Manager within whose jurisdiction the Branch Manager was also working, lends substance to the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent that from the viewpoint of the delinquent officer, the said circumstance did give room to entertain a feeling of serious apprehension of bias. Hence, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the enquiry is vitiated on account of it being not free from the element of bias.
20. The next procedural defect pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent is that the delinquent officer was not furnished with the necessary documents nor was he given an opportunity to produce documents in support of his case. An examination of the enquiry report reveals that first of all, the charge-sheet material furnished to the respondent does not mention about witnesses who are going to be examined in support of the charge. No such list of witnesses is enclosed to the charge-sheet, not is there any mention in the charge-sheet supplied to the respondent about the documents on which the Management wants to rely in the enquiry proceedings. The inference to be drawn from this is that the respondent was kept in dark as regards the witnesses who are going to be examined, and even the documents on which the Bank would be placing reliance. Secondly, the enquiry record discloses that the request made by the respondent to furnish certain documents was not complied on the ground that those documents were seized by the Head Office authorities.
21. A perusal of the original enquiry proceedings dated 24-9-1992 also discloses that certain documents were not made available to the delinquent officer on the ground that they could not be traced out. Similarly, we find at page No. 183 of the enquiry proceedings that the Enquiry Officer has observed that with regard to the documents sought for by the defence, the Presiding Officer and the defence are advised to sort out the matter. Again, at page 186 of the enquiry proceedings dated 25-9-1992, there is a submission by the presiding officer that certain documents are not traced out at the branch and it is also mentioned by the presenting officer that inspite of all the efforts put in, some documents could not be traced out. We also notice from the original enquiry proceedings that many documents were introduced in the enquiry without prior notice to the delinquent officer. In addition to the above defects, the Bank got marked several documents through the Branch Manager Hanumanna, without the delinquent officer being given an opportunity to cross-examine the said witness.
22. The case-law on the point is to the following effect: A Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party (S.R. Nayak, J.), in the case of Venkatesh Gururao Kuratti v. Syndicate Bank, Manipal, Dakshina Kannada District and Ors., 2004(7) Kar. L.J. 243 (DB) : ILR 2004 Kar. 2240 (DB) has held that the non-supply of documents sought by the delinquent will vitiate the enquiry, and summed up the proposition of law thus:
"The delinquent in the departmental or domestic enquiry is entitled to demand and receive two sets of documents namely, (i) all those documents on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority has framed the charges and the documents on which the Disciplinary Authority placed reliance to prove those charges; and (ii) other documents which may not be the basis for framing the charges nor those on which the Disciplinary Authority places reliance to prove the charges against the delinquent, but, which are required by the delinquent to effectively defend himself in the enquiry and to effectively cross-examine the witnesses of the Disciplinary Authority. If required relevant documents are not made available to a delinquent, it is trite, such delinquent would be prejudiced in defending himself against the charge effectively. Departmental/domestic enquiry in order to be valid, a Disciplinary Authority not only appraise the delinquent precisely and clearly with the charges levelled against him but also should supply all necessary information, particulars and documents that may be required by the delinquent to defend himself effectively in the enquiry".
23. The Apex Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shatrughan Lal and Anr., 2has observed that where copies of documents indicated to be relied upon in the charge-sheet are not supplied and it was said that the delinquent could have inspected the documents at any time, the same would not be a sufficient compliance with principles of natural justice and the inference that effective opportunity was not afforded to the delinquent has to be drawn. In yet, another decision referred by the learned Counsel for the respondent, learned Single Judge of this Court in S.G. Nayak v. Canara Bank, W.P. No. 30770 of 1995 (S-DE) connected with W.P. No. 3039) of 1995 (S-DE) has observed that non-furnishing of documents at the earliest point of time and denial of documents on the ground that documents are not in custody etc., would vitiate the enquiry. The entire procedure followed in the enquiry, if examined in the light of the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court referred to above, would leave no one in doubt that the procedure followed was not fair and proper insofar as production and supply of documents are concerned. We are, therefore, in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the enquiry is vitiated on account of non-furnishing of documents to the delinquent officer.
24. Thus, the foregoing discussion of the enquiry procedure followed by the Enquiry Officer would go to show that the enquiry stood vitiated for more than one reason, although the said conclusion of ours is in consonance with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge, though from a different angle. We, accordingly, answer Point No. 1 in the affirmative.
25. Point No. 2.--The learned Single Judge, after having recorded his finding that the enquiry is not fair and proper, has set aside the dismissal order passed by the appellant-Bank and granted consequential benefits, including full salary to the respondent. While mentioning that although in the normal course, the Court would have remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct de novo enquiry, yet, in view of the Bank having filed application before the DICGCI that there is no misutilisation of the loans advanced to the loanees, the learned Single Judge opined that remanding the case is not warranted.
26. Learned Counsel Sri Puttige R. Ramesh appearing for the appellant-Bank has contended that even if the learned Single Judge took the view that the enquiry is vitiated, the only alternative could have been, remanding the matter for de novo enquiry and not interference with the order of dismissal passed by the Management.
27. It was further contended by the learned Counsel that the High Court cannot function as an Appellate Authority and examine the findings of the Enquiry Officer threadbare. As there was some evidence placed before the Enquiry Officer with regard to the alleged misconduct, sufficiency or otherwise of the same cannot be examined by the High Court as if sitting in appeal over the finding of the Enquiry Officer. It was submitted that the charges levelled against the respondent pertain to misappropriation of loan amounts and abuse of official position, to secure undue pecuniary gain and extending undue favour to certain borrowers and such being the nature of the charges levelled against the respondent, interference with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is uncalled for. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on a judgment in the case of Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India and Anr., ILR 2005 Kar. 1924 (SC) : 2004 AIR SCW 6725 : 2004 (8) Supreme 607
28. On the other hand, Sri P.S. Rajagopal contended that when the Bank itself had stated in its application given to the DICGCI that there was misutilisation of the loans advanced, the question of the respondent committing any irregularities muchless financial irregularities will not arise and the learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that this was not a case warranting remand.
29. In the light of the contentions put forward by the respective sides and after a careful perusal of the entire material placed before us, we are disinclined to accept the viewpoint of the learned Single Judge for the following reasons.
30. The evidence let in by the appellant-Bank to substantiate the charges levelled against the delinquent officer has not been discussed anywhere in the order of the learned Single Judge. Whether there was sufficient material placed by the Bank to prove the charges levelled against the delinquent officer or not is a matter which requires appreciation of evidence. In the instant case, on behalf of the Bank, three witnesses were examined and 15 documents were marked and, on the side of the defence, D.Ws. 1 and 2 and Exs. DEX-1 to 7 were marked. Whether solely on the basis of the statement given by the Bank before the DICGCI, the entire evidence placed before the Enquiry Officer can be discarded in toto is the moot point. The further question that crops up is, was there not sufficient evidence to establish the charges against the delinquent notwithstanding the statement of the Bank before the DICGCI. Can this Court totally ignore, the evidence placed in the enquiry and draw inference that the statement of the Bank before the DICGCI is sufficient to conclude that there was no iota of material placed in the enquiry against the delinquent officer. The answer to the above questions lie in the appreciation of evidence on record. Can this Court embark upon such an exercise? The straight answer is "No".
31. This is because of the limitations of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi and Ors., (1991)2 SCC 716 has observed that, while exercising the powers, under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the Court does not sit as a Court of appeal on the findings of facts recorded by the Standing Committee (domestic enquiry body), nor has power to evaluate the evidence as an Appellate Court and to come to its own conclusions. In the case of State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, the Apex Court has held that, reappreciation of evidence as if it were sitting in appeal against the decision of departmental authorities is erroneous. In the case of R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors., the Supreme Court has observed thus:
"High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction does not reverse a finding of inquiring authority on the ground that evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support conclusions of inquiring authority, it is not the function of the Court to review evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole Judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate its findings. Adequacy or reliability of evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings".
The observation of the Supreme Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, is as under:
"... The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities...".
32. It is the above pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court that has inclined us to say no to the task of embarking upon appreciation of evidence.
33. Before proceeding further, mention has to be made about the judgment referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondent. Learned Counsel Sri Rajagopal, placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in N. Krishna Murthy v. Syndicate Bank, Manipal, Dakshina Kannada and Ors., 2000(1) Kar. L.J. Sh. N. 31 : ILR 1999 Kar. 3096 contended that once the Bank files a statement before the Credit Guarantee Corporation that loans sanctioned were in order, then, in view of the said admitted position, the charge relating to sanction of loans will be untenable. After careful perusal of the said case, we are convinced that the facts and circumstances in the above mentioned case are entirely different from the one on hand. That was a case where there was enormous delay in initiating the enquiry itself. In the absence of an enquiry being held, the only material available before the Court was the admission said to have been made by the Bank before the Credit Guarantee Corporation and, therefore, the Court rightly ordered reinstatement of the delinquent. But, in the instant case, a full-fledged enquiry has been conducted, number of witnesses have been examined and both sides have produced documents and considering all the material placed, the Enquiry Officer has recorded the finding as regards the charges levelled against the delinquent officer. Hence, the above said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts.
34. What then is the course open to this Court? The answer lies in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, . In the said case, after holding that the enquiry was vitiated for non-supply of enquiry report, the Supreme Court held that the proper course would be to give the Management an opportunity to hold fresh enquiry. The Apex Court observed thus:
"(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice".
35. One other reason why the matter requires to be remanded is that the case of the Bank against the delinquent officer is that the latter, while working as Branch Manager at Hoogia and Naganahalli Branches, committed certain irregularities amounting to misappropriation and misusing official position for unlawful financial gain. In a case of such nature, if, without examining the evidence let in by the parties before the Enquiry Officer, the order of the Disciplinary Authority is interfered with, the same would not be justifiable in law. For this view, we draw support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur. In the said case, the Apex Court has observed that the Bank Manager/Officer and employees of any Bank, nationalised or non-nationalised, are expected to act and discharge their functions in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bank. The Apex Court entirely agreed with the following observations made in the case of Regional Manager, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Etawah and Ors. v. Hoti Lal and Anr., :
"If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal".
36. Therefore, having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of the settled position in law, we are of the considered view that this is fit case to remand the matter to the appellant-Bank to conduct a de novo enquiry by observing the principles of natural justice and ensuring that the enquiry is conducted in accordance with the procedure established by law. Hence, the order of the learned Single Judge insofar as it relates to interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the Bank cannot be sustained in law for the aforementioned reasons. Accordingly, we answer the point under consideration in the negative.
37. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we pass the following order:
(a) The writ appeal is allowed;
(b) The order dated 28-8-2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 4947 of 1995 is set aside;
(c) The enquiry held by the Bank and the order of dismissal dated 29-8-1994 are set aside. The Bank is at liberty to conduct a de novo enquiry in accordance with law and the disciplinary proceedings shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of this order;
(d) The period from the date of passing of the dismissal order till completion of the Disciplinary proceedings to be now held shall be treated as one of suspension.
The parties to bear their own costs.