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Conventions and Rules of Conduct :

34. There is no precise definition of political conventions'. Geoffrey-Marshall defines 'conventions' as "rules that define major non-legal rights, powers and obligations of officeholders in the three branches of Government, or relations between the Government and organs of Government"; (see page 210 of his book "Constitutional Conventions : Rules and Forms of Political Accountability"). This may be taken as the most acceptable one. According to Hood. Phillips, the working definition of 'Constitutional Conventions' is "Rules of political practice which are regarded as binding on those to whom they apply but which are not laws, as they are not enforced by Courts or by the House of Parliament....". The learned author further distinguishes constitutional conventions from mere practice, usage, habit, or fact and also from non-political rules, i.e., Rules of Conduct. The author says, "this definition distinguishes constitutional conventions from: (ii) non-political rules, i.e., rules of conduct, which are not referable to the reads of the constitutional government, e.g., ethical or moral rules, or the almost invariable custom of Crowning the Queen's consort which has no constitutional significance.....". The learned author says further "it is also helpful to distinguish conventions from such.....alike concepts as 'traditions', 'principles', and 'doctrines'..... The purpose of convention may be seen as to give effect to these traditions, principles, or values.....". It, therefore, appears that the Rules of Conduct, or Code of Conduct which the petitioners are speaking of, do not fall within the concept "Constitutional Conventions", as it is ordinarily understood. Even if we take a broader view of the expression 'conventions' and say that conventions may also pertain to Rules of Conduct of such high constitutional functionaries, even so the fact remains that these conventions are not laws, and that they are not enforceable in Courts. Moreover, no material has been placed before us to show that any such conventions relating to rules of conduct of Ministers, are evolved in England, or are evolved in this country, or that the Courts have proceeded to enforce such conventions, if any.

"The main purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that the legal framework of the Constitution will be operated in accordance with the prevailing constitutional values or principles of the period. For example, the constitutional value which is the pivot of the conventions stated above and relating to responsible government is the democratic principle; the powers of the State must be exercised in accordance with the wishes of the electorate; and the constitutional value or principle which anchors the conventions regulating the relationship between the members of the Commonwealth is the independence of the former British colo-nies.

36. Indeed, this decision has given rise to a criticism on the following lines: Once the majority says that the Court has no power to enforce the constitutional conventions, there was no occasion for the Court to go into the question, or to record a finding whether a constitutional convention of the kind pleaded by the Provinces, does, or does not exist. On the other hand, the supporters of the viewpoint who adopted the decision, say that the line adopted by the court is a case of judicial statesmanship, and that it helped to clarify an uncertain issue of great importance to the Canadian nation.

37. Our Supreme Court too has repeatedly referred to constitutional conventions, but has not held that constitutional conventions are enforceable by Courts; (see : U.N.R. Rao & Ram Jawaya Kapur, and .

Power of this Court to grant relief in these writ petitions :

38. From the preceding discussion it is clear that the rules of conduct do not have a constitutional or statutory sanction, and cannot be enforced by the Court. The Code of Conduct evolved by the Union or the State Government does not confer any rights upon citizens and, therefore, cannot be enforced through Court. The respective Codes specify the authority empowered to enforce the same. The Court does not enter the picture. Indeed, we had been, at pains to point out to the counsel for the petitioners from the very beginning that it would neither be permissible, nor advisable for this Court to evolve a Code of Conduct by itself, though we do not deny the. necessity of such a Code in the interest of good Government and fair administration. The Court cannot perform a pure and simple legislative function. It is significant to notice that the Constitution has left several matters un-said. Even the Parliament or the State Legislature has not thought it fit-to make a law regulating the conduct of Ministers. It would be inadvisable for the Court to seek to supply the omission by evolving a law/ code itself, and then enforce it. The Ministers are primarily responsible to the Legislature. Any deviation from moral and ethical standards is a matter for the Legislature, and ultimately for the people to deal with. Nor can we say that merely because a Minister is held to be a public servant, within the meaning of S.21 of the I.P. Code, he becomes a public servant for all purposes and therefore he must devote all his time to his official duties. It must be remembered that it is an elective office. There is no relationship of employer and employee, or master and servant, in the case of a Minister-the concept of the people being the masters being really a political concept. It is a political office. Participation in political activities while continuing as a Minister is inherent in the very office. How much time does a Minister devote to his political activities and how much time to official duties is not a matter for the Court to decide. It is well known that at the time of elections, these functionaries devote more lime to political work than to official work. No one has said so far that they ought not to do so. We must also say that at the highest levels of Government, or for that matter, of judiciary, what matters is a sense of self-discipline, a commitment to duty, and an adherence to oath of office. There may in fact, be no check on wrong doing on their part. Experience has shown that in a Parliamentary form of Government, more so in a welfare State, the Prime Minister/Chief Minister tends to become all powerful. The notion that a Prime Minister is 'primus inter pares' is no longer valid. Some scholars think that the appellation 'Prime-Ministerial form of Government' would be more nearer to reality. (See Keith: British Constitutional System (Second Edition)' at pages 64-66, where he says :