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Paragraph 457 of the same volume deals with the circumstances in which a "Lessee may show that the lessor's title has determined" and it is laid down that--

"A tenant is not estopped either before or after the expiration of the term from showing that his lessor's title has determined. If, however, the tenant came into possession under the lessor, the better opinion would seem to be that he must surrender possession before he disputed the lessor's title or have been evicted by a person having title paramount; but it has been held that unless he claims to be entitled to the premisses in his own right, it is not necessary that he should actually go out of possession."
"The defendant (Clarke) cannot by reason merely of the delay refuse to give the possession of which he was bound to have given at the time when the plaintiffs demanded it of him."

9. The aforesaid principle of surrendering or solemnly renouncing possession, is, however, subject to certain exceptions. By and large, the exceptions to this rule are (i) where a plaintiff or a defendant does not seek either to evict or to defend his title as a landlord on the strength of a tenancy, but on the strength of his title and the erstwhile tenant having acquired an indefeasible right in himself is opposing the stand on the strength of a title in himself say for instance, as a vendee. (The case of Md. Hussain v. Abdul Gafoor. AIR 1945 Mad 321 is a case of this nature), (ii) where the tenant has been evicted by a person holding a title paramount, and (iii) where under a threat or compulsion of being evicted by the true owner or by a person claiming better title than the landlord, the lessee attorns to such third person with notice to his original lessor. In either of these cases the actual physical possession need not be given up, for the possession, in such circumstances, under the lease will be deemed to have been surrendered and a new title created either as an owner or as a new lessee under the true owner or the paramount title-holder. Even mere payment of rent to a third party would not be enough to determine the tenancy by attornment to that party so as to give a protection to the tenant from the legal requirement of surrendering possession to his original landlord. This aspect of the law has been very elaborately discussed and succinctly put in the case of Jogendra Lal Sarkar v. Mahesh Chandra Sadhu (47 Cal LJ 387 at p. 393) = (AIR 1929 Cal 22 at P. 24) thus--

And again--

"Though the tenancy may be continuing it is quite open to the tenant to plead and show that his liability to pay the rent has wholly or partially or for a time ceased. Such a plea does not amount to disputing the landlord's title but is really one of confession and avoidance. One such plea is that of non-liability to pay the rent on the ground that the lessor's title has been defeated by a title paramount or in other words that there has been eviction by title paramount. In the case of a complete eviction it is not quite easy to see the distinction as the question of continuance of tenancy and the question of eviction by title paramount terminating the liability to pay the rent would go hand in hand."

10. It would thus be seen that eviction by title paramount may be a meritorious defence for the tenant to set up against the plea of eviction by the original lessor, vide Jogendra Lal Sarkar's case 47 Cal LJ 387 = (AIR 1929 Cal 22) (Supra) and K.S.M. Guru Swami Nadar v. N.G. Ranganathan, AIR 1954 Mad 402. This defence obviously must be established by the party setting it up. What then is the true connotation of the term "eviction by title paramount". Foa on Landlord and Tenant 6th Edition at pages 194-195 says that it is not necessary that the tenant should go out of possession, and if upon a claim being made by a person with title paramount he consents to an attornment to such person to change the title under which he holds or enters into a new arrangement for holding under him, this will be equivalent to an eviction and a fresh taking. It will thus be seen that a forcible expulsion of the tenant is not an invariable concomitant of eviction by title paramount. The title paramount over that of the lessor destroys the effect of the grant made by that lessor, thereby destroying as a neces3ary corollary the corresponding liability for payment of rent. If the eviction has been from the demised premises by a party having a title better than or superior to the landlord and the tenant had either quitted against, his will or has attorned under a threat of expulsion with intimation to the original lessor, then the eviction by title paramount is complete. For such a defence to be substantiated necessary facts must be pleaded. In the present case, as a matter of fact, the plea of eviction by title paramount was not even taken in the written statement nor was any issue framed upon it. It was merely submitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that since the entire Dhalbhum Estate must be deemed to have vested in the State of Bihar, as a consequence of a notification issued under Section 3 or 3-A of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 1950, it should be presumed that the respondents title qua landlord had been extinguished and that the appellant should be held to have been evicted by title paramount by the State of Bihar. It has never been the case of the appellant that he had ever been threatened either expressly or even tacitly by the State of Bihar to be evicted from the leasehold premises in question. Nor has it been averred and proved that there has been any attornment by payment of rent to the State of Bihar. The plea of eviction by title paramount in answer to the doctrine of estoppel in favour of the respondents must, therefore, fail. Learned Counsel for the appellant had placed great reliance on a judgment of Mulla, J., in the case of Rev. Luckman Chaplain v Pearey Lal. AIR 1939 All 670 for the proposition that where the tenant's denial of his landlord's title was related to facts which had happened subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy the bar of estoppel did not come into operation. I am afraid, the true purport of this decision has not been fully appreciated by learned Counsel. The learned Judge in that case was actually considering a plea of eviction by title paramount as would appear from the following observations at page 672: