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3. It is the last contention which was pressed most strenuously by counsel and I would deal with it in the first instance. The argument of counsel was that the doctrine of issue estoppel was attracted to the case and that since the petitioner was acquitted by the criminal Court on identical charges, the findings in the criminal cases would operate as res judicata against Government and would preclude evidence being led to prove the facts in issue in the disciplinary proceedings as regards which evidence has already been led and findings entered by the criminal Court. Counsel said that there is no reason why the doctrine of issue estoppel should be confined to the trial of an issue in a subsequent criminal case.

5. I do not think that the doctrine of issue est appel has any application here. The doctrine is only concerned with the admissibility of evidence designed to upset a finding recorded by a competent Court in a previous trial in a substquent criminal trial, It has never been applied in the case of an enquiry before a tribunal conducting a disciplinary proceeding, although the proceeding might be quasi-criminal in character.

6. It was then contended that because of the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal cases, the disciplinary proceedings were barred. Counsel referred me to the judgment of Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in J. D'silva v. Road Transport Authority A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 858 to support the contention. In that case, the question was whether the discharge of the cleaner of the lorry in question there by the Magistrate of an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Panal Code and Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act would preclude the Road Transport Authority from suspending the permit on the ground that the lorry was used to carry smuggled artices. The learned Judges held that the discharge order by the Magistrate was conclusive, and that no further enquiry oan be had into the offence by the Road Transports Authority for suspendlng the permit of the vehicle. The Court said that primarily the criminal Courts of the land are entrusted with enquiry into offences, and it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal Courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi-Judicial tribunals like Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court also said that if there is conviotion by a competent criminal Court, that would furnish conclusive ground for any penal action by the transport authorities and that equally, if the criminal prosecution ended in a diacharge or acquittal of the accused. and that event happened before the order of any Road Transport Tribunal, then, the tribunal would not have the power to go behind the final order of a competent criminal Court. According to the learned Judges, if at the time the Road Transport Tribunal disposes of any application or before such tribunal passes an order no prosecution has been launched, then, of course, It is not incumbent on the tribunal to await the criminal prosecution. But if a prosecution has actually commenced and that prosecution is in respect of the same offence by reason of which the transport authority proposes to take drastic action against the accused in the criminal case, then, it is desirable that the transport authority should await the decision of the criminal Court. The Court considered that this procedure would avoid the spectacle of two departments of the Government proceeding on contradictory lines to the annoyance and hardship of the citizens. This decision was followed in Shaik Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Offices, Chingleput Division, and Anr. 1965-I L.L.J. 197. In that case Ananthanarayanan, emulating Chief Justice, said that an administrative authority in initiating disciplinary proceedings is not bound to wait for the verdict of a criminal Court. But where the criminal Court has tried a person and acquitted him, it would be improper, and that such a proceeding is liable to be quashed as not in consonance with the principles of natural justice, if the administrative authority later initiates disciplinary proceedings on the identical facts and identical charges and records a contrary conclusion. The learned Judge said that the acquittal should have been substantially on the merits; and that technical acquittals on grounds like want of sanction or Jurisdiction may not inhibit departmental disciplinary proceedings. He further said that there is no inflexible rule that the finding of a criminal Court is conclusive, in every sense, upon administrative authorities and that if the finding is based purely on technical grounds; the administrative authority may conceivably punish, on the same facts. It could also punish, he said, on the same facts. for some lesser charges, which may not amount to a criminal offence, but may well amount to grave dereliction of duty, entitling disciplinary action. He was of opinion that where the acquittal is substantially on merits, it will not be proper for a disciplinary tribunal to record a finding of guilt on substantially same facts, and to punish thereon and that there is no difference whether the departmental authority acts before the criminal proceedings or after it.

12. The principles governing criminal Justice that the State would allow a score of real offenders to escape rather than see a single innocent man convicted, can hardily find an each in disciplinary proceeding.

13. As regards the observations of the learned Judges in J. D'Silva v. Road Transport Authority (vide supra) that when a criminal Court and a disciplinary authority come to difference conclusions on identical charges, the spectacles is rather undefying, I need only say that is inherent in our system. We see much the same thing when a civil Court arrives at a finding different from that of a criminal Court in respect of the same matter.