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Showing contexts for: NGT in Sunil Kumar Samanta vs West Bengal Pcb Ors on 24 July, 2014Matching Fragments
9. A bare reading of the above provision shows that appeal as contemplated under Section 16 against an order or decision or direction or determination, has to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to the aggrieved persons. Proviso to Section 16 of the NGT Act provides for a special limitation i.e. the appeal could be filed beyond the period of 30 days within a further period not exceeding 60 days, upon showing 'sufficient cause'. This means the tribunal cannot allow an appeal to be filed under Section 16 beyond a total period of 90 days. The NGT Act is a self-contained code as it provides for the forum, procedure, limitation, functions and powers of the tribunal. Furthermore, the scheme of the NGT Act, particularly, with reference to the language of Section 16 of the NGT Act, provides special limitation period. Thus, it necessarily excludes the operation of the general law of limitation. The provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be harmoniously construed with the provisions prescribing special limitation under the NGT Act as in that event it would defeat the very purpose of the NGT Act. A limitation provided under special law must prevail over the general law of limitation; particularly in face of the overriding effect given to the NGT Act by the framers of the law in terms of Section 33 of the NGT Act. In terms of Section 33, the provisions of the NGT Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. The cumulative effect of all these factors would be that the special limitation prescribed under the NGT Act does not admit any exception to attract the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. Section 16 of the NGT Act controls the very institution of an appeal in the Registry of the Tribunal. In terms of Section 16, the appeal can be filed 'within a further period not exceeding 60 days' but thereafter the Tribunal is not vested with the power to allow the appeal to be filed beyond the total period of 90 days. Thus, the tribunal loses its jurisdiction to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the special period of limitation provided under proviso to Section 16 of the NGT Act.
15. We have already noticed that NGT Act is a self-contained code in itself. It provides the forum/procedure that has to be adopted, the limitation period within which the jurisdiction of the tribunal gets invoked, and the power and functions of the tribunal in explicit terms. As a self-contained code, it does not admit of any ambiguity with regard to application of other laws in the adjudicatory process of the tribunal. The legislature in its wisdom has worded provisions of Section 16 of the NGT Act so as to prohibit even filing of an appeal beyond a total period of 90 days. The language of these provisions clearly demonstrates the legislative intendment on excluding application of general law of limitation to this special statute. Such a view would also find clear support from the language of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act which postulates that when a special law prescribes for any period of limitation different from the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act and the language of the provisions of such special law is indicative of express or implied exclusion, then Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act shall apply only and to the extent they are not excluded by the Special Law. The cumulative reading of Section 16, particularly, the proviso and Section 29 of the Limitation Act leaves no doubt in mind that legislature had clearly intended to exclude the application of the general law of limitation provided under the Limitation Act from the NGT Act. Proviso to Section 16 of the NGT Act uses the expression 'allow it to be filed under this Section within a further period not exceeding 60 days'. The use of the negative language 'not' in the proviso makes it mandatory that appeals cannot be filed after the expiry of total period of 90 days and thus, there is lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal to condone the delay beyond a total period of 90 days. The framers of law, where, in their wisdom wanted to give a benefit and/or restrict or place embargo on exercise of a right, have done so by using specific language in Section 16 of the NGT Act. A special concession is made available to an appellant to file an appeal beyond 30 days, the initial period of limitation prescribed under that provision. The framers there put a specific embargo on the power of the Tribunal not to entertain an appeal after the expiry of a further period of 60 days. Thus the legislature, by necessary implication excluded the application of general law of limitation from the provisions of the NGT Act. At this stage we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133, where the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the Representation of the Peoples' Act, 1951 and the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Court in relation to the interpretation of the language of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act held as:
Having noticed various judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts for and against the proposition, the undisputed principle that emerges and which has been consistently followed by the Supreme Court, is that a mere provision of the period of limitation in the statute is not sufficient to displace the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. But where the act is a complete code in itself and where the scheme of the Act and the language of the relevant provisions expressly or impliedly exclude the applicability of the general law of limitation, then such exclusion is accepted by the Court. Not only the scheme of the NGT Act, which is a self contained code, clearly demonstrates legislative intent for exclusion of the general law of limitation, but specifically gives precedence to the provisions of the NGT Act in terms of Section 33 of the NGT Act, which clearly means that the provisions of limitation contained in the NGT Act would prevail and by necessary implication would exclude the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act. Thus, it squarely satisfies the ingredients of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
30. It is next contended on behalf of the appellant that since no penal consequences for default in not filing application within 90 days have been provided under the NGT Act, it should be construed that the legislature did not intend to exclude the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act from the NGT Act. Even this contention of the appellant does not impress us. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the NGT Act in relation to limitation. The consequences of not filing an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation are inbuilt in proviso to Section 16. It is the very filing of the appeal under Section 16 of the NGT Act that stands barred if it is brought beyond the period of 90 days. The language of the proviso clearly imposes a duty upon the Tribunal not to permit filing of the appeal if the same is filed beyond the further period of 60 days.