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17. By reason of the said order, therefore, a dispute was required to be raised which evidently did not comprehend filing of an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act but despite the same, such an application was filed by the respondent No. 3 on June 1, 1992 i.e. long after his date of superannuation which, as noticed hereinbefore, took place on January 7, 1991.

18. The submission of the respondent No. 3 to the effect that as no time limit has been fixed for exercising option, such option could be exercised at any time is stated to be rejected. The submission raised to the effect that such a time limit fixed is merely directory in nature is not correct. When a person is required to exercise his option in terms of a scheme, notification or a settlement, he must do so within the time framed. Exercise of option by an employee beyond the time framed does not arise unless the same is expressly extended by the employer. Only because the consequence has not been provided for therein, the same cannot be held to be directory as was sought to be submitted. A provision fixing a time limit asking the public functionary to exercise a public function within a time limit is normally held to be directory but the said rule does not apply in a case of an employee where he is required to exercise his option in terms of a settlement. If the argument of the respondent No. 3 is accepted, the same would result in an absurdity inasmuch as he could exercise his option even after expiry of the period of settlement. In any view of the matter, such a question in the present does not arise inasmuch as noticed hereinbefore the respondent No. 3 had accepted all the benefits to which he was entitled by opting out of the settlement and he having received the said benefit without any demur whatsoever must be held to be stopped and precluded from questioning the same. In case of this nature even the doctrine of acceptance sub-silentio shall be attracted.