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11. A reference is also made by the respondent in her plaint to certain facts alleged by respondent no.1 in respect of late Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru by his late Secretary M.O. Mathai in the book published by Mr. Mathai. It is further alleged in the plaint that the publication of appellant is not based upon any public records nor doe sit relate to the acts or conduct relevant to the discharge of any official duties.

12. The respondent prayed in the suit for a restraint order against the defendant form publishing, circulating or selling the said autobiography or any extract pertaining to respondent and her family, in any manner, as reproduced in the article in India Today and further claimed damages against appellant no.1 for publishing the defamatory statements in India Today. The claim for damages has been quantified at Rs. 5 lacs on which ad-valorem court fee has been affixed but in para 12 of the plaint the respondent has stated that the court may determine the final quantum of damages and the respondent would pay court fee of such amount of damages as may be awarded by the court. Along with the plaint an application for interim relief (IA NO. 12567/95) under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 CPC was also filed. The respondent was granted an ad-interim ex parte order by the learned Single Judge on 16th December, 1995 against the publication of the autobiography. Appellant no.1 filed an application (IA No. 646/96) for vacation of the order dated 16th December, 1995 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 read with section 151 CPC. Appellant no.2 also filed an application (IA No.647/96) on the same terms supporting the case of appellant no.1. In the said application appellant no.1 has denied that there are any defamatory or libellous statements against the respondent. Appellant no.1 further owed up to the statement and asserted them as correct and truthful. In para 2 of the application it is stated "the defendant no.1 submits that what is stated in his autobiography relating to Maneka Gandhi is correct and the truth of the statement will be justified at the trial." Thus appellant no.1 has stood up to what he has stated in the autobiography. Appellant no.1 has further stated that he regarded the respondent as a younger member of his family and from time to time advised her as such, supported her and defended her against false accusations and unjust attacks. In fact it is stated by appellant no.1 that he had complimented the respondent in laudatory terms on various occasions. Appellant no.1 has referred to his association with the Magazine Surya when the respondent was a journalist in-charge of the same.

(B) "Whoever fills a public position renders himself open thereto. He must accept appendage to his office "(Per Bramwell B., in Kelly v. Sherlock (1866) 1 Q.B. 686(689).

(C) Public men in such positions may as well think it worth their while to ignore such vulgar criticisms and abuses hurled against them rather than give an importance to the same by prosecuting the persons responsible for the same.

30. The learned senior counsel for the appellant referred to the judgment of Bombay High Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Limited & Another vs. Dr. Jagmohan Mundhara & another to advance his submission that it is a well settled principle of law that although the court is satisfied that the words complained of are prima facie libellous and untrue, it will refuse interlocutory injunction where the plaintiff has been dilatory in making his application or has by his conduct disentitled himself to such relief e.g., has expressly or impliedly encouraged, acquiesced in or assented to the publication of which he complains. Mr. Sundaram, thus contended that the subject matter had been previously commented upon in publications and in fact the respondent had encouraged the media to comment on her disputes with late Smt. Indira Gandhi at the relevant stage and thus could not object to appellant no. 1 now writing about the same.

"There is a parallel to be drawn with libel cases. Just as in libel, the courts do not grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of the truth or of fair comment. So also with confidential information. If there is a legitimate ground for supposing that it is in the public interest for it to be disclosed, the courts should not restrain it by an interlocutory injunction, but should leave the complainant to his remedy in damages. Such that this case were tried out and the plaintiffs failed in their claim for libel on the ground that all that was said was true. It would seem unlikely that there would be much damages awarded for breach of confidentiality. I cannot help feeling that the plaintiff's real complaint here is that the words are defamatory; and as they cannot get an interlocutory injunction on that ground, nor should they on confidential information.

36. The learned counsel also referred to Carter-Ruck on Libel & Slander, 4th Edition at page 178 to fortify his submission that the law relating to grant of interlocutory injunctions in defamation actions is significantly different from that relating to injunctions in general. To the same effect is the commentary on "defamation" by Colin Duncan QC & Brian Neill QC 1978 Edition at page 146 and 147 paras 19.0 to 19.03, 19.04 and 19.05. The authors have referred to observations of various courts and propounded the general rule that an interlocutory injunction will not be granted if there is any doubt as to whether the words are defamatory or if the defendant swears that he will be able to justify the words complained of. The learned counsel also drew strength from the commentary of Gatley on Libel and Slander, 8th Edition at pages 640 and 641 to the same effect.