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19. Mrs. Ketty A. Mehta, learned advocate appearing for the appellants has further submitted that the suit was not registered with the registering authority and hence, the doctrine of lis pendence is not applicable. Section 18 of the Registration Act, 1908 deals with documents of which registration is optional. In its application to the State of Maharashtra, in Section 18, clause (ee) was inserted by Bombay Act, 14 of 1939 read with 35 of 1956. Clause (ee) states that notices of pending suit or proceedings referred to in Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1988. Section 2 of Bombay Act, 14 of 1939 as amended by Bombay Act, 17 of 1945 states that this Act shall apply to notices in respect of suits or proceedings which relate to immovable properties situated wholly or partly in the Greater Bombay with effect from such date as may be directed by the State Government in this behalf by Notification in the Official Gazette. The State Government, however, by similar Notification may direct that the Provisions of this Act shall apply to such notices relating to immovable properties situated wholly or partly in such other area as may be specified in the said Notification. By virtue of the Transfer of Property (Bombay Provisions for Uniformity and Amendment) Act, 1959, the provisions of the Transfer of Property and the Indian Registration (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1939 which amended the Trnasfer of Property Act, 1882, in its application to the pre-organisation State of Bombay, are extended to and remained in force in that part of the State of Bombay to which they did not extend immediately before the commencement of the said Act, and, now, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is deemed to be amended accordingly also in that part of the State. On the basis of the changes made in this statutory provision, Mrs. Mehta has submitted that the doctrine of lis pendens has no application to the facts of the present case as even after bifurcation of the state of Bombay, if the property is situated in the State of Gujarat and filing of the suit in respect of that property is not registered with the registering authority, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application.

26. Mr. Vyas has further submitted that since the transfer of the suit property was effected during the pendency of the suit, in view of the provisions contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the said transfer is hit by principles of lis pendens. For this purpose, he relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NAGUBAI AMMAL AND OTHERS V/S. B. SHAMA RAO AND OTHERS, AIR 1956 S.C. 593 wherein it is held that when a suit is filed for maintenance and there is a prayer that it be charged on specified properties, it is a suit in which right to immovable property is directly in question, and the lis commences on the date of the plaint and not on the date of the decree, which creates the charge.

27. Mr. Vyas has further relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ANAND NIVAS PRIVATE LIMITED V/S. ANANDJI KALYANJI'S PEDHI AND OTHERS, AIR 1965 S.C. 414 wherein it is held that "the Legislature intended to make the Act applicable only to transfers of title to immovables only in areas where the litigants were sufficiently sophisticated to understand the importance of registration. As Bombay Act XIV of 1939 is intended to apply to the situs of immovable property not the Court proceeding, application of the rule of 'lis pendens' is, in respect of proceedings relating to immovable properties situated in certain areas, made conditional upon the registration of the notice of the pendency of the suit. The section in terms applies only to the notices in respects of suits or proceedings which relate to immovable property in the Greater Bombay Area, it does not apply to any suits in which property in Greater Bombay is not the subject matter in dispute. By the Proviso to Section 2 of the Act, it may be extended by the Provincial Government of notification to notices relating to immovable properties situate wholly or partly in such other areas as may be specified. No notification was however issued by the appropriate Provincial Government extending the Act to notices relating to immovable properties in areas outside Greater Bombay. Where the suit was filed in the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad the Act did not apply and the decree in the suit was binding on the transferee to whom the property in question was transferred pending the suit."

28. On the basis of the above judgments, Mr. Vyas has submitted that it is not necessary that the notice regarding the pendency of the suit is required to be registered. For this purpose, he has also invited the Court's attention to the observations made in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (9th Edition). At page 367, it is observed that an amendment was declared by Bombay Act 57 of 1959 to be in force in the whole of the then recognised State of Bombay and is, therefore, in force in the whole of the present State of Gujarat and Maharashtra under Section 2 of the Bombay Act of 1939. However, the amended section only applies to immovable properties situated wholly or partly in Greater Bombay; but the State Government is empowered to extend its application to other areas by notification. A suit regarding immovable properties situated outside areas so notified is not, of course, affected by the amendment. In view of the amendment, the rule of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Act will operate in the notified areas provided the lis is registered in the manner required by the local amendment. Mr. Vyas has alternatively submitted that the notice was also addressed to the Registering Authority about the pendency of the suit. When the transferees pendente lite are made parties to the proceedings, they are bound by the orders - interim or final, passed against their predecessors in title. In this connection, he relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of DIGAMBARRAO HANMANTRAO DESHPANDE V/S. RANGRAO RAGHUNATHRAO DESAI AND ANOTHER, AIR (36) 1949 BOMBAY 367 wherein it is held that "the rule of res judicata prevails over the doctrine of lis pendens and once a judgment is duly pronounced by a competent Court in regard to the subject matter of the suit in which the doctrine of lis pendens applies, that decision is res judicata and binds not only the parties thereto but also the transferees pendente lite from them." Mr. Vyas has further submitted that the order of injunction passed against defendant Nos.1,2 & 3 would be binding on the transferees even on the basis of principles of res judicata. For this purpose, he relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of RAJ KUMAR AND ANOTHER V/S. OFFICIAL RECEIVER OF THE ESTATE M/S. CHIRANJI LAL RAM CHAND, LUDHIANA AND OTHERS, reported in AIR 1996 S.C. 941, ARJUN SINGH V/S. MOHINDRA KUMAR AND OTHERS AIR 1964 S.C. 993 since they are legal representatives in view of devolution of interest under O.22, R.10 of C.P.C.