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4. It would be convenient to refer to Copingers's Law of Copyright (Edn. 6 1927), which gives in a condensed form the case law on the subject. For the view which we have taken of the state of the law in India it is not necessary to consider these English cases in any great detail. Copinger has pointed out on pp. 135 to 138, that in Dod Sley v. Kinnersley (1761) Amb 403, Howkworth v. Newbery (1774) Lofft 775, Butterworth v. Robinson (1801) 5 Yes 709, Sweet v. Benning (1855) 16 C.B. 459 and D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835) 1 T. & Ex. 288. it was held that a bona fide fair abridgment was permissible. The learned author also pointed out that in Dickens v. Lee (1884) 8 Jur 183, it was observed that the right to abridge the works of another was not recognized and so also in Tinsley v. Lacy (1861) 1 H & M 747, where a very unfavourable opinion was expressed in regard to the rights of an abridger. Lastly, in Weatherby v. International Horse Agency (1910) 2 Ch. 297, it was pointed out that an author is entitled to the indirect as well as the direct fruits of his labour. Copinger wound up this survey of the caae law with the opinion that it is probable that in future it would be held that abridgments of copyright works are no longer permissible.

7. However that may be we are bound by the Statutory Enactments in force in India. The position here is that up to 1914 an author had the sole liberty of reprinting his book. It would therefore appear prima facie that an abridgment of a work would not upto that time be an infringement of a copyright, but of course such an abridgment must be a fair and bona fide one and must not amount to a reprinting of the work of the author. We shall show presently that in the case decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council the point for consideration was quite a different one, but there is undoubtedly the fact that their Lordships quoted with approval passages from Copinger's book which had proceeded on the assumption that there was a right to make a. fair abridgment of a work without infringing the author's copyright. So long as the abridgment was a fair one and did not amount substantially to a reprinting of the work itself there was nothing under the old Copyright Act which would give a right to the author to claim damages or injunction. We must accordingly hold that in the year 1908, when Dr. King brought out his Digest of Professor Marshall's Principles of Economics there was no infringement committed by him of any copyright of Professor Marshall. Indeed the copyright of Professor Marshall was confined to the sole liberty of reprinting or reproducing the book and did not include a sole right to prepare an abridgment of his book. However unsatisfactory this view might have been from the point of view of an author there seems to be no doubt that in view of the language of the Act then in force and the view which prevailed in England in other cases there is no option for us, but to hold that this was the law at that time.

9. It was in this connexion that their Lordships laid down that an abridgment of an author's work means a statement designed to be complete and accurate of the thoughts, opinions and ideas by him compressed therein, but set forth much more concisely in the compressed language of the abridger and that it requires learning, judgment, literary taste and skill requisite to compile properly and effectively an abridgment deserving that name (476). Their Lordships then quoted passages from Copinger's Law of Copyright (from p. 39 of 1904 edition and from p. 64 of 1915 edition). But these passages were in connexion with the question as to whether a copyright exists in abridgment. That was the point for their Lordships' consideration. Two more passages from the same book were quoted but they were also in illustration of the same point whether a copyright in an abridgment could exist. As pointed out above at least one of these passages in Copinger's book was taken from the place where he had also remarked that a fair abridgment is permissible. But in the 1915 edition there was equally the opinion expressed by Copinger at p. 138 that it was considered probable that it would be held that abridgments of copyright works are no longer permissible. Their Lordships did not comment on this passage at all. It is therefore quite clear that their Lordships were dealing solely with the question whether there was a copyright in the book belonging to the plaintiff which in their Lordships' opinion was not a fair abridgment at all. There was no question whether the plaintiffs' book in itself was an infringement of Sir Thomas North's Translation. That it was not so was quite obvious to their Lordships. We may also point out that their Lordships did not concur in view of the Bombay High Court that reprint of passages selected from the work of an author can never be entitled to copyright and that it may well be that in selecting and combining for the use of Schools or Universities passages of scientific works in which the lines of reasoning are closely knit and labour, scientific knowledge, sound judgment and literary skill are expended, in which case copyright might well be acquired for the print of the selected passages. Their Lordships discussed at length Section 1(1), Copyright Act of 1911, and also quoted with approval the opening words of Lord Halsbury in Walter v. Lane (1900) A.C. 539, that it would be regrettable if the law permitted a man to make a profit and to appropriate to himself what had been produced by the labour, skill and capital of another and also approved of the observation made by Frederic Emerson v. Chas. Davies 2 Story 768, and then laid down a third test on p. 497 that:

12. Under Section 24, Copyright Act, of 1914 no new right was conferred on an author in respect of an existing book. "Whatever copyright he had at the commencement of the Act was continued in his favour. It follows that when Professor Marshall had not a copyright as far as the abridgment of his treatise was concerned before the Act of 1914, no such right subsists after that Act. The defendant has therefore not infringed any copyright at all. As regards the plea of limitation we are of opinion that it has no force. Under the Copyright Act, an infringement takes place not only when a book is reprinted, but also when a book in respect of which a copyright exists is sold. It is therefore clear that there is a fresh cause of action on the sale of every book. Even if the right had first been infringed in 1908 the claim cannot be barred by time. We must accordingly uphold the decree of the Court below, but in view of the fact that the learned Judge did not dispose of the case on the view which we have taken of the matter we order that the parties should bear their own costs of the appeal. There is deficiency of Rs. 4-14-0 due by the respondents on account of the translation, and printing charges. No decree will be prepared until this amount has been made good.