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1. By a partnership deed dated January 1, 195 7, fourteen persons, including a minor, Sri Kameswara Rao, agreed to carry on the business of running buses and lorries in partnership. the minor was represented by his mother and guardian, and he was treated as a full-fledged partner, liable for losses, amount other things. REgistration of this partnership firm was applied of, for the assessment year 1958-59, and for the next assessment year 1959-60, renewal was applied for. According to the law as it was understood then, such a partnership was not invalid. The ITo granted registration, and also renewal. by him order dated March 18, 1960. the Supreme Court held in CIt v. Dwarhands Khetan & Co. [1961] 42 ITR 528-a decision render on December 1, 1960-that a partnership deed in which a minor is admitted as a full partner, is not lid and cannot be registered under s. 26A of the Indian I. T. Act, 1922. The decision of the Madras High court and the other High Court to the country were e overruled. Pursud by him for the assessment year 1958-59 and 1959-60, involving his ant to this decision the ITo proposed to cancel the registration granted by him for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60, invoking his power of rectification under s. 154. Meanwhile, the minor, Sri Kameswara Rao, became a major on October 27, 1958, and opted to continue as a partners, as contemplated by s. 30 of the Partnership Act. A rectification deed was executed on October 29, 1958, recording the said fact. Though this fact was brought to the notice of the ITo when he proposed to exercise his power of rectification, the ITo canceled e registration for the assessment year 1958-59, as also e renewal granted for the assessment year 1959-60, . On appeal, however, the AAC took the view that the ITo was not competent to cancel the registration under s, 154 and according set aside his order. The Revenue filed an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal contending that, in view of the Supreme Court decision, it must be held that e partnership deed executed on January 1, 1957, was invalid and could not have been registered under s. 26A of the (1922) ACt and that the said error constituted an error apparent on the fact of the record liable to be rectified under s. 154. It was argued that s. 186(1) (of the 1961 Act) was not available in such a case inasmuch as a cancellation can be effected under that section only on one ground, viz, that there was " no genuine firm in assistance as register". The Tribunal, however, dismissed the appeal holding that e power under s, 154 did not extend to rectifying an order granting registration to a firm. The words :"any other order" occurring in s. 154 were sought to be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding words "order of assessment or of refund : and, on that basis, it was held that the said words could not take in every type of order passed by the ITO. Another principle pressed into service by the Tribunal in support o the same conclusion is "special excludes general"> The Tribunal held that the power to cancel the registration granted to a firm is contained in s. 186, which is a special provision,; and if so, e general power under s. 154 is not available for the purpose of canceling the registration of a firm, once granted. It was of the opinion that the Legislature has designedly condigned the power of the cancellation of the registration of a firm, once granted, only to once ground, viz. non-genuineness; and, therefore, th cancellation cannot be effected on any other ground. May be that an erroneous order granting registration can be corrected by the Commissioner under s. 263, or probably the ITO may himself involve s. 147; but in any event-the Tribunal observed-the power under s, 154 was not available for such a purpose. So far as the assessment year 1959-60 is concerned,. the Tribunal referred to the further that the erstwhile minor became a major on October 27, 1958, and opted to continue as a full-fledged partner, which was recorded by a rectification deed, dated October, 29, 1958, and the further fact that an independent application for registration of the firm was made for this assessment year. It, therefore, held that so far as the assessment year 1959-60, is concerned, there is absolutely no ground for canceling the renewal.

2. Thereupon, e Department applied for and obtained this reference under s, 256(1) of the 1961 Act. The question referred for our opinion is;

"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstance of the case, the canceling of registration could be made under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?

3. Sri M. S Murthy, the learned standing counsel for the Department, assailed the correctness of th interpretation placed by the Tribunal upon the words "any other order" in s. 154. he contend that there is no scope for applying the rule of ejusdem generis to give a restricted meaning to the said words. Accordingly to him the words "any other order" must he given their full effect, and must beheld to cover all types of orders. he contended further that the decision of the Supreme Court in CIt v. Dwarkadsa khetan & Co, which overruled the decision of the Madras High Court, does constituted a valid and sufficient ground for involving the power of rectification under s. 154. Even with respect to the assessment year 1959-60, learned counsel submitted, the red into by the partner after the erstwhile, minor, Sri Kameswara Rao, position cannot be different, because no fresh partnership was entered ito by the partners after the erstwhile minor, Sri kameswara Rao, attained majority. ACcordingly to the learned counsel, the rectification deed executed on October 29, 1958, is not sufficient compliance with the requirements of s 26A.

4. On the other hand, e learned counsel for the assessee, Sri T, Shanker Rao, supported then reasoning and the conclusions of the Tribunal. He contend that, if the words "any other order" in s. 154 were conceived to take in every type of order, there was no necessity for Parliament to use the words "any order of assessment or of refund", preceding the said words. Counsel contended farther, that, in any the assessment year 1959-60 there is no basis for canceling the registration in view of the fact that the erstwhile minor attained majority and opted to continue as a full-fledged partner, which was also record by a rectification deed.

14. We must, however, uphold the contention of Mr. Shanker Rao and the finding of the Tribunal that, in so far as the assessment year 1959-60 is concerned, there is absolutely no ground warranting the cancellation of the registration. As stated above, the erstwhile minor, Sri Kameswara Rao, attainted majority on October 27, 19598, and elected to continue as a full-fledged partner, as contemplated by s, 30 of the Partnership Act, which fact was recorded by a rectification deed October 29, 1958. This fact was also brought to the notice of e ITO, within the prescribed time, and all the papers filed before him. For this assessment year, there was not only an application for renewal, but there wa a fresh application for grant of registration. In this view, it cannot be said that the partnership deed, as modified by e rectification deed, was in any manner illegal, so far as the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1959-60 is concerned. of course, the partnership was undoubtedly illegal so far as the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1958-59 is concerned.