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19. At the outset, this Court will examine the legal principles that guide the issuance of an interim injunction in defamation cases.

20. In the case of Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. 1995 5 SCC 545, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while discussing the factors to be considered by the Courts in exercise of the discretion under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC, has held that:

"The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the Court. While exercising the discretion, the Court applies the following tests:

Bonnard Principle

22. The Bonnard Principle, derived from the case of Bonnard v. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269, is a legal principle related to the granting of interim injunctions in cases of defamation. It is a guiding principle related to the granting of interim injunctions in cases of defamation. According to this principle, an interim injunction should not be awarded unless the defense of truth/justification by the defendant is certain to fail at the trial level. In other words, the court should not restrain the publication of alleged defamatory content before the trial, unless it is clear that the content is untrue and no valid defense can be presented. The Bonnard Principle sets a high threshold for granting interim injunctions in defamation cases, requiring a clear case of an untrue libel before restraining the publication. Where the defendant in the civil suit of defamation pleads justification, no interim injunction can be granted and in the event that the said defendant fails in his defence, damages would be an adequate remedy. The principle emphasizes the importance of protecting the right to free speech.

31. In the case of Hari Shankar (supra), there was no discussion or consideration of the Bonnard principle, rendering it irrelevant for determining the principle's applicability. The judgment primarily focused on the idea that reputation damage cannot be adequately compensated with monetary damages. However, this view becomes less tenable when considering the Bonnard Principle, which was not invoked in Hari Shankar's case. Additionally, the judgment in Hari Shankar comes from the Honorable Madhya Pradesh High Court. Given that there are explicit rulings from the Honorable Delhi High Court, which have a differing stance on the issue of interim injunction in defamation cases, this Court in the jurisdiction of Delhi is obligated to adhere to the precedents set by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court.

Misc. Civil Appeal (DJ) No. 45/23

32. In light of the analysis in the preceding paragraphs, it's clear that the Honorable Delhi Court acknowledges and employs the Bonnard Principle in relevant cases. Consequently, the contention by the respondent that the Bonnard Principle is outdated and no longer relevant is not tenable.

Prima Facie Case

33. The responsibility to establish a 'Prima facie case' rests with the Plaintiff. The judgment in Tata Sons (supra) specifies that the plaintiff must meet a higher threshold in defamation cases, especially when seeking an injunction against the press. As discussed earlier, when the defendant invokes and emphasizes Bonnard's principle, the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate a prima facie case is only met if they can convincingly show that the defendant's defense of truth, fair comment, and public interest is destined to fail. It's crucial to understand that the proof required is of 'bound to fail', not merely 'may fail'. This is the reason the burden on the plaintiff is heavier in case the Bonnard principle is pressed.