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Showing contexts for: Motion Re in Motion Pictures Association, In Re: ... vs Motion Pictures Association And Others on 18 December, 1981Matching Fragments
28. After the failure of the compromise talks for a relatively lasting solution I proceeded with the writing of the orders. A most unmistakable fact which is apparent through the protracted rounds of litigation In re motion Pictures Association, is that every order, interim or final, becomes subject matter of appeals before the Division Bench or the Supreme Court. Naturally, the hearing of the main C.P. again is pushed back. Another difficulty was of the overlapping nature of the disputed questions of fact and law in the said C.As. and the main C.P. A court should refrain from pronouncing on such disputed question before the evidence is taken and arguments advanced in support of legal submissions in the C.P. If this is not done with discriminating mind, number of difficulties are created in the future course of litigation. This can be seen from the Division Bench judgment in Company Appeals Nos. 3 and 5 of 1980. The question whether the executive committee deliberately avoided the holding of elections for the years 1977 and 1978 or whether the meetings could not be held because of the order of the company judge dated August 30, 1979, is a question seriously raised in the main C.P. So also is the question regarding alleged misappropriation. The Division Bench rightly observed at a number of places that the said questions cannot be finally decided without leading evidence in the main C.P. However, the observations made for the limited purpose of the disposing of the C.As. by the Division Bench are utilised by the counsel for the company almost in every subsequent C.A. as if the matters were finally concluded by the Division Bench judgment in the said appeals. The Supreme Court order rejecting the S.L.P. (expressly keeping the question of the illegalities of the elections open) is also utilised for the same purpose. This tendency of the parties to overuse the previous judgment in C.As. was another reason why I decided not to pass any orders in the said C.As. During the course of hearing of these petitions, several times, I had made observations to that effect and the parties and their counsel always gave me an impression that they agreed that the course of action I was following was the only course open in the circumstances.