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23. After framing the alternative questions, as have been referred to above, the Supreme Court, observed that "the said question, even though ticklish, had received a quietus from the Supreme Court with the pronouncement in Patel Lajibhai's case (supra) while considering the scope of its corresponding provision in the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. However, a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Menon and Anr. v. D. Raja Reddy and Anr., 1984(4) SCC 240, which struck a different note thereon, seemed to have revived the issue and kept it buoying up in the legal stream. The counsel for the appellants, Mr. Sinha raised the point that decision in Patel's case (supra) was no longer relevant as the said decision was rendered under the corresponding provision of the old code which has a subtle difference from the new provisions in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code and that difference makes all the change and inasmuch as the decision rendered by the Supreme court in Gopalakrishna's case (supra) was rendered under the new Code, it is the decision rendered in that case should hold the field. The contention of Mr. B.B. Singh, counsel for the respondent was that the slight change made in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code vis-a-vis the corresponding provision in the old Code was not for deviating from the legal position settled by this Court in Patel's case. After extracting Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code, the Supreme Court observed that "there could not be any dispute that if forgery was committed while the document was in the custody of a Court, then the prosecution could be launched only with a complaint made by that Court. However, if forgery was committed with a document which had not been produced in a Court, then prosecution would lie at the instance of any person. If so, will its production in the Court make all the difference, was an other question formed by the Apex Court." If the clause is capable of two interpretations, the Supreme Court held that "narrower interpretation had to be chosen." The reasons for choosing the narrower interpretation were then given by the Supreme Court. It was then observed that "it was difficult to interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) as containing a bar against initiation of prosecution proceedings merely because the document concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in the Court. Any such construction was likely to ensure unsavoury consequence. For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document was detected and the forger was sure that he would imminently be embroiled in prosecution proceedings, he could simply get that document produced in any long drawn litigation which was either instituted by himself or some body else who could be influenced by him and thereby preempt the prosecution for the entire long period of pendency of that litigation." The Supreme Court further observed that "it was settled proposition that if the language of a legislation was capable of more than one interpretation, the one which was capable of causing mischievous consequences, should be avoided." As Section 340(1) of the Code was inter-linked with Section 195(1)(b), the Supreme Court thought it necessary to refer to that sub-section in the present context. After reproducing Section 340, it was held that "the same puts the condition that before the Court makes a complaint of "any offence referred to in clause, (b) of Section 195(1)" the Court has to follow the procedure laid down in Section 340. In other words, no complaint can be made by a Court regarding any offence falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code without first adopting those procedural requirements." While dealing with the scope of the enquiry, the Supreme Court observed as follows and it is the extracted portion which has been relied by Mr. Sibal in support of his contention that the Court cannot take cognizance and launch prosecution against the petitioner.

11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in Court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodian legis.

12. It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery of document, if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, could also be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the Court records."

24. Insofar as paragraph 11, as extracted above and which has been relied by Mr. Sibal, is concerned, it deals with the scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged under Section 340(1) of the Code which is to ascertain whether the offence affecting administration of justice has been committed. The offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in the custody of the Court. The observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 12, extracted above, in our view, only deal with the expediency of launching prosecution by the Court with regard to a document that might have been forged outside the precincts of the Court but ultimately produced on the court records. With regard to some forgeries, as observed by us earlier and as was before the Supreme Court in Sachidanand's case (supra), it may not be expedient to launch prosecution by the Court but if the document straightaway affects the administration of justice, as in the present case, the enquiry as envisaged under Section 340 of the Code has to be made. It cannot be read from the observations of the Supreme Court, extracted above, that in no case whatsoever, where the document has been forged outside the precincts of the Court and then produced there, it would be inexpedient to hold an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code. If the meaning as suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner is to be given to the observations made by Supreme Court, referred to above, it would result in anomalous situations. In quite a few cases, the offenders would go unpunished. In a given case, an adversary to a party, which has forged a document, may not be interested at all to launch prosecution as it may not affect his substantive rights. Should forgery of a document in such matters go unnoticed and unpunished ? Insofar as the party is concerned, it is not interested in launching prosecution and insofar as the Court is concerned, it has no jurisdiction to launch prosecution. That cannot be the interpretation of Section 340 of the Code. To illustrate, one has not to go far as the facts of this case would demonstrate that if the Court is also not to take cognizance of the offence, then a serious offence, alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, would go unnoticed and unpunished. Insofar as adversary is concerned, it is only the State. A forged certified copy of the award so as to bring the appeal preferred by the claimants within limitation has been produced in the Court. If the Court was not to notice this fact, and take cognizance of the offence, the State, in all probability, would have never come to know about the forgery alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. In a given case, even if the State comes to know about the tampering of a certified copy of the judgment and decree, it may contest the matter only with regard to limitation and it may be wholly un-interested in launching prosecution against the forger. No exhaustive list of illustrations can be given, but to cite some, it may be noticed that if, while procuring an order so as to go on parole on the ground of marriage of his daughter or son, by a convict the invitation cards are forged, there being no marriage to be celebrated, who shall be an interested party to launch prosecution ? In a given case, State may launch prosecution, In the other, it may not at all be interested and rather may choose to contest the prayer for parole on the only ground that no marriage as such has been fixed. Further, an order 'of grant of bail by the High Court may be forged and then produced before a Magistrate, who would be interested party to launch prosecution. In a given case, neither the complainant nor the State may ever come to know about such forgery having been committed. In Anr. given case, a false birth certificate is made by an employee nearing retirement and produced in a Court in a claim that he cannot be retired on a particular date, who would be interested party to lodge a complaint ? It may be mentioned that in number of cases, kind of forgeries, referred to above, have been noticed by this Court. The illustrations can be multiplied but there is no need to give any other illustration as the facts of the present case perhaps provide the best example where document forged straightaway affects the administration of justice and the forgery was such as could primarily be noticed by the Court and where it does not appear that the State ever thought of launching prosecution against the petitioner. That apart, as to whether the Court is debarred from taking cognizance and launching prosecution with regard to a document which has been forged outside the Court and then produced therein, was not before the Supreme Court in Sachidanand's case (supra). The observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 12, as extracted above, in our view, do not spell a bar for a court to take cognizance and launch prosecution. Assuming, that the observations made in para 12, to some extent, support the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, in that case, the question that further arises is as to whether the said observations can be said to be law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, The questions for its answer as framed by the Supreme Court have already been noticed above. To reiterate, the question before the Supreme Court was as to whether prosecution could be maintained in respect of a forged document produced in Court unless complaint has been filed by the Court concerned in that behalf. In other words, the question before the Apex Court was as to whether the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would apply to such prosecution. The facts have already been noticed above. Suffice it to say here that a complaint, even though filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate and referred by him under Section 156(3) of the Code, ultimately resulted into registration of an FIR, and presentation of challan by the police before the Magistrate. The facts of the case as also the questions framed by the Supreme Court clearly suggest that the bar for a Court to lodge the complaint with regard to any kind of forgery, be it outside the Court or within the precincts of the Court, was not before if. it is conceded that it is neither desirable nor permissible to pick up a word or a sentence from the judgment of the Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete law declared by the Supreme Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. A decision of the Supreme Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of the Supreme Court.

35. From the discussion made above, we hold that, as mentioned above neither the plain language employed in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) nor the purpose for which the-said section was enacted by the Legislature, creates any bar for a Court to take cognizance and launch prosecution of a person who might have committed forgery of a document or of the offences as envisaged under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. We further hold that while taking cognizance of the offences of the type mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii), i.e., the documents that were forged in the precincts of the Court and not outside the precincts of the Court and then produced, and holding an enquiry as envisaged under Section 340, the Court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made. The forgery of a document has to be such that may affect the administration of justice. If the parameters contained in Section 340 are in existence, there will be no bar for the Court to take cognizance of the offences as mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) and launch prosecution against the accused. We further hold that there is no bar placed upon the Court, even remotely, to take cognizance of the offences that are spelled out in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code if the document has been forged outside the precincts of the Court and then produced in the Court. It may be desirable in such cases to still see as to whether prosecuting an offender would be expedient for the administration of justice but it is not sine qua non for initiation of proceedings against an accused that all parameters mentioned in Section 340 must be strictly meeted. We further hold that while holding an enquiry as envisaged under Section 340 of the Code, it is not necessary for the Court to observe in writing that it is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest, of justice that the enquiry should be made. Once the source of power to initiate the enquiry Is in existence, non-mention of the Section empowering the Court or recording in writing the reasons forming an opinion as shall, shall not be essential.