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Showing contexts for: terrorist in Babulal Turi vs National Investigation Agency on 4 November, 2025Matching Fragments
10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case and is having no nexus with the member of the terrorist gang and has been made scapegoat to ease the burden of investigation.
11. The submission has been made that the allegation as leveled by the NIA in the chargesheet that the appellant along with other gang members carried out terrorist act at Tetariyakhad Colliery on 18.12.2020 by indiscriminate firing and burning of coal loaded trucks and one motorcycle to extort money for the terrorist gang by disrupting the Government work and when the police party had rushed to the spot, the accused persons had burnt four trucks, one motorcycle and injured four civilians but there is no evidence to that effect as has been gathered having not been mentioned in the chargesheet.
28. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines "terrorist organization". It is defined as an organization listed in the First Schedule. CPI (Maoist) has been listed at Item no. 34 in the First Schedule. Chapters III onwards of the 1967 Act incorporate various offences. Chapter IV has the title "punishment for terrorist act". Clause
(k) of Section 2 provides that "terrorist act" has the meaning assigned to it under Section 15 and the terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.
49. It has also come in the chargesheet that the appellant was actively involved in the attack of Tetariyakhad colliery being a member of the terrorist gang of Sujit Sinha (A-1) and Aman Sahu (A-2) and was arrested from the forest with other accused persons with arms and ammunition while planning other terrorist attack. The said fact has been corroborated with the documentary evidences marked as D-11, D-12, D-13, D-14, D-15, D-19, D-57, D 58, D-59, D-60, D-123, D-87, D-88, D-89, D-91, D-92, D 93, D-
64. So far, the delay in trial is concerned it is relevant to state that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) taking into consideration the ratio of judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 has observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
"46. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of 2025:JHHC:33107-DB terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist organisation involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted."