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Mr. Bhim Singh, Mr. Anil Dev Singh, Mr. D.D. Thakur and Mr. Salman Khurshid, the learned counsel appearing for the unsuccessful candidates have vehemently contended that the reconstituted competent authority consisting of three mem- bers never functioned because Shri J.P. Kesar did not join the other two members at any stage of the selection process. It was also contended that the scrutiny as per consent order dated 17th October, 1988 was not done by the competent authority but by the committee appointed by the State Gov- ernment. Before examining these contentions we may notice that the competent authority was reconstituted on 15th September, 1988 by the State Government and it was approved by the High Court in the consent order dated 17th of October, 1988. The written test had taken place on 7th and 8th August, 1988 and the result thereof was published on 25th of August, 1988. The viva voce test was held from 29th August, 1988 to 7th Sep- tember, 1988. The whole of the process of selection was almost complete on 17th October, 1988 when the consent order reconstituting the competent authority was passed by the High Court. The competent authority was only to scrutinize the selections. There are no specific allegations of favou- ritism or arbitrariness in the conduct of entrance examina- tion or the viva voce.

We may now examine the submissions. It is an admitted fact that Mr. J.P. Kesar never functioned as part of compe- tent authority. The scrutiny and compilation of the selec- tions was done by two members namely Dr. Aga Ashraf Ali and Prof. Satish Raina. The three member authority was not a statutory authority. It was entrusted with the functions of executive nature. The mere fact that one member did not participate in the selection does not ipso facto render the selections illegal. Mr. Anil Dev Singh disputed the validity of selection placing reliance on the United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their workmen, [1951] SCR 380. In this case Central Government had constituted an Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes in banking companies in exercise of its powers under Section 7 of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947. The tribunal was to consist of three members. One of the members did not function on the tribunal for a period of about three months. By a majority judgment this Court held that the two remaining members were not a duly constituted tribunal and any proceedings in the absence of the third member without reconstituting the tribunal were without jurisdiction. This Court, construing the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of Industrial disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 5 of the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1949, came to the conclusion that when a vacancy occurred it was obligato- ry on the Government to notify its decision as to whether it intended to fill up the vacancy or not, and if the Govern- ment decided not to fill up the vacancy, a notification under Section 7 of the Act was essential to reconstitute the remaining members of the tribunal. The decision was rendered on the construction of the relevant statutory provisions and keeping in view the fact that the tribunal was to perform quasi-judicial functions. The ratio of this decision is inapplicable to the committee constituted by executive order for performing purely administrative functions. Selection of candidates for admission to medical colleges does not in- volve performance of any judicial or quasi-judicial func- tions. Mr. Anil Dev Singh then relied upon A vadh Bihari Sinha v. University of Bihar, C.A. 1650/67 decided by this Court on 4th of January, 1968. In this case Bihar University Regulations framed under the Bihar State Universities Act, 1960 provided that a Board of moderators must consist of five members of whom two must be external experts. Two external experts were invited to join the Board but they declined. The appointment of members to the Board was to be completed only after they were desig- nated and had accepted their appointment. Three members without the two external experts moderated an award which was set aside by this Court. This was a case where inter- preting the statutory provisions of the regulations this Court came to the conclusion that the constitution of the Board of moderators was not complete without the designation and acceptance of the appointment by the external experts. The ratio cannot be attracted to the facts of the present case. In the present case competent authority with three members was constituted by an executive action. In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, it was perfectly legitimate for the authority to function with two members. Even otherwise the written test and viva voce having already taken place, the selection process was almost complete and nothing much was left for the competent author- ity to do. It had only to scrutinize and finalise the selec- tion. No arguments were addressed and not a single circum- stance was pointed out to show any prejudice to any candi- date in the scrutiny and finalisation of the selection by the authority. Mr. Altar Ahmed fairly made all the records available in the Court. The learned counsel for the unsuc- cessful candidates could not point out any prejudice or injustice to any of them. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned counsel. Regarding the other attack on competent authority it is argued that under the consent order it was the reconstituted competent authority which was to scrutinize all the cases of the candidates who appeared in the entrance examination and since it was done only by the committee the selection is vitiated. Mr. Altar Ahmed has taken us through the records and we find that the committee consisting of Prof. Shafi-ud-Din, Dr. Y. Singh and Dr. Abdul Aziz scrutinized the answer sheets of the candidates and recorded a note to this effect on 24th of October, 1988. Thereafter the two members of the competent authority approved the said scruti- ny on 25th of October, 1988. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the scrutiny was done only by the committee and not by the competent authority. The purpose of appointing a committee under SRO 291 read with 1987 Order was to assist the competent authority. The scrutiny in this case having been approved by the competent authority, it cannot be said that the competent authority abdicated its powers to the committee. We, therefore, do not see any force in this argument of the learned counsel.

The objective test for entrance examination and viva voce for admission to the MBBS course in the medical col- leges of Jammu & Kashmir for the session 1984-85 was again approved by this Court in Atul Khullar v. State of J & K, [1986] Supp. SCC 225. We see no force in the argument of learned counsel and uphold the selection.

Mr. Bhim Singh invited our attention to the judgment rendered by one of the learned judges in Farooq Bacha's case to show that there were observations adversely criticising the conduct of Prof. Satish Raina. Mr. Bhim Singh says that since the conduct of a person was adversely commented upon by one of the learned judges, it was unfair to entrust him with the functions of competent authority. The action of the State 'Government, according to him, is not bona fide and as such the selection is vitiated. It is correct that there are some adverse observations, but the same have not been endorsed by the learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment on reference. In any case all the parties including the unsuccessful candidates agreed to the consent order which was passed by the High Court on 17th of October, 1988. These candidates accepted the appointment of Prof. Satish Raina in the reconstituted competent authority. It was to their knowledge that entrance examination and viva voce, which was complete before the consent order, was got conducted by Prof. Satish Raina. No objection was raised to the process of selection already conducted by Prof. Satish Raina, rather his appointment on the reconstituted competent authority to complete the remaining process of selection was accepted by the parties in the consent order. Mr. B. Sen learned counsel appearing in SLP (C) No. 1299/89 contends that 50% seats are to be filled from gener- al category and remaining 50% from reserved categories. He urged that when a reserved candidates secures merit in the first 50% seats then he is treated as a general candidates and the seat in the reserved category which he should have occupied is given to some other reserved candidates with lower points. According to him the reserved candidate who secures merit in both the general category and the reserved category must consume the seat in the reserved category and not the general category. The reservations have been provid- ed under SRO 291 read with SRO 272 dated 3rd of July, 1982. Reading Paras II and III of SRO 272 together it is clear that the 50% of the general category seats have to be filled in the first instance and remaining seats are to be offered to the reserved category thereafter. Counting the reserve candidate, who fall within the first 50 positions, as gener- al candidate, is thus permissible under SRO 272. The execu- tive orders providing reservations have not been challenged. There is no material on the record to show that procedure followed to fill the reserve/general vacancies has resulted in excessive representation to the reserve category. We, therefore, see no merit in the contention.