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4. On 9-8-79, the defendant 1 namely the appellant in this appeal put into execution of the said compromise decree in the ordinary original jurisdiction of this Court and prayed for delivery of possession of the portion of the premises No. 5A, Brindaban Mullick Lane which was then in occupation of the respondent 8. It may be noted that the said portion is still in occupation of the respondents 1 to 8.

5. The respondents 1 to 8 preferred a petition of objection under Section 47, C.P.C. on various grounds inter alia, challenging the validity and executability of the said compromise decree passed on 23-2-65. D. K. Sen J. after hearing the parties was pleased to dismiss the said petition of objection under Section 47, C.P.C. and directed the issue of a writ for taking delivery of possession in favour of the appellant. The said order of D. K. Sen J. has been annexed in the paper book at pages 90 to 93. It also appears from the facts disclosed by the parties that an officer of the office of the Sheriff of this Court went to the premises No. 5A, Brindaban Mullick Lane for the purpose of giving effect to the said order of this Court passed on 25-2-81. But the execution was opposed and delivery of possession could not be delivered. Respondents 1 to 8 namely the plaintiffs preferred an appeal before this Court against the said order of D. K. Sen J. and made an application for stay of the operation of the order dt. 25-2-81. The said application has been included in the paper book at pages 101 to 126. It appears that the appeal court did not pass any order of stay and the application was disposed of without any order. There is some controversy between the parties as to under what circumstance, the said application for stay was disposed of without passing any order and we shall refer to such contentions at a later stage.

7. Mr. Roy appearing for the defendant 1 appellant, has contended that the said title suit was instituted in order to frustrate the compromise decree and the order of execution passed by this Court. It has been contended by Mr. Roy that the said suit is not maintainable in view of the fact that the maintainability and/or executability of the said decree cannot be questioned in a separate suit in view of the provisions of Section 47, C.P.C. Mr. Roy has also contended that under the amended provisions of Order 23, Rule 3A, a separate suit cannot be instituted for challenging the legality and validity of the said compromise decree. Mr. Roy has further contended that in effect, in the said suit, the plaintiffs have been trying to get a declaration that the said compromise decree is nullity and as such, the same should be set aside but such suit is barred by limitation because the said compromise decree was passed in February, 1965 and if the plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest were aggrieved by the said decree, they were aggrieved on the very same date when the compromise decree was passed. Mr. Roy has submitted that the plaintiffs have been trying to contend in the suit instituted by them in the City Civil Court and also in the application for temporary injunction that the said compromise decree cannot be executed until the plaintiffs will get vacant possession from the tenants occupying the portion allotted in their favour in the ejectment suit since filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in the City Civil Court. It may be noted here that the said ejectment suit was decreed and the same is now pending before this Court in appeal at the instance of the tenants occupying the said premises.

10. Mr. Roy has also contended that although prima facie the said suit instituted by the plaintiffs respondents 1 to 8 in the City Civil Court is not maintainable for the reasons indicated hereinbefore, it may not be necessary for this Court to decide the merits of the said suit for the purpose of disposing of this appeal arising out of an interlocutory order. Mr. Roy has, however, submitted that the plaintiffs-respondents 1 to 8 had raised various objections under Section 47, C.P.C before this Court for opposing the maintainability or executability of the said compromise decree and similar contentions have been sought to be raised in the said suit instituted in the City Civil Court. As a matter of fact, the learned Judge in disposing of the said application for temporary injunction has noted categorically that the contentions which have been raised in the suit as also in the application for temporary injunction are similar to the contentions raised before this Court in the proceeding under Section 47 of the Code, Mr. Roy has submitted that when this Court has negatived the contention of the plaintiffs and dismissed the said application under Section 47 and when the plaintiffs failed to get any interim order in the application for stay made before the appeal court, the learned Judge, City Civil Court, should not have passed the interim order thereby stultifying the effect of the order passed by this Court. Mr. Roy has submitted that by the said interim order, the very effect of the order of D. K. Sen J. has been stalled and although the plaintiff has failed to obtain any stay from the appeal court they can now merrily enjoy the possession of the said premises and the decree cannot be executed in terms of the order passed by D. K. Sen J. Mr. Roy has submitted that on this score alone, the application for temporary injunction should have been dismissed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court and this Court should allow this appeal and set aside the order of injunction passed by the trial Court. In this connection Mr. Roy has drawn the attention of the Court to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank Ltd. . It has been held in the said decision that ordinarily a preventive relief by way of prohibitory injunction cannot be granted by a Court with a view to restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding and this is subject to one exception enacted in larger public interest, namely, a superior court can injunct a person from instituting or prosecuting an action in a subordinate Court with a view to regulating the proceeding before the subordinate courts. At any rate, the court is precluded by a statutory provision i.e. Section 41(b) from granting an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting a proceeding in a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction or superior jurisdiction.