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10. Counsel appearing for the petitioner placed considerable reliance on the decisions in Kesavananda@@ CCCCCCCCCCC Bharathi's case (AIR 1973 S.C. 1461), State of Rajasthan@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC v. Union of India(AIR 1977 S.C. 1361) and S.R.Bommai v.@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCCC Union of India (AIR 1994 S.C. 1918) and other decisions@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCC and contended that since Article 226 of the Constitution being basic structure of the Constitution judicial review of orders passed under Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Act 2002 carnnot be excluded from the purview of judicial review. Counsel submitted even in spite of Articles 323-A and 365 exclusion of jurisdiction of court was declared illegal. Relying on the decision of the apex court in L. Chandrakumar's case (AIR 1997 S.C. 125)@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC counsel also submitted that exclusion of jurisdiction under 10th Schedule was held to be not binding on courts. In any view counsel submitted that any law as understood under Article 329(a) of the Constitution can be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

11. We find it unable to agree with the proposition urged by counsel for the petitioner. Basic structure theory enunciated in Kesavananda Bharathi's case@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC (AIR 1973 S.C. 1461), came up for consideration before the apex court in Smt Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC (AIR 1975 S.C.2299) and in paragraph 667 of the judgment,@@ C Justice Shri Y.V.Chandrachud dealing with the argument of the counsel that judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution noticed that when the Constitution was originally enacted it expressly excluded judicial review in a large variety of important matters. Reference was made to Articles 31 (4), 31 (6), 136(2), 227(4), 262(2) and 329(a) of the Constitution of India. The court noticed that each of the provisions has a purpose behind it but those provisions would show that the Constitution did not regard judicial review as an indispensable measure of the legality or propriety of every determination. Article 136(2) expressly took away the power of the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from the decisions of any court or Tribunal constituted by a law relating to the Armed Forces. Article 262 (2) authorised the Parliament to make a law providing that the Supreme Court or any other court shall have no jurisdiction over certain river disputes. Reference was also made to Articles 103 (1) and 329(b). Article 102 prescribes disqualificzations for membership of the Parliament. It was noticed that by Article 103 (1) any question arising under Article 102 as to whether a member of the Parliament has become subject to any disqualification has to be referred to the President whose decision is final. Further President is required by Article 103 (2) to obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and to act according to its opinion. The court noticed that in a vital matter pertaining to the election for membership of the Parliament the framers of the Constitution had left the decision to the judgment of the executive. Further Articles 327 and 328 give power to the Parliament and the State Legislatures to provide by law for all matters relating to elections to the respective legislatures including the preparation of electoral rolls and the delimitation of constituencies. It also noticed that by Article 329 (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies cannot be called in question in any court. Referring to Article 329 (b) the court pointed out that the article provides that no election to the Parliament or the State Legislature shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. Judicial review there can be excluded in certain limited areas, though it is considered to be the basic structure of the Constitution.

12. The Constitution Bench of the apex court later in L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India and others@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC (1997 (3) SCC 261) after referring to the decisions of the apex court in Kesavananda Bharati's case, Minerva Mills@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC Ltd. v. Union of India (1980 (3) SCC 625) and Indira@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCC Nehru Gandhi's case, noticed that Article 329(a) as an@@ CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC example and pointed out that judicial review cannot be considered to be a part of the basic structure so far as election to the legislature is concerned. In the above decision, apex court held that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure and therefore ordinarily the power of the High@@ CCCCCCCCCC Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. Constitutional Bench therefore noticed that in extra ordinary circumstances, for example, for purity of election and other related matters judicial review cannot be considered to be part of basic structure and same can be ousted by law.

14. The above mentioned decisions would show even though judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, but Constitution could exclude judicial review in certain situations. Articles 31 (4), 31 (6), 136 (2), 227 (4), 262(2), 243 O, 243 ZG, 329(a) etc. have excluded the scope of judicial review with a laudable objective pointing that the judicial review in certain situations may not be regarded as an indispensable measure to determine the legality or propriety of actions. The .PL 58 difference in the phraseology used in Article 329(a) and