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7. The High Power Committee heard the parties at length and as the parties agreed to enter into an arbitration agreement, the committee decided that the disputes be resolved through arbitration under the PMA.

8. Thereafter, an arbitration agreement dated 10.06.2005 was entered into between PEC and KPT. A similar arbitration agreement was also entered into between KPT and STC on 10.06.2005.

9. Subsequently, the Special Leave Petition (SLP (C) Nos.19932-35 of 2003) filed by KPT before the Supreme Court challenging the orders dated

19. The learned counsel for KPT has emphatically submitted that KPT had been coerced to refer the disputes with the respondents under the PMA and its consent to refer disputes was not free consent at all. He submitted that the fact that KPT had preferred a Special Leave Petition against the order of the Gujarat High Court directing the representation of the respondents to CoD is indicative of the fact that KPT was not agreeable to refer the disputes to the PMA. It is KPT's stand that its consent was pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court in ONGC cases and the arbitration agreement was also entered into by KPT pursuant to the order passed by the Supreme Court in the ONGC cases. It was contended that KPT was not in a position to challenge the orders passed by the Supreme Court and thus had no alternative but to accept arbitration under the PMA.

23. Although, the Special Leave Petitions filed by KPT have not been placed on record, it is apparent from this order that KPT had not challenged the arbitration agreement or the PMA before the Supreme Court and, if so, the challenge was not accepted.

24. There is also no material to indicate that the KPT had raised any objection as to the jurisdiction of the PMA before the arbitrator. The arbitration award passed by the Arbitrator also does not indicate that any contention challenging the PMA had been canvassed before him. Thereafter, KPT had availed the remedy of an appeal provided under the arbitration agreement. The Memorandum of Appeal also does not refer to any ground relating to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator.

33. The principle that jurisdiction can neither be vested nor excluded by private agreement, has no application in the present case. Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that is premised on agreement between parties. An arbitrator derives his jurisdiction on the basis of an arbitration agreement. The interference of courts is restricted by virtue of section 5 of the A&C Act and not by private agreement.

34. The learned counsel for KPT further argued that the decision in the case of Ircon (supra) was erroneous and the entire the PMA ought to have been held as null and void and not only the part of the arbitration clause that excludes the applicability of the A&C Act. However, in the supplementary written submissions submitted by KPT, KPT sought to distinguish the said case by contending that in Ircon (supra) the issue involved was with respect to execution of the arbitration award and the role of Courts to execute the awards under Section 36 of the A&C Act. It was contended that in the present case, KPT had not challenged the award under Section 34 of the A&C Act because the same had been excluded under the agreement. It is further submitted that in Ircon (supra) the validity of the PMA and the Office Memorandum dated 22.01.2004 was not challenged. KPT has further sought to distinguish the present case from that of Ircon (supra) by contending that whereas in Ircon (supra) the parties had agreed for their disputes to be resolved through the PMA, in the present case, KPT had been forced to do so. In my view, the aforesaid contentions are also without merit. First of all, it is incorrect to contend that reference to the PMA was not consensual. In the present case, also, KPT had consented to arbitration under the PMA. Secondly, the principal argument of KPT that the PMA is void as it excludes recourse to Courts is erroneous as this Court in Ircon (supra) had found that the part of the clause excluding the applicability of A&C Act was void. The ratio of the said decision would be equally applicable in the present case and exclusion of applicability of A&C Act would be void and this stipulation would not come in the way of the parties to challenge the award in terms of Section 34 of the A&C Act.