Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

Again in the decision of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade , the Supreme Court in paragraph 20 held as follows at pp. 1133 & 1134 of LLJ:
20. It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the management where the workman concerned is found guilty of misconduct. The said area of discretion had been very well defined by the various judgments of this Court referred to hereinabove and it is certainly not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion which can be exercised under Section 11-A is available only on the existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the Court, or the existence of any mitigating circumstances which require the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment. In the absence of any such factor existing, the Labour Court cannot by way of sympathy alone exercise the power under Section 11-A of the Act and reduce the punishment. As noticed hereinabove atleast in two of the cases cited before us i.e. Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu 1960-I-LLJ-518 (SC) (supra) and New Shorrock Mills v. Maheshbhai T. Rao (supra), this Court held: "Punishment of dismissal for using of abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate." In this case all the forums below have held that the language used by the workman was filthy. We too are of the opinion that the language used by the workman is such that it cannot be tolerated by any civilized society. Use of such abusive language against a superior officer, that too not once but twice, in the presence of his subordinates cannot be termed to be an indiscipline calling for lesser punishment in the absence of any extenuating factor referred to hereinabove.

It may also be noticed that in Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu 1960-I-LLJ-518 (SC) and in New Shorrock Mills v. Maheshabhai T. Rao , this Court held that use of abusive language -against a superior, justified punishment of dismissal. This Court stated "punishment of dismissal for using abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate....

As such the jurisdictional limits of the Labour Court as also that of the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on them under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act and Article 226 of the Constitution of India have been well defined by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. What is left for us is only to apply the principles to the facts of the present case.

8. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent-workman would submit that the misconduct alleged against the workman was not grave enough to warrant the punishment of dismissal. He tried to convince us that the words used by the workman against both the customer as well as the Branch Manager, particularly the word in Malayalam used for addressing both of them, namely, "Nee" (translated into English as "you") is only a local slang, which is not considered offensive in that part of the country. We are not at all convinced by that argument. Although, translated into English it may not sound that offensive, the word used by the workman to address both of them as "nee" (Malayalam) is offensive enough not only in Trichur where the incident occurred, but also in any part of Kerala and connotes a disrespectful way of addressing especially against superiors. We are also of opinion that whether it is in Trichur or in any other part of Kerala, no disciplined staff of a bank would and should address his branch manager by using the word 'nee'. The misconduct of the workman is compounded by the context and the facts that the Branch Manager was a lady and the incident was in the presence of other staff as well. The Supreme Court has in the decisions quoted above has categorically held that the punishment of dismissal for using abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate.