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23. This is enough to unsuit the Plaintiff. But if there were any remaining doubts, I believe these to be quite firmly extirpated by the submissions advanced by Mr. Khambata for Sandeep and Mr. Kamdar for Durga and her children. As they point out, Section 4 forbids an action to recover property held benami, as defined in Section 2. Then Section 4(3) makes an exception, and the second of those is in relation to trusteeship. A trustee's holding can never be said to be benami. The result is that unless trusteeship be shown, no suit to enforce a right over property held by a benamidar lies at the instance of a person claiming to be the 'real' owner of that property. Section 7 of the Benami Act repeals Sections 81 and 82 of the Trusts Act, which deal with resulting or implied trusts, and Section 94, which deals with constructive trusts. Consequently, in order to fit within the exception of Section 4(3)(b) of the Benami Act, the 'trust' spoken of must be one that is outside Sections 81, 82 and 94 of the Trusts Act; and this leaves only an express trust within the meaning of Sections 5, 6 and 10 of the Trusts Act. Those provisions demand the formality of an express declaration of trust, its objects and purposes, its property, beneficiaries and, On the Benami Act: Canbank Financial Services v Custodian, AIR 2004 SC 5123; Dr Jagdish Bansal v Shivkumar Pal, MANU/DE/3903/2012; On limitation: Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v Balwant B. Patil, AIR 1995 SC 895; Daya Singh v Gurdev Singh, AIR 2010 SC 3240; Gunvantbhai M. Shah v Anton Elis Farel, AIR 2006 SC 1556 22 of 27 5-S777-14-RAHEJA-F.DOC importantly, an acceptance of trusteeship by the named trustee. None of these requirements are met. There is no pleading of an express trust at all, as indeed there could not have been. The only pleading, and that is clear even from the written submissions, is of an implied trust, i.e., of the 'impress' of a trust. At most, Sabita might have been able to claim the existence of a resulting trust; but even that is now barred. However, Section 4(3)(b) also speaks of a property being held by some other person standing in a 'fiduciary' capacity. This may happen as in Reeta Wahi's case before the Delhi High Court, where there was an actual admission of the property being held in trust, albeit without the necessary formality of a regular deed of settlement of an express trust. It might also arise where the law imports a fiduciary relation. Not every holding in a family is fiduciary, and not every nominee is proprio vigore a fiduciary. It is certainly not insignificant that Sabita's claim extends to equity holdings in companies. At a minimum, if these holdings were 'impressed with trust', they required a statutory declaration under Section 187C of the Companies Act, 1956 or Section 89 of the Companies Act, 2013. The 2013 Act came into force before the present suit was filed. Section 89(8) makes it clear that absent the necessary declaration, no right in relation to that shareholding is enforceable. This would have been entered on the companies' registers of members. There is no such case even made out.