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(iv) 'Hereditary office' means an office the succession to which before the first day of January, 1920, or, in the case of the extended territories, before the 1st day of November, 1956, as the case may be, devolved, according to hereditary right or by nomination by the office-holder for the time being, and 'hereditary office-holder' means the holder of a hereditary office."

25. From these statutory provisions, it is evident that the basic and primary definition provided by the statute is of the "hereditary office". It is thus manifest that the office as such is distinct from its present or earlier incumbent. The definition, therefore, provides for scrutiny into the nature of the office and not the status of the last incumbent thereof. The definition lays down that the succession to the office has to devolve in one of the two ways, that is, by "hereditary right" or by nomination. It is first to be found whether there is an office attached to the institution concerned and secondly, whether the same devolves by a hereditary right or by nomination. The definition of office as reproduced above, provides that the office is one which gives the legal right of management or performance of public worship or rituals or ceremonies in a Gurdwara. It is, therefore, obvious that the office as an institution, and its incumbents as human beings, must be viewed as distinct and separate entities. Office is an incumbency, perpetual and continuing, capable of devolving by succession on human beings who may hold the same for short durations in accordance with the principles or custom of succession of a particular Gurd-wara. It follows, therefore, that the character and nature of the office and the mode by which the last incumbent of the office came to occupy the same, are two relevant considerations in order to find whether a person is a "hereditary officeholder" or not.

26. The contention of Shri K. N. Tewari, the learned counsel for the appellant, that once he is able to show that the appellant had succeeded as the Mahant of the institution prior to November l, 1956, and was occupying that office on that day, he must be held to be a "hereditary office-holder" capable of moving the petition under Section 8 of the Act, lacks merit. As has been discussed above, in order to satisfy the ingredients of Section 8, the office of the institution has to be distinctly looked into and then the question of the incumbent having occupied the same by hereditary right or by nomination, has also to be seen. If the contention of Shri Tewari is accepted, it would mean that any Chela appointed by a person calling himself a Mahant coming into illegal possession of he institution any time prior to November 1, 1956, in the case of extended territories, will be entitled to be called a hereditary office-holder" entitled to pre-ent a petition under Section 8. That learly does not appear to be the inten-ion of the Legislature. The definitions of the words "office" and the "hereditary office" as provided by the Legislature clearly do not visualise any such situation. t would be apparent from the bare examination of the provisions of the Act hat the "hereditary office-holder" of a Gurdwara or an institution, is clothed with very valuable rights with regard hereto. The obvious intention of the Legislature was to give rights to the incumbents of this office which had come to devolve upon the persons by a regular rule of descent or sanctified usage and the rights of such persons were in fact recognised by the statute. NO doubt the statute has not provided any mode by which the office may become hereditary and thus it is incumbent upon the petitioner who claims himself to be a "hereditary office-holder" and whose locus standi is challenged, to prove that there existed a well established rule of descent or a well-recognised mode of succession to the office in question. The definition prescribes two modes, namely, that such an office must be one which devolves from one incumbent to another according to, the hereditary right or by nomination.

"This does not contemplate that the office should have devolved on the applicant himself according to hereditary right or by nomination, as aforesaid, but what it means is that the office should have devolved on the person who was holding it on the first day of January, 1920 (whether he be the applicant himself or his ancestor or Guru) by hereditary right or by nomination."

29. The reading of the whole judgment would show that the above passage is really sought to be read by Mr. Tewari out of its context. These observations in fact were made to repel an argument that the person presenting the petition must be one upon whom the hereditary office had devolved on the prescribed date, i.e., January 1, 1920. This authority is no warrant for the proposition that it is sufficient for the incumbent to show merely that on the prescribed date he was holding the office by hereditary right irrespective of the earlier modes of descent. This would be apparent from the subsequent part of the paragraph above quoted, which is in the following terms:

"The wording of clause (iv) Section 2 (4) is plain and explicit and cannot possibly bear the interpretation sought to be put on it by the respondent. The allegation on behalf of the plaintiff is that his ancestors held the office of a Manager and a lamberdar of Sri Akal Takhat from the time of the Mughal Emperors, that succession has all along devolved in the male line from father to son and that, on the 1st day of January, 1920, his father Sunder Singh was the holder of this office. If he succeeds in proving these allegations, there can be no doubt whatever that Sundar Singh was an here ditary office-holder as defined in the act."